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Glossary  222i
A GLOBAL PRIORITY 
National Infrastructure (NI) provides the foundation for economic productivity and human 
wellbeing, and is the cornerstone of modern industrialised society. It shapes many of the 
interactions between human civilisation and the natural environment. However, in the UK 
and other advanced economies, NI faces serious challenges of:
•  Growing demand for infrastructure services from a modern economy and growing 
and ageing population;
•  Significant investment requirements so that an ageing infrastructure system can 
meet this demand and provide reliable, cost-effective and high quality services;
•  Increasing complexity and interdependence of infrastructure networks.
A growing stock of infrastructure helps to promote economic growth by increasing 
productivity, participation in the economy and aggregate demand. Infrastructure 
investment is also necessary to reduce the likelihood and consequences of system failure 
and to ensure a healthy environment and a stable climate. 
The lead-time and long lifetime of major infrastructure means that a long term view is 
essential. Yet a long term strategic approach is challenged by the associated uncertainties, 
be they technical, environmental, political or financial. Interdependence between 
infrastructure sectors add to the complexity and uncertainty in the strategic planning of NI. 
In the 2011 National Infrastructure Plan (NIP),1 the UK government has identified a strategy 
for meeting infrastructure needs. Metrics for monitoring UK infrastructure performance 
and strategic priorities for the future are set out in the NIP. The NIP underlines the 
importance of taking a long term and cross-sectoral view of infrastructure provision. 
1  HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK (2011). National Infrastructure Plan 2011. London, UK: HM 
Treasury.
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STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE UK INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSITIONS RESEARCH 
CONSORTIUM 
The UK Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium (ITRC) has been funded by the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) to develop and demonstrate 
a new generation of system simulation models and tools to inform analysis, planning and 
design of NI. The research programme deals with energy, transport, water, waste and ICT 
systems at a national scale, developing new methods for analysing their performance, risks 
and interdependencies. ITRC will provide a virtual environment in which to test strategies 
for long term investment in NI and understand how alternative strategies perform 
with respect to policy constraints such as reliability and security of supply, cost, carbon 
emissions, and adaptability to demographic and climate change.
The 5 year ITRC research programme started in January 2011. In its first year, the ITRC 
has begun the development of a new generation of simulation models for national 
infrastructure assessment that will be ready for piloting in 2013. In parallel, the ITRC has 
undertaken a Fast Track Analysis (FTA) in order to: 
1.  Ensure that the ITRC research programme is building upon existing knowledge.
2.  Review and refine the scope of the ITRC research.
3.  Pilot and communicate new analysis concepts. 
4.  Strengthen the relationship between the research team and the consortium’s 
partners in government and industry. 
This report describes the method and results from the FTA. It includes:
1.  A review of the energy, transport, water, waste and ICT sectors, including governance 
arrangements and future opportunities and threats. 
2.  Development of a scenario framework for long term analysis of NI, and associated 
uncertainties.
3.  Development and analysis of alternative long term strategies for infrastructure 
provision.
4.  Synthesis of insights that will be used to focus the remainder of the ITRC programme. iii
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THE CURRENT STATE OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
FUTURE CHALLENGES
Review of literature and consultation with industry has identified current trends and issues 
in the NI sectors.
ENERGY SECTOR
Reliability of the energy sector is high. Major investments are anticipated in electricity 
generation and distribution in order to maintain and increase capacity, meet the UK’s 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction commitments and address EU directives. 
All other infrastructure sectors are dependent upon the energy sector, but of these only 
transport represents a significant proportion of energy demand (34%). Yet the energy 
sector is also dependent upon ICT and transport infrastructure and is responsible for 32% 
of fresh water abstraction, though the majority of that cooling water is eventually returned 
to rivers. 
TRANSPORT SECTOR
Demand for transport infrastructure has grown steadily over the years for a variety of 
reasons, including population growth, economic growth combined with relatively low 
costs making travel affordable for most people, and societal changes such as increasing 
numbers of female drivers. Growth seems likely to continue, although demand for personal 
car transport may reach a saturation point. Continued growth in demand will result in 
increased congestion and delays, particularly on roads and rail, which will in turn tend to 
inhibit further growth. Building new transport infrastructure will alleviate congestion and 
delays in the short term but also induce further demand. Increasing transport costs will act 
to inhibit demand, which could have an adverse impact on the economy unless transport 
growth can be decoupled from economic development. Ambitious carbon reduction 
targets will drive development in vehicle and fuel technologies and result in increased use 
of electric vehicles on roads, increased rail electrification and lower use of carbon fuels. 
This will require substantial investment in energy infrastructure, particularly for electricity. 
Providing new energy infrastructure will impose further requirements on the transport 
system, for example, a change in the combination of imported fuels may have alternative 
shipping and storage requirements which will affect ports infrastructure. 
WATER SUPPLY SECTOR
The water industry supports a diverse range of uses for water, all of which possess 
stringent levels of service with respect to both water quantity and water quality, dictated 
by a complex legislative and regulatory framework. As well as significant geographical 
and seasonal variability, pressures including increasing consumptive demand, an ageing 
and deteriorating infrastructure, affordability, and a potentially critical redistribution 
of resource under future climates, providing a potent set of challenges for the water 
supply sector in the 21st century. It is unlikely that even major change in the behaviour 
of consumers will be sufficient to alleviate such pressures without additional investment 
in infrastructure. Thus, a broad programme of measures combining management of 
consumptive demand across all users of the water environment alongside strategic 
provision of new supplies is necessary.iv
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WASTEWATER SECTOR
Wastewater treatment accounts for the majority of the total asset value of the water 
industry, with capital expenditure on sewerage services programmed to exceed £12 billion 
between 2010 and 2015 in England and Wales alone. There has been extensive investment 
in wastewater treatment in order to improve water quality standards in rivers and coastal 
waters, though improved treatment standards imply escalating energy costs. Energy use 
in wastewater treatment now averages roughly 300 MW. Options that would reduce or 
eliminate energy use in wastewater treatment are needed to ensure the future affordability 
of service. Projected changes in rainfall patterns due to climate change and major and 
minor flooding pose a risk to the existing drainage infrastructure.
SOLID WASTE SECTOR
The solid waste sector deals with approximately 300 million tonnes of waste annually 
in the UK. In the last decade, the sector has transformed rapidly, responding to EU and 
national legislation. This has increased the amount of waste recycled, composted or reused 
and nearly halved waste going to landfill. Historically, economic growth and household 
waste generation were coupled, but there is some evidence that this may no longer be 
true. National and EU directives (e.g. possible banning of all biodegradable municipal 
waste to landfill in the next decade) for reducing solid waste will affect the levels of 
investment needed in the near term. There is the possibility of a complete paradigm shift 
towards solid waste becoming a resource recovery industry.
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (ICT)
In comparison to the physical infrastructure sectors already discussed, ICT is a new and 
rapidly changing sector, but it is less clearly defined and understood. ICT infrastructure 
is considered to comprise of communication (including fixed and mobile telephony, 
broadband, television and navigation systems) and computation systems (including 
data and processing hubs). Significant increases in ICT capacity have been provided via 
a competitive industry, which has innovated to provide new technologies and respond 
to consumer demand (which is itself largely driven by innovations in consumer and 
enterprise technologies). Further rapid increases in coverage, in particular in superfast 
broadband, are anticipated, though there are some locations where the market alone 
cannot deliver. The current way that the electro-magnetic spectrum is used may also 
become a constraint: solutions include reallocation of the spectrum use and technological 
innovation. ICT has a critical role in infrastructure interdependence and failure. 
INFRASTRUCTURE GOVERNANCE
Alongside these sector-specific issues, the shift towards liberalisation, private provision 
and competition in infrastructure sectors has led to a more complex governance landscape 
in which utility providers must negotiate with a range of other actors to effect change. 
Additionally, current governance arrangements continue to operate in isolated sector-
specific silos, paying limited attention to cross-sectoral synergies and interdependencies.v
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THE ITRC FAST TRACK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
National Infrastructure systems have to cope with the implications of long term changes 
in population, the economy, society and the environment. The nature of these changes is 
hard to predict in the long term, so the ITRC is adopting an approach in which plausible 
ranges of these future changes are analysed. A simplified version of this methodology has 
been developed for the FTA, in which three primary scenario dimensions that are common 
to all infrastructure sectors have been analysed: demographic change, energy prices and 
economic growth. 
Whilst the ITRC modelling tools that are now under development will enable the analysis 
of many combinations of these and other scenario dimensions, in the FTA the analysis has 
been restricted to only three combinations, representing low, medium, and high growth 
scenarios.
Sector-specific issues can be as influential as these cross-cutting scenario dimensions, and 
include for: 
•  Energy: GHG emissions targets.
•  Water supply and wastewater: the effects from climate change on water availability 
and quality; the requirements of the Water Framework Directive.
•  Solid waste: EU directives and national standards.
A multitude of possible means of providing NI are conceivable in the context of these 
scenarios, including supply and demand-side measures. The ITRC is seeking to explore how 
integrated cross-sectoral approaches may yield new insights and benefits. As a first step, in 
the FTA three distinct and cross-sectoral transition strategies have been identified.
•  The Capacity-Intensive (CI) strategy represents high investment in new capacity to 
keep up with demand and maintain good security of supply in all sectors. 
•  The Capacity-Constrained (CC) strategy represents low investment, in which there 
are no increases in the current level of infrastructure investment, but an emphasis is 
placed upon demand management measures. 
•  The Decentralised (DC) strategy represents a reorientation of infrastructure provision 
from centralised grid-based networks to more distributed systems. This will involve a 
combination of supply and demand-side measures.
The three transition strategies are analysed against the demand for infrastructure services 
associated with each of the three FTA scenarios in order to provide insights into future 
infrastructure performance in a range of possible conditions. vi
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RESULTS FROM THE FAST TRACK ANALYSIS
Results are reported by NI sector, followed by a cross-cutting synthesis.
ENERGY SECTOR
The analysis of transition strategies for the energy sector using the MARKAL model 
demonstrates that, under the FTA medium growth scenario, carbon emissions reductions 
of 80% across the economy can be delivered by all of the infrastructure transition 
strategies. All strategies can deliver continued electricity supply security, provided the 
required investment levels can be met. 
In all FTA scenarios, the CC strategy has the lowest cost due to an emphasis upon demand 
reduction. The DC strategy scenario has the highest cost due to use of less cost-effective 
technologies. The DC strategy offers benefits in terms of increased supply diversity, 
although the Shannon–Wiener index does not account for the security benefit provided by 
over-capacity in the CI transition strategy.
Under the high growth scenario, carbon targets would inevitably be more challenging, and 
higher absolute levels of investment are required to ensure security, but this investment 
is a lower proportion of GDP. Conversely, under low growth carbon targets are less 
challenging but investment requirements form a higher proportion of GDP. 
TRANSPORT SECTOR
Low, medium and high growth scenarios for transport demand have been developed, 
using an elasticity model to relate transport demand growth to growth in population, 
fuel prices and GDP, with any added taxes or charges also being considered (e.g. national 
congestion charge). Demand suppression due to congestion was modelled using feedback 
relationships between demand and resulting journey times. The low growth FTA scenario 
is more consistent with historical trends in transport demand. The transition strategies 
that were analysed in the FTA involve differing levels of capital investment in roads and 
rail, including investment in the HS2 high speed rail link. Transport infrastructure would be 
particularly stressed under the high growth scenario. 
Vehicle emissions standards and differing rates of uptake of electric vehicles were also 
analysed. Future electrification of road transport sector would reduce emissions at the 
point of use, but could result in more congestion due to energy price effects (moving from 
highly taxed petrol to untaxed electricity).
The CI strategy (high investment and fast uptake of electric vehicles) would result in higher 
growth in demand (e.g. 23% more car/van km in 2050 compared to the reference case). 
Whilst contributing to congestion, this demand growth is compensated by improved fuel 
efficiency (approximately 70%), thus it results in the largest reduction in CO2 emissions 
(19% fewer emissions from cars and vans, and 25% fewer emissions from HGVs in 2050 
compared to reference case). 
The CC strategy (low investment, low uptake of electric vehicle, introduction of a national 
congestion charging scheme) would result in the lowest growth of demand, with an 
estimated reduction of car/van km by 3%, and with reduced CO2 emissions of 7.3% for car/
vans and 2.4% for HGVs in 2050 compared with the reference case. vii
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WATER SUPPLY SECTOR
Contrasting levels of water demand and supply-side measures were tested in the CI and 
CC strategies using data on public water supply in England, Scotland and Wales. Whilst 
security of supply is currently good, population growth and climate change represent a 
threat to the industry over the coming decades, unless per capita demand is reduced and 
or capacity is increased. This needs to take into account the large regional variations across 
Great Britain. The CI transition strategy implies high investment in supply infrastructure 
(including reservoirs, transfers and desalination) as well as in capital programmes of 
leakage reduction. These measures contribute to security of supply in terms of both 
capacity and flexibility of use of resources. In high climate change and population 
growth scenarios, the strategy sees rapidly increasing capital and energy costs. The 
strategy is threatened by the possibility of climate change reducing water availability, 
the requirements for restoring aquatic environments and the energy implications of 
desalination and inter-basin transfers. 
The DC strategy implies more local self-sufficiency, which is vulnerable to supply and 
demand side uncertainties. The CC strategy emphasises vigorous price and regulatory 
measures to reduce demand to an average of 110 litres/person/day by 2050, which have 
the added benefit of reducing energy use, in the water sector and by water consumers. 
At the same time margins between supply and demand are eroded, with implications for 
security of supply. 
WASTEWATER SECTOR
For wastewater treatment, demand is determined by population. However, population 
density and the treatment technologies implemented determine the unit cost of 
treatment. As with water supply, economies of scale favour centralised strategies and 
increasing population density further reduces costs. In the CC strategy, for which we 
assume incremental changes to current infrastructure, energy costs increase rapidly. 
The performance of the CI transition strategy is characterised by replacement of existing 
energy-intensive treatment capacity with new treatment capacity using new energy 
recovery technologies. These technologies allow wastewater treatment to become an 
energy-neutral or energy-generating process. However, these new treatment technologies 
still require research and development. The cost and long design life of the existing 
sewerage infrastructure means that radical transitions would be very costly. This will mean 
managing the existing assets actively and intelligently, perhaps accelerating the adoption 
of the active monitoring and control of sewerage systems and developing strategies to 
incrementally replace or renew the network.
SOLID WASTE SECTOR
For solid waste, in most scenarios, EU and local government imposed targets will require 
new capacity for some treatments (e.g. composting and recycling) but this could be 
achieved at the investment levels envisaged in any of the transition strategies. However, in 
high growth FTA scenario it will be challenging to meet recycling targets and the implied 
requirement for new treatment sites may also be problematic. viii
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INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (ICT)
ICT capacity has continued to rapidly expand keeping well ahead of demand thanks to 
on-going innovation in a competitive market. It is anticipated that this arrangement will 
continue, so the sector has not been subject to the same quantified analysis as other 
sectors. In 2010, ICT consumed an estimated 13–16% of the total electricity in the UK. 
Projections indicate that global electricity usage in ICT will grow by approximately 9% 
per year, a trend that may continue up to 2020. However, since 2000 there has been a 
continuing decrease in growth for home computing and other electronic consumer goods 
in the UK, and new products have greater energy efficiencies, which may serve to depress 
future growth of energy use in ICT. Beyond 2020, technological changes make electricity 
demand from ICT very difficult to project. 
CROSS-SECTORAL SYNTHESIS
Each NI sector requires a somewhat different set of metrics to evaluate its performance, 
which are presented in the main text of the FTA report. Performance has been reported 
with respect to three metrics that apply across all sectors: (1) cost, (2) CO2 emissions and 
(3) security of supply. This enables the cross-sectoral evaluation of the transition strategies 
and evaluation of key questions of interest to stakeholders.
What are the implications of growing demand for infrastructure services? 
High growth in demand for infrastructure services is associated with increasing needs and 
costs for infrastructure provision, in particular given the CI and DC transition strategies, 
but high growth in demand is associated with scenarios in which more resources would be 
available for infrastructure investment. However, high growth in demand is also associated 
with higher GHG emissions, unless the CI transition strategy is adopted, in which case 
innovation and investment enables a successful transition to infrastructure systems that 
are all effectively decarbonised. Higher transport demand is associated with increased 
transport congestion even given a CI approach to transport infrastructure provision, as, 
without demand management measures, demand continues to expand to fill the available 
capacity. 
What are the implications of constrained investment in UK infrastructure capacity?
Evaluating the performance of the CC strategy provides insight into the implications of 
constraints on investment levels for NI. For example, in the water sector the CC strategy 
requires vigorous price and regulatory measures over many years, in order to achieve 
the per capita water demand target of 110 litres per day. Security of supply is eroded, 
especially in high growth scenarios. The CC strategy is the least cost approach, as costly 
supply-side measures are avoided through demand management. However, whilst 
demand reduction can under some circumstances result in efficiency improvements 
without deterioration in the quality of the infrastructure service (for example, improved 
building insulation reduces energy requirements for space heating), in other sectors, 
notably transport, stringent demand reduction will have implications for the economy and 
society. ix
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What are the implications of a carbon-constrained future? 
As a consequence of the Climate Change Act (2008) the UK is committed to a reduction 
in GHG emissions of at least 80% (relative to 1990 levels) by 2050. Increasing global 
demand for fossil fuels at a time of reducing global oil reserves reinforces the case for 
reducing dependence upon fossil carbon. The UK’s GHG mitigation commitments imply 
a major restructuring of the UK’s energy supply infrastructure and ripple through other 
NI sectors, which are all dependent upon energy. Changes within these sectors in turn 
influence the energy sector, in particular in the case of a transition to electric vehicles. For 
both wastewater and solid waste, there is the potential for the energy demand from these 
sectors to be met through conversion of the waste streams to energy. 
What are the implications of a decentralised National Infrastructure system? 
The FTA revealed that reorientation towards a decentralised arrangement of infrastructure 
(both in terms of technology and governance) could result in NI performance increases. 
The energy sector analysis, for example, revealed that the decentralisation transition 
strategy resulted in the greatest diversification of energy supply options. Decentralisation 
also has the potential to capitalise upon interdependencies (e.g. via local waste to energy 
conversion or combined heat and power plants) and provide new supply options (e.g. 
rainwater harvesting in the built environment). However, the evaluation of the cross-
sectoral performance of the DC transition strategy indicated that there are significant 
front-loaded capital investment requirements to transition towards a decentralised 
arrangement, particularly in the high and medium growth scenarios.
What are the implications of interdependence between infrastructure sectors? 
Demand for different infrastructure sectors is highly correlated, both due to the final 
demand associated with population and economic growth and because of intermediated 
demands between infrastructure sectors. The FTA has revealed the importance of cross-
sectoral interdependence, in particular via energy demand from all sectors. Potential 
changes in demand (e.g. from electric vehicles and as a consequence of ICT) need to be 
accommodated in the energy sector. Changes in other sectors, for example, in transport 
congestion or water availability will also have cross-sectoral impacts. The FTA has not 
revealed new opportunities that could be accessed by taking interdependence into 
account, though these may exist at the scale of individual facilities or infrastructure 
corridors. However, understanding interdependence is essential to recognise new cross-
sectoral demands that otherwise might not be accommodated and to minimise the risks of 
infrastructure failure. 
NEXT STEPS FOR THE ITRC
The Fast Track Analysis has demonstrated the feasibility and utility of long term cross-
sectoral analysis of infrastructure demand and capacity. Cross-sectoral analysis has 
demonstrated how different sectors are shaped by many of the same drivers, especially 
those that influence demand (demography, economy) and energy prices. Where new 
investment is required, different sectors may be competing for the same pools of public 
and/or private finance. 
A cross-sectoral approach provides the opportunity to define a common direction of 
travel and to understand the contribution that separate policies or plans make to overall 
performance. Yet analysis of governance arrangements has underlined how current 
regulatory frameworks are not well adapted to this ‘system of systems’ perspective. x
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Undertaking the FTA based on currently existing datasets and models has not been 
straightforward as there is no tradition in the UK or internationally of taking a ‘system of 
systems’ approach to analysis of NI. The FTA analysis of each sector is therefore to some 
extent shaped by the assumptions and constraints of existing approaches within that 
sector, as set out in the FTA report and annexes.
Going forward, the ITRC is adopting three methodological perspectives in its development 
of tools for analysis of NI provision. The development of models and tools is taking place in 
the first three ITRC Work Streams and are explained below. 
Work Stream 1 (WS1) is developing a system of quantified capacity/demand assessment 
modules (CDAM) for analysis of long term strategies for infrastructure provision. In that 
sense it will resemble the FTA but will be based upon more quantified and more fully 
integrated models including: 
•  A micro-simulation model for generation of high resolution demographic and 
demand scenarios.
•  A regional economic model that will generate regional multi-sectoral projections of 
industrial demand for infrastructure services.
•  A model of the UK electricity and gas networks and a new disaggregated energy 
demand module.
•  A national strategic model of trunk road, rail, port and airport infrastructure.
•  A national water resources system model, coupled with a model of wastewater 
treatment systems.
•  A national solid waste assessment model. 
ICT will be excluded from the WS1 analysis, as the FTA has illustrated that new capacity has 
being provided historically and this can be expected to continue for the foreseeable future. 
Further the demand is very sensitive to unforeseen technological developments which 
makes future analysis difficult.
These models will be coupled in an overall simulation framework in which the main 
scenario uncertainties are extensively sampled, expanding upon the small number of 
scenarios analysed in the FTA. A set of infrastructure investment options will be developed 
for each sector and assembled flexibly into cross-sectoral packages, representing a 
major extension of the three transition strategies analysed in the FTA. New tools will be 
developed to explore and visualise the results of the analysis.
The interaction between this overall modelling system and the NI database being 
developed in Work Stream 4 (WS4) is illustrated in Chapter 5. The WS4 database, which is 
built using an open source spatial database architecture, already contains more than 300 
different layers of infrastructure and demand data and is rapidly expanding. 
Development of this new generation of models is due to be completed in March 
2013. They will be used to conduct a much more complete and quantified analysis of 
infrastructure transition strategies than has been feasible in the FTA. That second cycle of 
national infrastructure assessment is due to be delivered at the end of 2013.xi
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The FTA has not examined in any depth the risks of infrastructure failure and the ways in 
which interdependence between infrastructures may exacerbate those risks. This topic 
is the focus of ITRC Work Stream 2 (WS2). Given the severe long term threats posed by 
climate change, WS2 has begun by focussing upon climate-related hazards, though scope 
to extend to other natural hazards and man-made hazards will be explored later in the 
research programme.
Spatially coherent probabilistic scenarios of extreme climate related hazards and their 
associated uncertainties are being developed. Working with our industrial partners 
and building upon previous studies, WS2 will characterise the vulnerability and 
interdependence of energy, transport, water, waste and ICT systems. Central to WS2 will 
be the development and testing of network models for analysis of interdependent NI 
failure and risk. Quantification of the direct consequences of infrastructure failure will 
use the economic and demographic scenarios developed in WS1. The indirect economic 
consequences of failure and recovery will be analysed at regional and national scales using 
an input–output modelling approach. Results will be presented as a range of metrics of 
vulnerability and risk. 
Scoping of Work Stream 3 (WS3) is now under way, exploring a variety of complex 
systems approaches to simulate and interpret the long term interactions between 
infrastructure, society and the economy. The research in WS3 will start with exploratory 
simulations of synthetic examples and work up to more realistic models. Complex systems 
methodologies under examination include land use and transport spatial interaction 
models, dynamic network models and a variety of methods in evolutional economics. The 
most promising approaches will be tested in order to identify patterns of emergence and 
to understand how in the real world these new insights may be used to steer NI systems 
towards sustainable outcomes. 
The Fast Track Analysis has helped the ITRC to frame its research programme for the 
coming 4 years. It has identified priorities for more detailed analysis and has helped to 
refine understanding of those factors that need to be incorporated in development of the 
new generation of NI models that is now under way within the ITRC. 1
1  Towards integrated assessment of  
  National Infrastructure
This chapter provides an overview of the challenges facing National 
Infrastructure in the UK,2 and explains the contribution that the UK 
Infrastructure Transition Research Consortium is making to address these 
challenges. 
1.1 CHALLENGES FACING NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROVISION IN THE UK 
National Infrastructure (NI) provides the foundation for economic productivity and 
human wellbeing, and is the cornerstone of modern industrialised society. It provides 
the energy and water resources that society needs in order to function, and enables 
people, information, and goods to move efficiently and safely. NI shapes many of the 
interactions between human civilisation and the natural environment. Whilst infrastructure 
is mankind’s most visible impact upon the environment, modern sustainable infrastructure 
is also essential to minimising human impacts, for example on the water resources system 
and the climate. 
NI includes the five economic infrastructure sectors: (1) energy, (2) transport, (3) water, (4) 
waste, and (5) information and communication technology (ICT). They contribute directly 
to economic growth, a high quality of life, and a high living standard. However, in both 
the UK and other advanced economies, NI is facing serious challenges. These challenges 
threaten its ability to continue to provide their essential services that support nearly all 
aspects of daily life. 
1.1.1 CHANGING DEMAND FOR INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES FROM 
AN AGEING NI SYSTEM
Growing demand for an infrastructure that is ever-ageing, challenges its ability to 
provide a sustained service.
2  The focus of ITRC work is for Great Britain, however this Fast-track analysis uses data from both GB 
and UK; these distinctions are made in the text.2
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Infrastructure in Great Britain is ageing, with a considerable amount of existing 
infrastructure stock built in the 19th century (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010a): 
this can cause supply insecurities. Consider for example the 31,000 km of water mains in 
London, where nearly half (44%) are over 100 years old. Thames Water has replaced over 
2000 km of these mains since 2003, at a cost thus far of £650 million, reducing leakage by 
27% (Thames Water, 2011). 
While infrastructure is ageing, it must also meet demand from a growing and ageing 
population with changing expectations and preferences, alongside the demands of a 
modern economy. In the case of ICT, households with access to the internet increased 
16% over the last 4 years (ONS, 2011), while the absolute number of adults accessing the 
internet every day nearly doubled from 2006 to 2010 (ONS, 2010b). In the case of transport, 
the last 15 years has seen growing demand across all modes of travel for long distance trips 
(i.e. over 160 km). This growth is expected to continue, with the Department for Transport 
(DfT) forecasting that between 2008 and 2043, there will be an increase of 36% in the total 
number of long distance road, rail, and air trips per person (DfT, 2011b). 
NI is one of the main determinants of environmental quality. As well as delivering Britain’s 
energy supply, NI is also a major contributor to overall emissions, since it consumes well 
over half of that energy. Investment in water treatment infrastructure has been responsible 
for improvements in water quality in rivers and coastal areas, and further investment 
will be required in order to meet the Britain’s obligations under the EU Water Framework 
Directive. Changes in the solid waste infrastructure sector are reducing the quantity of 
waste going to landfill. Higher standards for vehicle and industrial emissions are improving 
local air quality. It is expected that society will continue to demand environmental 
improvements with important implications for NI: providing Britain’s capacity to meets its 
carbon emissions targets is a key issue.
1.1.2 INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS
Infrastructure interdependencies introduce layers of complexity, uncertainty, and risk 
to NI planning and design.
Over the last 50 years, infrastructure in the UK shifted from unconnected structures 
to interconnected networks (CST, 2009). This shift has important implications for the 
resilience of infrastructure sectors. For example, a recent power failure at a major 
exchange in Birmingham resulted in the temporary loss of broadband service for 
hundreds of thousands of customers across the UK, particularly affecting business 
customers (BBC, 2011a). Even small, temporary failures can have significant effects on 
economic productivity. In the long term, these risks intensify as systems become larger 
and increasingly interdependent. The combined effect of ageing infrastructure, growing 
demand (nearing capacity limits) from social and economic pressures, interconnectivity, 
and complexity leads to systematic weakening of the resilience of infrastructure systems 
(CST, 2009). Climate related extremes have caused major service interruptions in recent 
years (e.g. due to floods and snow). Climate change is increasing the risk of extreme events 
(IPCC, 2012).
The changing patterns of demand mentioned in Section 1.1.1 influence different 
infrastructure sectors in rather similar ways, providing a further source of interdependence 
in the long term. For example, if it is possible to reduce domestic demand for water this 
will have implications not only for water supply, but also for energy (as 18% of household 
energy is used for heating water (DECC, 2011c)) and wastewater treatment. Moreover, in 
some instances one infrastructure sector is a major component of demand for another 
sector: the transport sector represents 34% of energy demand in the UK, whilst electricity 
generation is responsible for 32% of all non-tidal water abstractions (Defra, 2009a). 4
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1.1.3 SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT NEEDS
Significant investments are needed to renew infrastructure, to meet growing demand, 
to meet the UK’s emissions reduction commitments, to ensure secure supplies and to 
maintain a competitive economy.
Significant levels of investment are needed to address the challenges of the ageing 
infrastructure, growing demand, and climate change. Over the next 5 years, there are 
£250 billion of planned investments in infrastructure (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 
2011). Whilst historically the UK has a strong record of investment in infrastructure, the 
past several decades have seen uncoordinated, incremental, and inefficient investments 
(HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010a). Indeed, in the last 30 years the investment in 
infrastructure as a percentage of GDP has reduced significantly (Figure 1).
Further, maintaining and strengthening NI standards designed to protect and improve 
environmental quality implies an on-going programme of investment. The energy sector 
alone for example requires an investment of approximately £200 billion between now 
and 2020 (BIS, 2011c). The Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) puts in place further 
measures to reduce acidification, ground level ozone and particles throughout Europe 
by controlling emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) and dust 
(particulate matter (PM)) from large combustion plants (LCPs) in power stations, petroleum 
refineries and other facilities with a thermal input of 50 MW or more. 
Figure 1: Public Investment 
in the UK in per cent of GDP, 
updated by the authors (Blanc-
Brude et al., 2007).
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1.1.4 ATTRACTING INVESTMENT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE IN A 
COMPETITIVE GLOBAL MARKET
There is a significant need for private investment into infrastructure in the UK. The National 
Infrastructure Plan (NIP) 2011 states that nearly two thirds of expected investment 
between 2011 and 2015 is expected to be privately funded (Figure 2). In order to attract 
these investments in an increasingly competitive global environment, it is essential to have 
a coherent long term national plan for infrastructure and a stable policy and regulatory 
framework.5
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However, there are particular challenges with this long term approach, for example, 
risk-conscious investors could be discouraged from investing in infrastructure associated 
with a low-carbon economy (i.e. green infrastructure), since the economic viability of such 
investments relies heavily on long term policies. Further, investments in technologies such 
as offshore wind are considered higher risk as these infrastructure assets lack a credible 
investment performance track record in this country, and have high transaction costs 
as a result of expensive processes (e.g. feasibility assessments, mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As), and due diligences). This can further serve to discourage investors. 
Figure 2. Source of funding 
for infrastructure investments 
Source: HM Treasury estimates, 
based on investment to 2015 
and beyond. (HM Treasury and 
Infrastructure UK, 2011).
All sectors
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1.2 INVESTMENT FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
Investments for a reliable and resilient NI facilitate economic competiveness, provide a 
competitive advantage, and positively impact growth. In many ways, infrastructure defines 
the boundaries of national economic productivity. It is an often-cited key ingredient for a 
nation’s economic competiveness (Urban Land Institute and Ernst and Young, 2011). The 
World Economic Forum (WEF) for example lists infrastructure as the second ‘pillar’3 in its 
Global Competitiveness Index, a measure of national competitiveness (WEF, 2011a).
Investments in increasing the resilience of infrastructure against the impacts of climate 
variability and change can serve as a competitive international advantage. Public 
investments in infrastructure generally have positive impact on economic growth, and 
there is a strong positive relationship between the growth rates of public capital and GDP 
(Figure 3, overleaf). 
3  WEF uses 12 ‘pillars of competitiveness’ in the Global Competiveness Index. These include: (1) 
institutions, (2) infrastructure, (3) macroeconomic environment, (4) health and primary education, 
(5) higher education and training, (6) goods market efficiency, (7) labour market efficiency, 
(8) financial market development, (9) technological readiness, (10) market size, (11) business 
sophistication, and (12) innovation.6
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It has been extensively argued that the poor state of the UK’s infrastructure is the main 
reason that could discourage foreign investment within the UK (Helm, 2009). Helm 
observed a link between the state of the UK’s infrastructure and economy. Eddington 
(2006) (and Helm) asserted that public investments in rail and road transportation have 
major productivity impacts. Crafts (2009) further supports Eddington and Helm in showing 
the link between productivity benefits and investing in infrastructure. Although the 
WEF’s recent ranking of the UK’s infrastructure would suggest that it is in a comparatively 
good state, the WEF’s measurement of infrastructure quality is subjective and seems to 
be subject to volatility that is out of proportion with feasible year-on-year changes in 
infrastructure provision: the UK’s ranking changed from 20th in the 2009–2010 report to 
6th (out of 142) in the 2011–2012 report on global competiveness.
Economic benefits of infrastructure provision
There has been extensive work showing the relationship between public investment 
in infrastructure and economic growth, particularly by US scholars such as Aschauer 
(1989), Munnell (1992), Gramlich (1994), and Lau and Sin (1997). Aschauer focused on 
the output elasticity of public spending on capital projects such as streets, public sector 
buildings and utility infrastructure. He concluded that that the change in private sector 
output for a unit of public sector investment ranges from 0.38 to 0.56 (Aschauer, 1989). 
Aschauer’s claims of such a high elasticity of output were contested by other scholars such 
as Munnell and Gramlich. Munnell accepted that the impact of infrastructure investment 
on economic growth is statistically significant (her estimate of the elasticity of output was 
0.30). However, she warned against the bias which may occur due to reverse causality 
when economic growth may cause or encourage investment in infrastructure. Thus, 
Munnell argued that cumulated results of economic growth and output cannot be used 
to guide government spending as these results do not account the effects of reverse 
causalities. She emphasised cost benefit analysis of specific projects may be undertaken 
in order to ensure intelligent decision making in public investments in infrastructure 
(Munnell, 1992). Gramlich further supports Munnell’s argument by suggesting the need 
to invest in optimal stock of infrastructure instead of increasing the expenditure based on 
these aggregate economic growth results alone. Gramlich rests his argument on the bias 
which occurs due to the narrow definition of public investment in infrastructure (often 
implied as infrastructure stock). Although the relationship between ‘economic growth’ 
and ‘investment in infrastructure’ is statistically significant as claimed by Aschauer, there 
needs to be clarity when defining such investment; Gramlich argues that more evidence 
is needed to understand what type of investment in infrastructure is responsible for 
Figure 3: Relationship between 
growth and capital stock 
increase. Modified, as produced 
in Arslanalp et al. (2011). 
Sources: Heston, Summers, and 
Aten (2006); Kamps (2006); and 
authors’ calculations. Note: The 
data are for 48 advanced and 
developing countries between 
1960 and 2001 (Arslanalp et al., 
2011).
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this growth, since investments in R&D, infrastructure capital, human capital, etc. may be 
responsible for actual growth but may be neglected in some definitions of investment 
(Gramlich, 1994). These biases due to narrow definitions and reverse causalities were 
rectified within the econometric analysis by Lau and Shin who came out with lower 
margins where elasticity of output of public spending in infrastructure were calculated as 
0.11 (Lau and Sin, 1997). Although all works have highlighted the significant relationship 
between public infrastructure investment and economic growth, some scholars such 
as Gramlich and Munnell warn that public spending decisions should be wary of these 
blanket results and decisions should be made on a case by case basis.
A typical approach to identifying the contribution of various factors to economic growth, 
is to estimate a production function that seeks to explain economic growth in terms of 
the relative contributions of labour, capital etc. Égert, Kozluk and Sutherland (2009) argue 
this approach by including infrastructure as a separate growth factor in their analysis of 
OECD countries. They thus seek to identify the contribution of infrastructure investment to 
economic growth relative to ‘conventional’ investment. This framework is not only able to 
comment on whether infrastructure investment contributes to economic growth, but also 
how the contribution of infrastructure investment compares to other forms of investment 
(i.e. whether there might be evidence of over-or under-investment in infrastructure in 
some countries). In this context, over-investment suggests that a country is utilising its 
infrastructure inefficiently and resources may in fact be better spent on other forms of 
capital that yield greater returns in terms of economic growth and vice versa.
The ITRC has begun to apply the approach in Égert, Kozluk and Sutherland (2009), which 
used OECD data, to European data from Eurostat, using similar indicators of physical 
infrastructure. Early findings corroborate the OECD results for road and rail: investment 
in these infrastructure types yields higher economic growth than investment in other 
non-infrastructure assets. The magnitudes for road and rail are similar to the OECD 
estimates. Similarly, electricity generation capacity has a positive effect on economic 
growth; in this case, our early estimates suggest a contribution to economic growth 
comparable to that of road and higher than the OECD estimates. Like the OECD study, 
the ITRC team finds the contributions of motorways and telecommunications to be less 
conclusive. The ITRC intends to develop the empirical analysis to better understand the 
role of infrastructure in economic growth. As in the OECD study, the ITRC finds substantial 
heterogeneity across different countries and types of infrastructure in the contribution 
of infrastructure to economic growth. Future work will provide greater insight into these 
relationships.
1.3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NI PROVISION IN THE UK
The UK has established new supporting institutions to begin to address infrastructure 
challenges identified in recent reports, and attract private investment. 
Over the past several years, there has been an increased focus on infrastructure in the UK. 
The Council for Science and Technology report on national infrastructure in the UK (CST, 
2009) identified significant vulnerabilities, capacity limitations and a number of national 
infrastructure components nearing the end of their useful life. It also highlighted serious 
fragmentation in the arrangements for infrastructure provision in the UK. Each year the 
Institution of Civil Engineering (ICE) publishes a State of the Nation report (ICE, 2010a) that 
includes a grading of infrastructure sectors in the UK. The ICE’s 2009 report on Defending 
Critical Infrastructure (ICE, 2009) emphasised the need for long term strategic planning. 
Further, Defra’s 2011 report on a Climate resilient infrastructure (Defra, 2011a) makes 
significant steps towards identifying key risks and actions to prepare for the impacts of a 
changing climate in the UK. 8
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The government has made proactive steps towards addressing many of the 
aforementioned challenges facing NI. The coalition government’s Plan for Growth (BIS 
and HM Treasury, 2011) states that radical changes to the planning system will include 
fast-tracking major infrastructure projects. Additionally, in April 2011 the Government 
published binding principles of economic regulation to provide greater long term 
certainty for investment in UK infrastructure (BIS, 2011b). The reduction of uncertainty in 
policy and regulation can further assist in attracting private investments. 
The UK is one of the first countries to establish a Green Investment Bank designed to 
work in close coordination with the government objectives and fulfil the dual tasks of 
transitioning to green infrastructure as well as earning returns from investments. The 
Green Investment Bank is intended to accelerate funding from the private sector and 
help address market uncertainties by providing risk mitigation products and innovative 
financial recipes alongside investment capital (BIS, 2011c). The government has committed 
around £3 billion until 2015 to support initial green investments. 
Infrastructure UK and the National Infrastructure Plan
In 2009, Infrastructure UK was formed as a unit within the Treasury with three objectives 
(HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010b):
•  enabling long term investment;
•  developing effective long term plans and priorities; and
•  improving delivery.
UK’s National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) 2010 (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010a) 
identified priorities for infrastructure provision and set in place a number of actions 
needed to address those priorities. It emphasised the necessity for government to produce 
such a holistic plan that is able to capture dependencies between sectors, and balance 
requirements for maintenance, resilience, and renewal of existing infrastructure. 
The National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) 2011 (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2011) sets 
out a new strategy for meeting infrastructure needs in the UK comprised of three elements: 
(1) a medium-term cross-sectoral plan with a pipeline of infrastructure projects, (2) 
mobilisation of financing through the coordination of private and public investments, and 
(3) a new Cabinet Committee that will provide leadership in ensuring the infrastructure 
plan is delivered efficiently. 
The plan identifies a pipeline of over 500 infrastructure projects (over three-quarters of 
which are for energy and transport) to 2015 and beyond. Most of these projects are major 
programmes (e.g. highways, rail, nuclear, offshore wind and broadband), although there 
are also individual projects identified due to their size, complexity, or importance to the 
economy.
Further, the NIP 2011 outlines new steps taken by government to open new sources 
of finance, including attracting new investors (e.g. signing the Memorandum of 
Understanding with two groups of UK pension fund, to support investment), exploring 
new sources of revenue for investment (e.g. tolling), and the use of guarantees to 
accommodate certain investment risks in major new projects.
These recent developments begin to build an important foundation for addressing the 
pressing challenges of NI. However, NI still faces significant challenges, particularly in the 
long term cross-sectoral planning.9
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1.4 CHALLENGES IN LONG TERM PLANNING OF NI PROVISION
Whilst a long term view is essential in the planning of NI, development of a long term 
strategy is challenging because of the uncertainty in the long term and because of the 
complexity of possible pathways for future infrastructure provision
It is essential to take a long term view in planning for the replacement infrastructure 
nearing the end of its life, and for the required additional capacity to meet increasing 
demands (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010b). New infrastructure often has a long 
lifetime (50–100 years (Defra, 2011a)), thus, present and near-term investments will define 
the infrastructure of the future. 
Whilst a long term view helps ensure new NI will meet current and future demand, 
anticipating future demand is challenging due to the high degree of uncertainty in the 
long term (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010b). Moreover, infrastructure provision 
can encourage patterns of development and land use that become practically irreversible. 
Choices about technologies can lock in patterns of behaviour and economic activity. 
Complex interdependencies between infrastructure sectors intensify the uncertainty in the 
long term planning of infrastructure. Hence, when predicting future demand for a given 
infrastructure sector, the demands from other sectors must be considered (e.g. the need 
for transportation services to provide fuel sources to the energy sector, or the necessity 
of energy in the ICT sector). Thus, evaluating the demand for a given sector in the long 
term requires a coordinated planning effort across infrastructure sectors to balance these 
dependencies.
The effects of climate change complicate the planning process. The long term impacts 
of climate change can amplify interdependency risks over time, and thus should be 
considered in the adaptation of infrastructure in the UK (URS, 2010). During the floods in 
June 2007, for example, there were concerns that a breach of the Ulley reservoir’s dam 
would result in the loss of high voltage power lines and the flooding of a regional power 
substation that supplied electricity to all of Sheffield (Defra, 2011a). While, fortunately, this 
breach did not occur, risks of this kind will likely increase with climate change. As there 
are significant uncertainties in both the scale and timing of these climate impacts (Defra, 
2011a) on infrastructure, planning appropriately for a resilient infrastructure is challenging. 
In the context of this range of uncertainties, the notion that a unique and comprehensive 
plan for infrastructure provision could be developed is obviously unrealistic. In many 
respects, individual utility companies and investors are best positioned to assess 
opportunities and risks and adapt their strategies on an on-going basis. However, 
given the long term nature of infrastructure provision and the complex inter-sectoral 
interdependencies, it is necessary to define broad directions of travel. A strategic direction 
is needed to ensure that long term investment is forthcoming and to guard against the 
possibilities of inconsistencies between sectors and systemic failures. Whilst the need for 
such a strategic approach is already acknowledged; for example in the CST report (CST, 
2009) and the ICE’s advice on the 2011 National Infrastructure Plan (ICE, 2011), such a 
strategy does not yet exist. 10
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1.5 TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION
The legacy of sector-based planning combined with uncertainty in the long term, 
challenge the development of integrated assessments.
If the process of transforming national infrastructure is to take place efficiently, whilst also 
minimizing the associated risks, it will need to be underpinned by a long term, cross-
sectoral approach to understanding national infrastructure performance under a range 
of possible futures. The ‘systems of systems’ analysis that must form the basis for such a 
strategic approach does not yet exist. (Details of alternative methods of long term futures 
analysis are given in Annex A.)
A ‘system of systems’ approach would build confidence that infrastructure capacity 
and demand can be efficiently matched whilst avoiding risks of failure or unforeseen 
side-effects. It would assist in unlocking performance gains (including sustainability) by 
selecting sector-specific infrastructure that are in the context of a cross-sectoral strategy. 
Further, by focusing on the long term, it would assist in the prioritisation of short term 
and long term investment requirements. Thus, it could serve to increase the efficient use 
of resources by appropriately targeting investments on key needs. Additionally, it could 
provide finance and workload continuity, and avoid ‘stranded assets’. Such a coherent, 
integrated plan would provide the basis for consistent regulation and further serve to 
attract the necessary private investments amidst the competitive global market. 
1.6 THE UK INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSITIONS RESEARCH 
CONSORTIUM
The ITRC will deliver the theoretical research, models and practical decision support 
tools to enable strategic analysis and planning of a national infrastructure system fit for 
the 21st century.
The aim of the UK Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium is to develop and 
demonstrate a new generation of system simulation models and tools to inform analysis, 
planning and design of national infrastructure. The research programme is dealing with 
energy, transport, water, waste and ICT systems in an integrated way, paying particular 
attention to their interdependencies. The modelling and simulation techniques that the 
ITRC are developing will enable the future performance of these systems to be better 
understood and different strategies for NI provision to be tested in a virtual environment. 
These NI strategies will be assessed with respect to a range of metrics, such as reliability, 
security of supply, cost, carbon emissions and flexibility to demographic and climate 
change.
The ITRC research programme is structured around four major challenges dealing with (1) 
balancing capacity and demand over the long term, (2) planning for resiliency against risk, 
(3) understanding the evolution of infrastructure with the economy and society, and (4) 
developing integrated strategies for NI provision. 11
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Challenge 1: How can infrastructure capacity and demand be balanced in an 
uncertain future? 
The ITRC will develop methods for modelling capacity, demand and interdependence 
in national infrastructure systems in a compatible way under a wide range of 
technological, socio-economic and climate futures. The ITRC will thereby provide 
the tools needed to identify robust strategies for sustainably balancing capacity and 
demand. 
Challenge 2: What are the risks of infrastructure failure and how can we adapt 
national infrastructure to make it more resilient?
The ITRC will analyse the risks of interdependent infrastructure failure by establishing 
network models of national infrastructure and analysing the consequences of failure 
for people and the economy. Information on key vulnerabilities and risks will be used to 
identify ways of adapting infrastructure systems to reduce risks in future. 
Challenge 3: How do infrastructure systems evolve and interact with society and the 
economy?
Starting with idealised simulations and working up to the national scale, the ITRC will 
develop new models of how infrastructure, society and the economy evolve in the long 
term. The ITRC will use the simulation models to demonstrate alternative long term 
futures for infrastructure provision and how they might be reached. 
Challenge 4: What should the UK’s strategy be for integrated provision of national 
infrastructure in the long term? 
Working with the consortium’s partners in government and industry, the ITRC will 
use our new methods to develop and test alternative strategies for Britain’s national 
infrastructure, building an evidence-based case for a transition to sustainability. The 
ITRC will analyse the governance arrangements necessary to ensure that this transition 
is realisable in practice. 
The ITRC is a consortium of 7 universities, led by the University of Oxford. The ITRC 
research programme began in January 2011 and will continue until the end of 2015. The 
research programme was designed in collaboration with 43 organisations in government, 
industry and the engineering institutions, including Infrastructure UK, and will continue 
to work closely with these organisations in order to maximise the benefits to industry and 
government. 
Three cycles of analysis of the strategies for infrastructure provision will take place during 
the ITRC research programme, in order to inform NI planning. This report describes the first 
cycle of the analysis undertaken during the first year of the research programme, based 
on pre-existing datasets and models, to explore the scope of future NI challenges and to 
demonstrate new concepts in long term analysis of infrastructure systems. 
The objectives of this Fast Track Analysis (FTA) have been two-fold: 
1.  To develop and demonstrate key cross-sectoral concepts and approaches for analysis 
of NI systems.
2.  To take an integrated overview of the five NI sectors in order to provide key cross-
cutting insights.12
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The methodological perspective adopted in the FTA corresponds to ITRC Challenge 1 
(i.e. the FTA explores long term capacity and demand for infrastructure services). The FTA 
yields a preliminary set of insights to inform Challenge 4, though it has not been possible 
to propose a definitive answer to this question. The FTA has served to promote early 
collaboration amongst the institutions in the ITRC and with our partners in industry and 
government. 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT
This report summarises the Fast Track Analysis undertaken in the first year of the ITRC.
Chapter 2 provides the basic framework developed by the ITRC to analyse change in 
interdependent NI systems and its application in a Fast Track Analysis (FTA). It also sets out 
the approach used in the FTA to determine key cross-sectoral drivers of changes, and to 
derive consistent scenarios for use in the assessment. 
The starting point for analysis of future infrastructure provision is understanding the 
current system and trends that have been identified for the near term. Thus, Chapter 3 
provides a historical review of the governance of infrastructure. Next, Chapter 4 reviews 
current infrastructure provision in each of the NI sectors (energy, transport, water, waste 
(comprising wastewater and solid waste), and ICT), along with a cross-cutting review of 
governance arrangements for NI in the UK.
Chapter 5 presents analysis of the future performance of NI in the context of our 
scenarios of change (identified in Chapter 2) and a small number of strategies for future 
infrastructure provision. In the FTA it was not feasible to exhaustively explore a wide range 
of strategies in each infrastructure sector. Three contrasting strategies are analysed them in 
the context of each of the five infrastructure sectors (Capacity-Intensive, Decentralisation, 
and Capacity-Constrained). 
Chapter 6 provides a discussion on the initial analysis of the FTA. It also provides insight 
into how the results serve to prioritise issues for further analysis in the next four years of 
the ITRC. Background material is provided in on-line annexes, which are accessible with 
hyperlinks from the text.13
This chapter provides the framework proposed by the ITRC to analyse 
change in interdependent National Infrastructure systems. A simplified 
version of this framework has been piloted in the Fast Track Analysis (FTA). 
The framework is based around the analysis of demand for infrastructure services and the 
capacity of infrastructure systems to deliver those services now and in the future. Through 
this analysis, the ITRC seeks to 
•  develop new understanding of the performance expected from infrastructure 
systems in the long term, with respect to a range of metrics, and 
•  provide a platform to test strategic options for NI provision. 
2.1 A SERVICE-BASED APPROACH TO INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROVISION
Analysis of National Infrastructure (NI) often begins with the hardware that constitutes 
infrastructure capital: power stations, highways, reservoirs, treatment works, pipes and 
cables. Starting with physical infrastructure is natural, as it is readily identifiable and 
represents the accumulated capital costs. However, such an approach distracts from the 
purpose of national infrastructure, which is to provide services to people and the economy. 
It also tends to emphasise the flux of resources through infrastructure networks (e.g. 
gas, water) and implies that increasing flux represents improved infrastructure provision 
(and perhaps also increased revenue for the utility providing that resource). Again, such 
a perspective is undesirable, because improved service provision (e.g. for heating or 
washing) need to not be accompanied by increased resource use. 
A service-based perspective on infrastructure provision emphasises the purpose of 
infrastructure provision rather than the physical infrastructure and resource fluxes involved 
in providing infrastructure provision. The essential services that are considered are: 
1.  Energy services, enabling activities such as heating, lighting, and power for 
machines (e.g. transport);
2.  Transportation services that provide mobility for people and goods between 
locations;
2  A framework for analysis of change in  
  interdependent infrastructure systems14
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3.  Water supply services, that provide fresh water to households and industry;
4.  Solid waste services, for removing, treating and re-processing;
5.  Wastewater services, providing a similar role for wastewater;
6.  Telecommunications services that transmit information and enable digital 
communication.
In order to provide access to the services listed above, NI operates physical facilities and 
accompanying human systems to convert, store, and transmit flow entities. The term 
flow entities is used to encompass the broad range of physical and virtual commodities 
infrastructure deals with in order to deliver infrastructure services. 
An Infrastructure service is the provision of an option for an activity by operating 
physical facilities and accompanying human systems to convert, store and transmit 
flow entities.
Table 2 provides examples of the processes necessary to provide infrastructure services (i.e. 
conversion, storage and transmission). 
Table 2: Examples of the three processes necessary for infrastructure services
Process  Examples
Conversion takes place in:  Electricity generation in various types of thermal, 
hydro, wind, solar and tidal facilities; 
Transport interchanges and trans-shipment 
facilities; 
Water and wastewater treatment facilities; 
desalination plants; 
Solid waste recovery and incineration;
Telephone exchanges; routers and switching 
stations; transmitters and receivers; IT systems. 
Storage takes place in:  Gas, liquid and solid fuel stores; pumped storage;
Depots;
Reservoirs;
Waste consolidation facilities;
Data storage facilities.
Transmission takes place in:  Electricity transmission and distribution 
networks; gas pipelines;
Carriage of passengers and freight in road 
vehicles, trains, ships and aeroplanes;
Water pipelines;
Sewers;
Wired and wireless communications. 15
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As infrastructure services are at the centre of ITRC’s approach, the definition of 
infrastructure follows from it. Thus, infrastructure is the collection of physical facilities and 
human systems that operate in a coordinated way to provide infrastructure services. This 
definition recognises that the human, communications, and mechanical systems that 
control the operation of fixed infrastructure facilities are essential elements of the system. 
It is important to note that a given service (e.g. space heating) may provide one of several 
alternative flow entities (e.g. gas or electricity) and that different services (e.g. freight and 
passenger transport) may be provided by the same physical facilities. 
Infrastructure is the collection of all physical facilities and human systems that are 
operated in a coordinated way to provide infrastructure services.
Consumers are entities that have demand for infrastructure services in order to go about 
their businesses or to enhance their wellbeing. Providers of infrastructure services (in the 
public and private sectors) commission and operate physical facilities and accompanying 
human systems (collectively ‘infrastructure systems’).4 Finally, in the consumer–provider 
relationship, externalities are the people and the environment subject to the various 
positive and negative (e.g. pollution) effects of infrastructure services. 
The disparities of where infrastructure facilities are located and where the services are 
utilised can be important to the service specification, since the availability of a service 
(e.g. fibre optic cable communications) does not necessarily mean that it is accessible to 
all consumers, some of whom may be geographically remote or disconnected from the 
network. 
A number of benefits arise from the centrality of infrastructure services in the ITRC 
framework. For example, in the modelling and analysis it enables the possibility of 
substituting means of provision for a given infrastructure service (e.g. space heating may 
be provided by gas, liquid or solid fuel). Additionally, it naturally leads to the development 
of indicators of efficiency in terms of cost per unit of service provision, or energy input per 
unit of service provision, etc. Finally, it focuses the analysis on the aspects of infrastructure 
systems that have a direct effect on service provision (e.g. with respect to reliability) and 
the associated cost. 
2.2 INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY AND DEMAND
NI systems can be described in terms of its capacity to supply infrastructure services and 
the demand for infrastructure services that it is expected to satisfy. Both capacity and 
demand vary in time and geographically. The five NI systems are interdependent in that 
they place demands upon one another, e.g. all of the systems require energy infrastructure 
to function. Another source of interdependence is that components of demand for 
different infrastructure services are correlated, e.g. increased temperatures imply increased 
demand for both water and energy (for cooling). 
The capacity of infrastructure services defines the limits to and quantity of activities that 
it can sustain. The overall capacity for the supply of an infrastructure service is determined 
by necessary conversion, storage and transmission infrastructure operating as a system. 
Determining capacity involves analysis of these different systems elements and their 
interactions. 
4  Providers of infrastructure services will usually also be consumers of infrastructure services, 
leading to interdependency between infrastructure services.16
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For services that are provided as discrete events (e.g. train departures or waste collections), 
the same aggregate capacity (e.g. in terms of passengers per hour or tonnes of waste 
removed per week) may be provided by services of different frequency. Thus, the time 
profile of capacity may be of interest. 
Capacity of infrastructure services defines the extent and amount of activities that 
may be enabled.
Demand is determined by economic, demographic, behavioural and technological factors 
as well as by the existence of a specific infrastructure service. Further, demand may be 
modified by the capacity of the infrastructure (in particular in the transport sector, where 
capacity affects journey times and comfort). This is particularly true at times when demand 
may approach capacity limits. Pricing mechanisms and other policies may also serve to 
modify and reduce demand. Capacity and demand can also be inter-related via pricing 
mechanisms (e.g. tariffs to reduce peak demand in the energy sector). Thus, capacity and 
demand are not generally independent, though they may be treated as such in special 
cases. 
Demand for infrastructure services is defined as the amount and extent of actions 
enabled by infrastructure services that consumers seek to conduct.
Under normal operating conditions, the supply of infrastructure services will be equal to or 
greater then demand. However, in the event that there is a reduction in capacity (e.g. due 
to planned maintenance or unplanned failure) or a spike in demand, then the supply may 
be less than the demand. The supply then, is the amount of activity that is actually enabled 
from the infrastructure service.
Supply of infrastructure services is defined as the amount and extent of actions 
that are actually enabled.
Insufficient capacity and supply, compared to demand, leads to inadequate service 
provision, e.g. in terms of traffic congestion or water shortages, on a range of different 
timescales. In the long term (i.e. over periods of decades) (i) the capacity of infrastructure 
systems will change due to deterioration, retirement and replacement of infrastructure 
and (ii) the demand will change due to, amongst other reasons, economic, demographic 
and behavioural factors. The interplay between these highly uncertain sets of processes 
of change will determine the balance between capacity and demand in future, alongside 
major policy drivers such as the need to decarbonise energy infrastructure. 
2.3 THE PERFORMANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
The performance of an infrastructure service is a multi-attribute construct. The first and 
necessary attribute is the availability of the service to satisfy given levels of customer 
demand at given locations, both at present and in the future. This availability derives 
from the existence of the necessary physical facilities and their operation. Table 3 lists the 
categories of performance used by the ITRC. These categories can be formed into multi-
criteria sustainability metrics (e.g. economic benefit, service reliability, carbon emissions, 
etc.). 17
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Past service performance can in principle be measured, though relevant observations may 
not exist in practice. Multiple metrics will be required in order to provide a perspective on 
the various aspects of performance listed in Table 3. 
For planning purposes, the focus is upon present and future performance. Past 
performance is of relevance in so far as it provides evidence of present and future 
performance. Understanding future performance requires the employment of various 
versions of ‘models’, which may include extrapolations, projections and scenarios alongside 
more detailed computer models. 
Future infrastructure performance is regarded to be a function of: 
1.  The performance of the existing infrastructure system;
2.  Exogenous drivers of change in demand and capacity;
3.  Future deliberate interventions in the system, e.g. investments in new capacity or 
policies to manage demand. 
Thus, analysis of future infrastructure performance requires:
1.  Knowledge of the existing infrastructure system;
2.  Analysis of exogenous drivers of change and their associated uncertainties; 
3.  Analysis of alternative future strategies for infrastructure provision. 
Table 3: Categories of performance measures with descriptions
Categories of performance  Description
Capacity utilization Part of the available local capacity that is used for 
providing the actual level of supply.
Supply reliability Probability of occurrence of a failure of supply to 
meet demand.
Indicators of cost and 
efficiency of infrastructure 
service provision
Measure the cost of infrastructure services from 
the perspective of (i) consumers and (ii) service 
providers. Costs for consumers will be in terms 
of units of service provision, as will many of 
the operating costs for service providers. These 
cost indicators are the reciprocal indicators of 
efficiency (service provision per unit cost input), so 
the same category also includes other efficiency 
indicators, notably service provision per unit 
of energy input. Service providers will also be 
interested in other cost elements, including 
annual maintenance costs and capital costs of new 
infrastructure provision.
Indicators of externalities 
of infrastructure service 
provision
Measure the extent of a number of ‘side effects’ 
of infrastructure service provision, such as 
greenhouse gas emissions and effluent water 
quality.18
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The following section deals with drivers of change, with Section 2.5 describing the 
primary drivers identified for the FTA. Section 2.6 describes our approach for analysis of 
uncertainties. Section 2.7 describes our approach to constructing infrastructure strategies. 
2.4 DRIVERS OF CHANGE IN NI PERFORMANCE 
Social, economic, environmental and technological changes in the future will have 
profound impacts upon the use and capacity of Great Britain’s national infrastructure. 
While decision-makers naturally focus mainly on the short term effects of changes to 
policy, national infrastructure systems have a long lead-time to implement, are long-lived 
and can become locked-in due to associated land use change and economic development. 
They therefore require a long term policy analysis approach. Yet a long term perspective 
brings with it great uncertainties.
Table 4: Primary drivers by sector, including secondary drivers where relevant
Driver  Energy Transport Water Waste 
water
Solid 
waste
Socio-economic
Population growth  Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary
Household size  Primary Secondary
Economic growth  Primary Primary Secondary Primary
Energy costs  Primary Primary Primary Primary Secondary
Environment/climate change
Mean temperature change  Secondary Primary
Change in precipitation levels  Primary Secondary
Policy and technology options
Centralised/decentralised decision 
making
Primary Secondary
Carbon emissions reduction targets  Primary Secondary Secondary Secondary Secondary
EU directives/National strategies and 
standards
Secondary Secondary Primary Primary
Improved waste processing 
technologies
Secondary Primary Primary19
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The various factors influencing performance in five infrastructure sectors were reviewed. 
The methodology for this review is described in Annex B. Three broad driver themes have 
been defined: (1) Socio-economic (comprising Demographic and Economic drivers); 
(2) Environment/Climate Change; and (3) Policy and Technology Options (comprising 
Governance, Policy and Regulation, and Technology). Table 4 summarises the primary and 
secondary drivers identified in each sector. The fact that sectors share many of the same 
drivers is a key source of interdependence in infrastructure performance. 
2.5 FAST TRACK ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY DRIVERS
From Table 4, it is evident that the key exogenous drivers common to most of the 
sectors are (1) population growth, (2) economic growth and (3) energy costs (Figure 10). 
Consequently, these three drivers were developed as scenarios across all sectors (where 
applicable) for the FTA. Each of these three primary drivers is discussed in more detail and 
quantified in the following sections. 
Sector-specific issues can be as influential as these cross-cutting scenario dimensions, and 
include for: 
•  Energy: GHG emissions targets;
•  Water supply and wastewater: the effects from climate change on water availability 
and quality; the requirements of the Water Framework Directive;
•  Solid waste: EU directives and national standards.
These sector-specific  drivers are considered in the context of the Transition Strategies 
in Section 5.1. Other key drivers which seem to be common at a secondary level include 
the levels of capital investment (again, positively linked to GDP), and carbon emissions 
reduction targets. Policies to mitigate the amount of CO2 and other emissions are included 
in the FTA as part of the Decentralisation Transition Strategy (see Section 5.8.2).
2.5.1 POPULATION GROWTH SCENARIOS
The Office of National Statistics provides annual principal, low and high growth projections 
to 2033, and 5-year projections up to 2083 for population numbers in England, Scotland 
and Wales; the expected growth level in 2083 was then extended to 2100. These 
projections are summarised in Table 5, with a comparison for Great Britain of the three 
growth scenarios given in Figure 4. Further analyses of the demographic changes up to 
2083 (the limit of the ONS projections) is given in Annex C. 
In the Principal Scenario, the population of Great Britain increases from its current level of 
60 million to 72 million by 2033, and to 84 million by 2083 (the limit of ONS projections). 
Extrapolating this growth trend, the population in 2100 for this scenario is forecast to be 
around 88 million. The analyses below are predominantly based on changes in population 
size, but a general overview of the likely characteristics of future populations is given here, 
and will become highly integrated to future analyses within the ITRC project.20
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Figure 4: Great Britain 
population projections for the 
FTA scenarios. Data from the 
Office of National Statistics 
population projections (2008–
2083), extended to 2100 by the 
authors. Population pyramids 
(for the principal projection) 
for 2008 and 2083. Data from 
the Office of National Statistics 
sub-national population 
projections (2008–2033), 
extended to 2083 by the 
authors.
Table 5: Projected population growth figures (Source to 2083: Office of National 
Statistics, www.ons.gov.uk)
Population (millions) 2025 2050 2075 2083 2100
England 
2008 baseline: 
51.46 million
Low 54.49 57.20 55.89 55.29 53.93
Principal 57.97 65.66 72.24 74.42 79.12
High 60.50 74.55 90.38 96.08 109.29
Scotland 
2008 baseline: 
5.17 million
Low 5.19 4.65 3.88 3.65 3.21
Principal 5.47 5.57 5.52 5.52 5.51
High 5.77 6.55 7.38 7.70 8.40
Wales 
2008 baseline: 
2.99 million
Low 3.09 2.96 2.68 2.58 2.37
Principal 3.25 3.48 3.65 3.70 3.81
High 3.41 4.04 4.75 5.01 5.60
Great Britain 
2008 baseline: 
59.62 million
Low 63.77 64.81 62.45 61.52 59.50
Principal 66.68 74.71 81.41 83.64 88.45
High 69.67 85.14 102.51 108.79 123.28
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For the principal projection, the future population will become progressively more elderly, 
and these increases are most significant amongst the very elderly, as can be seen in Figure 
4. In 2008 there were 1.3 million people aged 85 and over; by 2033, this has more than 
doubled, and increases by a factor of 5 to 7.4 million by 2083. While elderly age groups are 
currently heavily skewed towards women (68% of people aged 85 or over are women), this 
ratio will approach parity with increasing life expectancy (to around 53% women over 85 
in 2083). Demographic ageing will have a profound impact on health, social services and 
housing, but for other infrastructure services such as transport and ICT the impact may be 
less important.
The ethnic composition of the population will become increasingly diverse over time 
through a combination of on-going positive net immigration and the youthful age 
structure of minority groups, some of which are also maintaining fertility at levels 
significantly above replacement. 
Recent trends show a significant decrease in average household size, falling from more 
than 3 persons per household (pph) in 1961 to its current level of 2.33 pph (see Figure 5). 
This is due, in part, to increasing participation rates in higher education and the formation 
of households at ever younger ages. At some point this process must be naturally limiting, 
and could go into reverse with the advent of the phenomenon of ‘boomerang children’ 
and larger household sizes amongst the ethnic minority groups. Nevertheless, ONS 
estimates a continued reduction in average household sizes down to 2.16 pph in the 25 
year projection (to 2033). Continuation of this trend implies average household size below 
2 pph by 2083.
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Figure 5: Household size 
projections (source: ONS 
(2010a) Household Projections, 
United Kingdom, 1961–2033).
Demographic change is likely to remain region-dependent. The fastest growing regions 
are the south and east of England, while the north of England, Wales and Scotland, are 
expected to exhibit much lower growth rates. In the 25 year principal projection (2008–
2033) the East, South-East, Yorkshire & Humberside, South West and East Midlands all have 
growth of 20% or more. The North, North-West and Scotland have growth of 10% or less. 
These trends are exacerbated over the 75 year projection period, with growth approaching 
60% in the South West, whereas Scotland has close to zero growth (Figure 6, overleaf). 
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However, there are major uncertainties. Modelling demographic change depends on three 
primary sets of assumptions, regarding fertility, migration and life expectancy. For the high 
growth scenario, it is assumed that each of the individual components of change points to 
an acceleration of growth in the population (higher fertility, increasing life expectancy and 
more net migration). Conversely, in the low growth scenario each component is associated 
with reduced growth (lower fertility, restricted improvements in life expectancy and a 
marginal net migration balance). Further details on population growth composition are 
given in Annex C.
All of the demographic projections are subject to the influence of government policy and 
other external influences at local, national and global scales. For example, border controls 
or quotas could influence migration; while investment in medical research and health care 
facilities could affect life expectancy. Fertility rates are understood to be affected indirectly 
by the performance and outlook for the economy. Regional housing policy could strongly 
determine local demographics, which might ultimately be responsive to infrastructure 
effects such as the availability of water or congested transport networks. These feedbacks 
will be explored is later phases of the ITRC project.
2.5.2 GDP SCENARIOS
In their ongoing assessment of the growth of emerging countries, Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers (PwC) give estimates of future long term economic growth, based on (1) World 
Bank data for growth up until 2009, (2) PwC’s short term projections for the years up until 
2014 and (3) their long term growth assumptions (population growth and increases in 
human and physical infrastructure) for 2015–2050 (PWC, 2011). The projections of GDP 
growth up to 2050 is 2.3% per annum, which is consistent with historic trends (Hicks and 
Allen, 1999).
Figure 6: ITRC projected 
regional population changes 
(principal scenario 2008–2033 
and 2033–2083). Source: 
Office of National Statistics 
sub-national population 
projections, extended to 2083 
by the authors (see Annex C).
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To provide ranges, upper and lower boundaries of +/- 0.7% per annum were selected 
based on historic trends. Around 0.3% of this can be accounted for by high and low growth 
in projected population and fossil fuel prices; the remainder reflects variations in world 
economic conditions. Hence, the three GDP scenarios are growth from 2008 as follows:
•  Low economic growth: 1.6% per annum
•  Medium economic growth: 2.3% per annum
•  High economic growth: 3.0% per annum
Economic projections based on these growth scenarios have been made with an 
enhanced version of the MDM-E3 econometric model (Multisectoral Dynamic Model 
– Energy-Environment-Economy) are discussed in Annex D. MDM-E3 generates annual 
comprehensive forecasts for a number of variables that are of interest for the ITRC research 
programme, including UK and regional macroeconomic factors such as output, prices, 
exports, imports and employment at industry level (allowing identification of industry 
expenditure on electricity, gas and water services); household expenditure; sectoral 
investment. The model also forecasts UK-level energy demand and emissions, for 3 primary 
energy users and 22 final users, and 8 main fuel types.
The key exogenous inputs to the model are both UK-wide and global in scope. At a UK 
level they include regional population projections by age range; current and capital 
Government expenditure; tax rates and allowances; and availability of extractable 
resources (coal, oil, gas). The main source of data for these inputs is official UK statistics, 
published by the UK Office for National Statistics. At a global level the inputs are economic 
activity, prices and interest rates; fossil fuel prices; and commodity prices.
Figure 7 shows how GDP changes under each of the growth scenarios. The largest changes 
in GDP by component of final demand come from exports (owing to the changes in world 
economic activity). In the low and medium growth scenarios, the volume of imports 
continues to exceed the volume of exports. However, in the high growth scenario, the 
higher export growth leads to the UK becoming a net exporter of goods and services. 
Higher export demand must be met by higher UK production, and consequently the 
labour input must increase, leading to more wage income in the aggregate. Higher income 
drives higher household expenditure, including greater demand for imported goods 
and services. Demand for imported inputs to production also increases owing to higher 
production requirements in the UK. 
Figure 7: FTA GDP growth 
scenarios for UK.
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In MDM-E3, higher industry output leads to higher investment expenditure, implicitly to 
augment the capital stock in order to sustain higher production. Government investment 
expenditure also increases, to support greater provision of public services. Consequently, 
investment in 2050 is higher in the high growth scenario and lower in the low growth 
scenario, relative to the medium growth scenario, as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: UK GDP by component 
of final demand. 8000
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2.5.3 ENERGY COST SCENARIOS 
Fossil fuel price assumptions are those used by the Committee for Climate Change (CCC) 
(2010), from figures produced by DECC (2010), based on an analysis of the international 
market and other forecasts. Since the ITRC baseline is 2008, these figures are for the 
projections published in 2009. The projections are presented in four different scenarios 
of future global fuel markets, but for the FTA, analyses are limited to the low (low global 
energy demand), central (reflecting timely investment and moderate demand) and high 
(reflecting high demand and producers’ market power) scenarios. The resultant energy 
prices are:25
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•  The range for gas prices in 2030 is 35p to 121p/therm, with a central price of 
76p/therm.
•  The range for coal prices in 2030 is £32 to £83/tonne, with a central price of 
£51/tonne.
•  The range for oil prices in 2030 in these scenarios is $61 to $153/barrel, around a 
central price of $92/barrel.
Figure 9: Fossil fuel price 
assumptions to 2050 (from 
Committee on Climate Change 
(2010) 4th Carbon Budget – 
Reducing Emissions through the 
2020s).
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These DECC projections were produced up until 2030, and CCC assumes that these costs 
will remain largely similar up to 2050. For the FTA, it is assumed that costs are maintained 
up to 2100.
UK electricity wholesale prices are currently closely linked to national, and therefore global, 
gas prices as gas-fired power generation is the current long run marginal technology. In 
scenarios in which electricity is decarbonised over the period to 2050, it is expected that 
this linkage will increasingly be broken with electricity prices driven by the costs of low 
carbon technologies (renewables, fossil fuels with CCS and/or nuclear). Electricity costs 
therefore become an output of the infrastructure system rather than an input assumption. 
Similarly trends in transport fuel prices may diverge from oil prices as alternative fuels such 
as electricity and biofuels become more important.
In all cases the costs of fuels to distributed users are higher than those in wholesale 
markets due to the costs of distribution, i.e. of the relevant infrastructure. This is 
particularly important for gas and electricity, where final user prices exceed wholesale 
markets prices significantly.
2.6 EXPLORATION OF UNCERTAINTIES
While decision-makers naturally focus mainly on the short term effects of changes to 
policy, national infrastructure systems have a long lead-time to implement, are long-lived 
and can become locked-in due to associated land use change and economic development. 
They therefore require a long term policy analysis approach. Yet a long term perspective 
brings with it great uncertainties. It is important to understand how future plans may be 
vulnerable to such uncertainties and, where possible, to seek decisions that are robust to 
those uncertainties. One approach to long term policy analysis is described by Lempert 
et al. (2003), who develop a range of plausible scenarios and explore the performance 
of many alternative strategies with respect to that range of possible futures. In the work 
of Lempert et al., the performance of a set of policy options is assessed with respect to a 
range of possible future conditions (Figure 10). The aim of exploring this space of possible 
future conditions is to identify vulnerabilities and opportunities, in order to seek strategies 
that are robust to uncertainty. 
Figure 10: Scenario dimensions 
adopted in the FTA.
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2.6.1 SCENARIO ANALYSIS IN THE FTA
For the FTA, a simplified approach has been adopted using just three scenarios. While this 
simplified approach using only three scenarios has disadvantages compared to the more 
comprehensive approach to be used subsequently in ITRC (Lempert et al., 2003) it allows 
a proof of concept which also provides a broad overview of the likely impacts of the more 
important drivers of change. Subsequent work in the ITRC will involve more extensive 
exploration of the scenario space by Monte Carlo sampling and include further dimensions 
of uncertainty, beyond the three driver dimensions identified in this chapter.
These primary drivers are not independent – historically, energy costs and GDP have been 
negatively correlated, whilst GDP and population growth are positively correlated. These 
interdependencies have been incorporated in the three scenarios summarised in Table 6. 
The base year is 2008 for all the scenario parameters.
Table 6: Summary of ITRC FTA scenarios
Scenario Population 
growth
Economic growth Energy costs
Low growth  Low ONS 
projection
Low (1.6%) High fossil fuel 
prices
Principal  Principal ONS 
projection
Projected (2.3%) Central fossil fuel 
prices
High growth  High ONS 
projection
High (3.0%) Low fossil fuel 
prices
2.7 STRATEGIES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION
The aim of the ITRC is to provide methodologies and tools to test strategies for national 
infrastructure provision. These strategies may consist of many decisions, for example, 
public spending on infrastructure, arrangement to enable private investment, and tariffs 
or other regulatory arrangements to manage demand. A transition to a sustainable NI 
system is considered to be a process that leads, over a period of decades, to a system 
configuration (in terms of both capacity and demand) that performs well with respect to 
economic, social and environmental criteria. Our contention is that the scope for feasible 
transitions to sustainable infrastructure systems is much increased if the five NI systems 
are considered in an strategic, integrated way, rather than in isolation, thereby exploiting 
synergies and avoiding unintended interactions. 
Of particular interest are policy decisions that result in a robust, resilient and reliable 
infrastructure system, which supports sustainable economic growth, helps meet 
environmental targets and satisfies both local and national requirements, while still 
offering value for money (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010a). To assess this, a range 
of alternative policy and technology options or scenarios must be evaluated to make 
quantitative comparisons of the likely consequences of each alternative.28
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The process for generating the space of strategies takes into consideration varying levels of 
aggregation for different infrastructure subsystems. Strategies might consist of changing 
the physical infrastructure facilities and networks. However, they may also include 
regulations and taxes that provide incentives for private investors and consumers to 
change their behaviour or demand for infrastructure services. The ITRC approach proceeds 
with the generation of the strategy space in the same manner as developing the space of 
possible future conditions: 
1.  Identify all possible mechanisms for policy intervention within and across the 
different sectors. 
2.  Identify a set of (mostly) independent basic dimensions that allows a representation 
of all policy options. Those basic dimensions might consist of scalar choices or a finite 
set of distinct options. 
3.  Construct the overall strategy for a single sector by sampling the basic representation 
of the entire strategy space.
Given the uncertainties inherent in models of capacity and demand, predictions that 
may be made about the likelihood of any given strategy to yield a sustainable outcome 
will be highly uncertain. Moreover, the broad aim of sustainability is reflected in multiple, 
and sometimes conflicting, objectives. Under the circumstances, it would be unrealistic 
to suppose that an optimal strategy could be located – a wiser approach is to identify 
strategies that perform acceptably well under a wide range of possible future conditions 
and against a set of sustainability metrics.
For the numerical evaluation of the impact of strategies on the performance of NI systems, 
the space of possible future conditions is represented formally and is sampled into a 
manageable, representative, subset of all possible future conditions. By evaluating the 
national infrastructure system performance for varying strategies and future conditions, 
the ITRC can identify robust strategies (Lempert, 2002) (i.e. strategies that perform well in 
multiple possible futures). 
2.7.1 APPLICATION TO THE FTA
The FTA develops three illustrative transition strategies that comprise portfolios of 
sequenced sector-specific governance and technology options for NI at specific 
investment levels. These transition strategies are constructed to represent some of the 
boundaries of the decision space. Each transition strategy has goals that guide the 
individual selection of options in the portfolio. 
In the FTA the construction of an alternative set of transition strategies has involved:
1.  Defining key questions of interest to decision-makers.
2.  Determining the essential ambition or aim of each question(s), which provides the 
goal(s) for transition strategies.
3.  Clustering these aims to define three distinct transition strategies.
4.  Using the clustered aims as goals to guide the selection of a subset of options for 
each transition strategy .29
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 2
The three transition strategies for the FTA are Capacity-Intensive, Decentralisation, and 
Capacity-Constrained. These strategies are described in more detail in Chapter 5. These 
strategies enable the exploration of key questions and the multiple dimensions of 
associated aims. Whilst they have been selected to be divergent, they all start with current 
infrastructure systems, limiting the potential for radical change. Thus each of  
these strategies contains a legacy of today’s infrastructure system, which is a key 
characteristic of NI. 
After the construction of the transition strategies, the FTA has sought to interpret 
the strategy in the context of each sector and calculate the corresponding system 
performance. The results of this interpretation are presented graphically in Chapter 5.
2.8 SUMMARY
The analytical framework described in this chapter uses a systems approach. The UK 
national infrastructure is represented as a complex physical and socio-economic system 
that contains the five infrastructure sectors as subsystems. The capacity to supply 
infrastructure services and the demand for infrastructure services are properties of the 
infrastructure system that emerge for a given future projection of external variables that 
influence the system. This interest in emerging properties of the infrastructure system 
renders the framework a ‘system of systems’ analysis.
Figure 11: Overview of the FTA 
methods and framework.
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Building from the core concepts in the ITRC approach outlined in this chapter, the FTA 
focuses on analysing the long term capacity and demand for infrastructure services. This 
requires the development of framework that links the sector models explained in Chapter 
5 with appropriate scenarios and transition strategies, including allowance for sector 
interdependence, as illustrated in Figure 11 (previous page). In particular, the focus is to 
evaluate which policies and infrastructure options are robust (i.e. perform well) across 
multiple possible futures (Wollenberg et al., 2000). 
The six major steps for completing the FTA are summarised as follows: 
1.  Identify the primary drivers that impact the future demand and capacity of 
infrastructure services. 
2.  Construct three possible futures based on these drivers extending to 2100, 
representing high, medium (business as usual), and low growth scenarios. 
3.  Each infrastructure sector projects the demand across the three scenarios.
4.  Identify key performance metrics for each infrastructure sector. 
5.  Construct three transition strategies, which are cross-sectoral strategic plans 
composed of sequenced sector-specific governance and technology options. These 
strategies are oriented toward distinct aims and specified levels of investment.
6.  Evaluate the cross-sectoral performance (according to key metrics) of the three 
transition strategies across the three scenarios. Robust transition strategies perform 
well across the range of possible futures. 
In this chapter we have identified the primary drivers and quantified the three possible 
futures (steps 1–2). Chapter 4 reviews the current infrastructure systems and identifies 
the key performance metrics (steps 3–4), then in Chapter 5 the three transition strategies 
of the FTA are detailed and evaluated for their sector-specific and cross-sectoral 
performances (steps 5–6).31
Arrangements for governance of infrastructure provision have a profound 
influence on the nature of NI systems and the performance of the services 
that they provide. Therefore, before proceeding to the Fast Track Analysis 
of infrastructure systems, in this chapter we review the governance of 
infrastructure provision. 
History shows that the physical components of infrastructure co-evolve with the 
associated institutions, policies, regulations, organisations and social norms (Foresight, 
2008). Governance arrangements will shape the form of UK infrastructure provision 
in future. As a precursor to our analysis of future infrastructure provision, an analysis 
of the evolution of UK’s governance arrangements in the UK has been carried out, in 
order to understand how and why they have developed. Section 3.2 then discusses 
the current governance arrangements. The analysis focuses on the complexity of these 
arrangements, the impact of regulation on investment and innovation, and the role of the 
European Union. Section 3.3 argues that there is an economic case to be made for State 
intervention to strengthen investment in infrastructure sectors. Section 3.4 considers 
interdependencies between sectors, and what these could mean for governance. Finally, 
Section 3.5 offers some tentative conclusions.
Before going any further, it is important to define ‘governance’, and to explain the approach 
used in the analysis of this essential aspect of infrastructure transitions. Governance is not 
the same as government. As Joseph Murphy has pointed out, these two concepts have 
very different meanings and scopes:
“Many scholars agree that politics has been transformed since the late 1980s by a shift 
from government to governance. Or, more modestly, that governance has emerged as a 
more important feature of government over this period. In these debates government is 
understood as centralised, hierarchical and perhaps technocratic, whereas governance 
involves power moving away from the centre and policy making through complex networks” 
(Murphy, 2007).
In other words, governance encompasses much more than what governments do. It 
includes the networks of non-State institutions and actors at national, international and 
local levels that influence policy formulation and implementation (Smith et al., 2005). 
3  Governance of infrastructure  
  provision32
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Another important introductory point is that governance arrangements cannot be 
analysed in isolation from other aspects of infrastructure. Thomas Hughes has illustrated 
this co-evolutionary process with respect to the history of electricity industries in several 
countries. It leads him to a broad definition of what these industries contain:
“Large-scale technology, such as electric light and power systems, incorporate not 
only technical and physical things such as generators, transformers and high-voltage 
transmission lines, but also utility companies, electrical manufacturers and reinforcing 
institutions such as regulatory agencies and laws…” (Hughes, 1989).
This close relationship between the technical and non-technical aspects of infrastructure 
can lead to ‘lock-in’ and returns to scale. Lock-in has been analysed with respect to 
individual technologies (Arthur, 1989) and with respect to entire systems of service 
provision – such as the energy system (Unruh, 2000). Whilst lock-in can be useful if it 
delivers benefits such as reduced costs, it can also be a significant source of inertia which 
can make infrastructure systems difficult to change.
3.1 EVOLUTION OF UK NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
GOVERNANCE
The governance system for national infrastructure in the UK has incorporated local, 
national and EU level actors and institutions into different roles at different stages of its 
evolution. In most ITRC sectors, infrastructure governance has moved from a decentralised, 
locally governed, publicly and privately controlled system with dispersed ownership 
towards a nationally centralised, market focused governance model. The evolution of 
various institutions, rules, regulations, and ownership arrangements is accompanied by 
the emergence of multiple internal and external actors. The most prominent governance 
actors are government departments, economic regulators and environmental regulators, 
accompanied by emerging salience of EU institutions in environmental matters of the 
member states.
Despite experiencing some similar trends, individual infrastructure sectors have not 
evolved in the same way, or for the same reasons. A historical review of infrastructure 
governance (see Annex K of this report) provides evidence that the perceived political 
and economic importance of individual infrastructure sectors has influenced the level 
of investment and political attention received. This has fluctuated significantly over 
time (Marshall, 2010). Much of the existing infrastructure in the UK grew initially out of a 
municipal system of provision that can be traced back to the 19th century. At this time, 
ownership and infrastructure investment decisions were more decentralised and dispersed 
and Local Authorities were largely responsible for many infrastructure sectors. Private 
sector actors operated mainly in unregulated or partially regulated markets (Marshall, 
2010). The post-Second World War period is marked by increased State control and 
national attention given to the infrastructure sectors. Nationalisation and an emphasis 
on integration was particularly important in energy and transportation, each of which 
received significant investment from the State. The main driver of central government’s 
policy was the need to plan and finance investment to underpin economic growth and 
the expansion of service provision. Public investment tended to focus on capital-intensive, 
supply-side infrastructure – though in the 1970s and 1980s this investment was not 
sustained due to increasing pressure on public budgets and slower economic growth. The 
1980s saw the privatisation of almost all ITRC sectors that were in State hands. This led to a 
different set of arrangements to the unregulated public/private governance system of the 
pre-1940s era. 33
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It was accompanied by the establishment of independent economic and environmental 
regulatory bodies such as Ofgem, Ofwat, and the Environment Agency (Marshall, 2010). 
The 1980s privatisations were driven by a strong political belief within the Conservative 
government at the time that the State should not be centrally involved in infrastructure 
provision. This was reinforced by their belief that State owned infrastructure companies 
such as the Central Electricity Generating Board were inefficient. The financial position 
of the government was such that privatisation came as a relief because it allowed the 
state to meet national infrastructure investment needs without placing the burden on 
government budgets (Helm and Tindall, 2009). The phasing in of privatisation in different 
infrastructure sectors was accompanied by the growing influence of environmental quality 
agendas, encouraging expenditure capital intensive infrastructure in order to meet the 
requirements of EC directives (Marshall, 2010). In some cases, the UK was ahead of the 
game. For example, the shift to gas-fired power plants in the electricity sector, which 
largely occurred for economic and political reasons, also allowed the UK to meet some of 
its environmental obligations.
The post-2000 era has predominantly focussed on climate change concerns and the 
reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which subsequently led to the introduction 
of demand management measures in conjunction with low-carbon supply side solutions 
(MacKerron, 2009). This way, governance arrangements have evolved and adapted over 
the years in different forms, playing different roles in individual infrastructure sectors. A 
detailed overview of the evolution of infrastructure governance is provided in Annex K.
3.2 CURRENT GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NATIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION
The historical changes in national infrastructure provision show a pattern in which the 
governance system is regularly adapting to deal with legacies of past decisions and new 
challenges. A rising concern is whether the traditional governance approach of using 
intermittent solutions is fit for dealing with new challenges and much needed future 
transformations. Do they provide the right regulatory signals to large private investors in – 
and owners of – UK infrastructure sectors? Are they fit for purpose to deal with challenges 
such as climate change, demographic changes, growing interdependencies across 
sectors, and an unfavourable investment environment? This section elaborates the current 
governance arrangements, and their potential to deal with future transitions. 
Most infrastructure in the UK is built, owned, and operated by the private sector and 
governed within a centralised regulatory regime. This regime is, in turn, shaped by a 
national and international policy landscape. The post-1980s privatisation of various sectors 
led to the introduction and restructuring of multiple actors performing various roles in the 
delivery, regulation, and finance of the national infrastructure, thus creating a complex 
and fragmented sectoral configuration (CST, 2009). The current funding, delivery, and 
regulatory mechanisms for UK infrastructure are summarised in Figure 12. 
The national infrastructure mechanisms (Figure 12, overleaf) clearly show that a variety 
of actors are engaged in different roles in different sectors. The Council for Science and 
Technology report delineates these mechanisms into a few main categories (CST, 2009):
•  Unregulated market driven consumer paid infrastructure, such as unregulated ports, 
airports, telecommunications, and partially energy – particularly power plants. 
•  Price regulated market driven infrastructure where government plays a pertinent role 
in price regulation, such as energy and regulated airports. 34
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 3
Figure 12: Funding, ownership and regulation in GB infrastructure sectors. Source: Council for Science 
and Technology (2009) ; HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK (2010a).
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Private companies 
in England and 
Wales, public sector 
corporation in 
Scotland –Scottish 
Water
England and Wales: 
price and investment 
regulated (OfWat)
Environmental: DWI, 
EA
Scotland: similar 
structure
Network Rail Passengers and 
general taxation
Private companies DfT/rail regulator sets 
efficiency targets and 
prices for the company
Roads General/local taxation
Some tolls
Publically owned 
(some private toll 
roads)
Government 
controlled and 
regulated
Telecommunication Consumers Private companies Competition
Regulation by OfCom
Waste England and Wales: PFI
General and local taxes
Scotland: Council and 
Scottish Government 
funding
England and Wales: 
Delivery – private 
companies
Scotland: Councils and 
waste industry
England and Wales: 
Government/local 
authority
EA/Defra or SEPA
Scotland: Scottish 
Government and SEPA35
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•  Price regulated infrastructure where the economic regulator plays an important role 
in setting prices and making investment decisions, such as the water, wastewater and 
drainage. 
•  Price regulated infrastructure where consumers and tax payers are the main funders 
and the regulator sets targets and prices, such as the national rail services. 
•  Government funded infrastructure such as roads. 
•  Private finance initiative as the main funding mechanism alongside tax payers’ funds. 
The ownership is private while delivery is at a local authority level. Environmental 
regulations by EA and Defra: Waste sector. 
These current arrangements germinated from the privatisation initiatives of the 1980s and 
have achieved the purpose for which they were designed, such as reducing the problems 
of financial deficiency, inefficiency, and a lack of competition. However, CST argues that 
the fragmented, complex, and disconnected nature of arrangements within and between 
various sectors is a matter of concern, especially when various infrastructure sectors have 
gradually become interdependent and the breakdown of one sector may directly influence 
the other (CST, 2009). 
The regulatory regime is designed so that multiple regulating actors operate at different 
levels within each sector. For example, in water and energy, Ofwat and Ofgem act as 
economic regulators of the industry, the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), Environment 
Agency (EA), as environmental regulators, and Consumer Council as the consumer 
rights regulators (for water). Furthermore, a set of European regulations also govern the 
economic development and environmental impacts of these sectors (see below). Each 
regulator works well within their ambits, negating the fact that future transitions will 
likely need more interconnection between regulators across sectors as well as within a 
sector. Defra’s recent review of Ofwat highlights the disjointed role of various regulators 
which can cause wasteful duplication or conflict of interests, as all interested parties work 
in isolation. This silo-based governance approach within and between interdependent 
sectors may have detrimental ramifications for future transformations (Defra, 2011c).
One response to this complex governance picture could be to call for a simpler, more 
streamlined set of arrangements, with fewer institutions involved. On the other hand, 
there are advantages to the shift towards more diffuse governance arrangements that 
has occurred in most UK infrastructure sectors over the past two decades. In contrast to 
the former State-owned era, there is arguably more transparency now – and more checks 
and balances within the governance system. Amongst the advantages of independent 
economic and environmental regulation is more open scrutiny of the activities of 
infrastructure providers. This can, for example, guard against the ‘gold plating’ of assets and 
promote the efficient use of consumers’ and taxpayers’ money. So perhaps the challenge 
is not necessarily one of excessive complexity per se, instead there is a need to ensure 
that governance arrangements are sufficiently co-ordinated to provide clear incentives 
to infrastructure providers (e.g. Bauknecht, 2011), particularly to respond to longer term 
challenges such as climate change. 36
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3.2.1 REGULATION AND INNOVATION
The current regulatory regime has now been in place for around 20 years, though it 
has evolved significantly since sector-specific economic regulators such as Ofwat were 
established, it was designed to ensure more efficient and cost-effective delivery of services 
to consumers, and of investments. It intended enhancing competition and to regulate 
those parts of infrastructure that were considered to be ‘natural monopolies’ via price 
controls. Although this regulatory regime was clearly designed to meet the needs of the 
time it was created, it is now questionable whether the regulatory system will be fit for 
dealing with emerging issues. 
The economic regulation of monopoly networks (e.g. within energy or water) is presently 
based on the ‘RPI-X’ formula, which have proven to be useful for controlling prices 
and ensuring operational efficiency within the respective utilities. The RPI-X formula 
emerged from the Littlechild report on Regulation of Telecommunications, which gave 
recommendations for a price cap regulation for telecom companies in 1983 (Littlechild, 
1983). This formula was subsequently adopted for the privatisation of all other utilities. The 
formula restricts the companies from increasing tariffs on monopoly services above the 
RPI-X percentage (Stern, 2003). In practice, this allows Ofwat and Ofgem to set limits on 
the changes that water and electricity network companies can make to their user billing 
each year. In the case of water, these price caps, or limits, are set every 5 years through 
the Periodic Review Process (PRP), the last set in 2009 (PRP09) for the Asset Management 
Period 4 (AMP4). Ofwat and Ofgem not only intend to induce efficiency and protect 
consumer interest through these regulations, they also encourage the companies to meet 
sustainability principles (BIS, 2011b). 
Although these regulatory measures have benefitted consumers by reducing costs, 
they have also affected capital intensive investment into long term infrastructure 
development. This has been particularly true in the water sector, where the Periodic 
Review Process with a time span of 5 years is too frequent to provide the financial certainty 
and strategically coherent planning needed to develop long life and large-scale capital 
intensive infrastructure. The price limit regulation on water companies further discourages 
infrastructure expenditure as a part of operational expenditure (OPEX) because of the 
limited ability for network companies to pass on their costs to final consumers (House of 
Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2006). 
The economic regulations, with high emphasis on companies’ operational efficiency 
have been instrumental in solving the post-privatisation challenges of the past. However, 
present day challenges such as climate concerns, water and energy security, ageing 
infrastructure, interdependency between sectors, etc., all demand innovative investment 
responses. The existing system, and its emphasis on controlled consumer pricing and 
operational efficiency, does not incentivise investment in long term R&D and innovative 
solutions. These include low-carbon water treatment techniques, water leakage reduction, 
smarter electricity grids, etc. (Cave, 2009). A recent Ofwat review also reflect that regulators 
not only restrict the scale of R&D investments in the water sector (by considering R&D 
expenditure as a part of the operating expenses), but also the business planning of water 
companies, thus R&D expenditures and business planning for long term planning is fairly 
dependent on consumers ability to pay and Ofwat’s judgement (Defra, 2011c).
However, recent initiatives have sprung up, encouraging companies to plan and think 
with a long term perspective, better coordinate with consumers and other regulators, and 
incentivise innovative solutions. Companies in the water sector have been requested to 
submit Strategic Direction Statements, which are long term (25 years) plans developed 
in consultation with water quality regulators (DWI/EA), and designed to inform business 
plans. 37
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Also quadripartite groups have been formed comprising of companies, consumer forums, 
EA and DWI, to contribute to the price review process. Ofwat is also in the process of 
reforming its price limit regulation with the introduction of its Future Price Limit (FPL) 
project. FPL project aims to develop a framework for future price controls without 
compromising the core objectives of the water sector (Ofwat, 2011a). Ofgem has also 
introduced a new performance based model to set price controls called RIIO (Revenues= 
Incentives + Innovation + Outcomes). The new model incentivises the companies to gain 
higher revenue if they deliver network projects under budget. It also rewards the company 
to be innovative and offers motivation to expand Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF) for 
the growth of smart grids (Ofgem, 2010b). These initiatives have been very recent and 
their impact on future transformations in various sectors is yet unknown (Defra, 2011c). 
Various companies affiliated to the water and energy sectors also use an R&D tax credit 
scheme to explore low carbon solutions in infrastructure. It is a tax relief incentive-based 
scheme which encourages large and small companies to invest in R&D. Water and energy 
companies may also use the scheme, however, the evidence is not very conspicuous.
3.2.2 THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The EU has played an instrumental role in bringing the environment as a major policy 
agenda in planning for infrastructure in UK. Early regulations in the energy and water 
sector were woven around issues such as acid rain, water quality improvement, etc., that 
sought solutions such as use of gas desulphurisation equipment to reduce emissions from 
coal fired plants, and investing in water and wastewater treatment plants, etc. (MacKerron, 
2009). However, since 2000, the emphasis has been placed on sustainable solutions for 
green growth and the transition towards a low carbon economy particularly stemming 
from EU emission reduction targets (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010a). The EU 
regulations manifest in increased environmental commitment of the UK over the years. 
It is also worth mentioning that the UK has taken the lead (in EU), particularly in energy 
liberalisation and in setting targets for emission cuts with the Climate Change Act. Some 
key relevant directives that have been transposed and adapted in the UK are illustrated in 
Table 7.
Table 7: EU Directives that have been transposed and adapted in the UK
Sector EU Directives Actions at the national level
EU emission reduction 
targets for 2020 – 20% less 
than 1990 levels.
Climate Change Act 2008 – 
requirement to cut GHG by 80% 
below 1990 levels by 2050, plus 
5-yearly carbon budgets to limit 
emissions in the short to medium 
term.
Energy EU Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS) under EC directive 
2003/87/EC, amended in 
2009/29/EC. EU ETS is a 
Europe wide Cap and Trade 
scheme that aims to reduce 
GHG emissions through 
cleaner mechanisms and 
joint implementation.
• UK emissions trading scheme 
pilot pre-dated EU ETS, and 
provided early experience to 
inform it. 
• A Carbon Price Floor (CPF) will be 
introduced in the UK from April 
2013 which will offer investors 
some stability in carbon prices – 
though will not lead to additional 
emissions savings.38
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 3
Table 7 (continued)
Sector EU Directives Actions at the national level
Energy 
(cont.)
Renewable Directive (EC 
2009/28) which included a 
20% renewable target for 
2020.
EUs climate action and 
Renewable Energy package 
(Green package) EU third 
package.
• UK Renewable Energy roadmap: 
15% of energy demand is to be 
met from renewable sources by 
2020 (under RE Directive).
• Roadmap intends to implement 
this by domestic action, 
supplemented by international 
trading between member states 
(e.g. of offshore wind power). 
• The EMR white paper 2011 
proposes changes to renewable 
incentives (currently a ‘Green 
Certificate’ scheme known as the 
Renewables Obligation). 
EPBD Directive 2002/91/
EC. Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive (EPBD), 
and the Energy End-Use 
Efficiency and Energy 
Services Directive (ESD).
New Energy efficiency 
directive 2011 designed 
to reduce consumption by 
20% but it is not binding/
mandatory for the moment. 
Building regulations and Housing 
Act of UK aims to enhance energy 
efficiency in buildings through: 
• Labelling: Energy performance 
certificates.
• Carbon calculation of buildings
• Sustainable building codes.
Green Deal: Energy efficiency 
retrofits in homes and businesses 
to be financed through energy bill 
savings. 
Water  Urban Wastewater Directive. 
Bathing and drinking water 
directives. 
Water Framework directive, 
2000/60/EC: Aim for an 
integrated system of water 
protection, improvement, 
and sustainable use through 
binding Environmental 
Quality Standards (EQS). 
Water Environment Regulation 
2003. River Basin Management 
Plans. Increased policy attention 
toward integrated water 
management. High level of 
investment in:
• Water treatment plants.
• Wastewater treatment plants.
Waste  EU Waste Framework 
Directive (amended in 2008), 
the EU landfill diversion 
directive (1999), effective in 
UK, 2002–2003. Requiring 
compliance with EU waste 
targets such as recycling 
and reduction of waste at 
landfills.
Landfill regulation, Landfill 
Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS), 
Landfill tax. 39
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As a whole, EU regulations are major drivers in environmental improvement and 
carbon reduction initiatives at a European wide scale. However, these obligations have 
posed additional concerns, particularly high level of demand for capital investment in 
infrastructure and increased trade-off between policy objectives, thus requiring balanced 
strategic intervention at the national level. 
Most European obligations have been met through capital intensive investments, 
manifested in improved air quality, reduction of waste, and drinking and bathing water 
quality improvement through investments in treatment plants, which was crucial for 
improving the environmental performance of infrastructure sectors. Future actions 
also demand for capital-intensive investments in low carbon infrastructure, renewable 
infrastructure, energy recovery infrastructure, etc. However, these obligations have had 
a limited translation into market reforms that promote the uptake of privately funded 
capital-intensive projects. In energy, some market reforms have been made to encourage 
the market uptake of investments, but in the highly capital intensive water and waste 
sectors, the EU influence on market reforms is practically absent.
Table 7 (continued)
Sector EU Directives Actions at the national level
Transport  Air Quality Framework 
Directive and the Directive 
on Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control 
(IPPC). Designed to comply 
with the EU ambient air 
quality directive to control 
NOX and PM levels in the air. 
Air Quality (England) Regulations 
2000 which saw improvement in air 
quality of UK. Congestion charging 
(in London) and Low Emission 
Zones.
Renewable Energy Directive 
and the Fuel Quality 
Directive.
Renewable Transport Fuel 
Obligation in the UK- in 
relation to uptake of biofuels in 
transportation.
EU’s New Car CO2 
Regulation. 
UK targets to achieve 130 g  
CO2/km as the fleet average for 
each car manufacturer for all new 
cars registered. 
2011 Budget has also announced a 
freeze on company car tax for low 
CO2 cars from April 2013. 
2009/33/EC Directive for 
promotion of clean and 
energy-efficient road 
transport vehicles.
CCC 4th carbon budget report 
(2010) have also translated 
the EU aims in its chapter on 
decarbonising surface transport 
suggesting improved efficiency of 
conventional vehicles, increased 
use of electric technology in both 
road and rail transport, and use of 
biofuels. 40
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Furthermore, many of these directives, although instrumental in meeting environmental 
commitments, pose a dual challenge when two policy objectives conflict with each other. 
For example, water and wastewater treatment or energy recovery from waste, etc. are 
highly energy intensive practises which may result in increased greenhouse gas emissions. 
This poses dual challenges for member states – for example energy recovery along with 
emissions reductions. These targets therefore may lead to inevitable trade-offs between 
objectives that need to be negotiated by stakeholders within governance systems. 
3.3 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION
The privatisation and liberalisation of the UK’s infrastructure sectors was intended to 
enhance competition and enable a more efficient approach to investment and innovation. 
However, the brief reflections on past and present infrastructure governance in the UK in 
this chapter have shown that the impacts have been mixed in practice. 
There is an increasingly widespread view that more government intervention is required 
to boost investment in the UK’s infrastructure – and that this investment will have positive 
economic impacts. This is a view that is now held by senior Ministers. In a recent speech 
to the London School of Economics, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg MP argued that 
particular kinds of infrastructure investment should be favoured: 
“Investment in infrastructure stimulates demand not overnight, but more quickly than many 
supply side measures. And it raises productivity well into the future too. … But it doesn’t 
all support long term prosperity. You have to be ruthless, focusing on the investments that 
transform growth potential: transport, energy, digital communications. Roads and rail so 
manufacturers can transfer goods. Better broadband so small, high-tech companies can 
flourish. Renewable energy so low-carbon industry can too.” (Clegg, 2011).
But what is the evidence that a significant government role is economically beneficial? 
Two main arguments reinforce the need to enhance government involvement in the UK’s 
infrastructure, instead of leaving it to the private sector. The first argument builds around 
the salience of infrastructure networks as an economic and public good from an economic 
growth perspective. The economic importance of infrastructure has long been recognised 
in relation to the growth and development of a nation (Rodrik, 2007) (see Chapter 1). 
Infrastructure systems form the backbone of the economy due to their ability to enable 
entry into markets (e.g. transportation and ICT) and the importance of water and energy 
as factor inputs for both households and industries. The recognition that infrastructure 
networks form part of the economic backbone of a nation and are also an essential public 
good, means that achieving optimal investment requires sufficient public policy attention.
The second argument elaborates upon how the observed market and systems failure in 
providing infrastructure reinforces the need for government attention. The characteristics 
of infrastructure networks are such that a purely privatised system is plagued by market 
failures that may also result in system failures. For example, the large-scale of investment 
required for infrastructure improvement, the long term pay back periods on investments, 
etc., all make it difficult for markets to function as expected. Furthermore, market 
imperfections in the UK’s infrastructure systems, such as information asymmetries and 
monopolistic competition, etc., have induced system failures such as underinvestment 
in non-traditional activities (e.g. green technologies) and inadequate investment in 
R&D and innovation. These market and systems failures are detrimental to the physical 
infrastructure of the UK and thus provide economic rationale for government intervention. 
A large amount of work has been done by scholars supporting the link between market 
failure and system failure as a rationale for policy interventions into market economies. 41
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For example, Gregory Tassey emphasises that it becomes essential to bring policy changes 
in private markets when market imperfections cause underinvestment in infrastructure 
technology (Tassey, 1982). Edquist (2000) further illustrates the need to correct the markets 
equilibriums in sectors such as environment, social security, infrastructure, research and 
radical innovations, etc., by ensuring that market mechanisms are complemented by 
public sector intervention (Edquist, 2000). Scholars such as Dani Rodrik also mention that 
the introduction of non-traditional activities does not naturally germinate within a market 
system and may therefore require positive enforcement by government intervention. 
Rodrik also points to harmonising public and private actions by developing a strategic 
collaboration between the government and the private sector (Rodrik, 2007). 
The combined evidence of infrastructure as an economic and public good and the market 
failures plaguing the UK’s current system provides a strong case for envisioning a new, 
more concerted intervention by the government and synergy between government and 
the private sector.
3.4 INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCIES AND GOVERNANCE
The interdependencies between critical network infrastructures is acknowledged by 
a growing body of literature (Rinaldi et al., 2001; CST, 2009; Buldyrev et al., 2010). In 
the past, economic interdependencies between sectors, for example, transportation 
and energy in the 1940s and energy and water in the 1960s, were the main drivers for 
enhanced State attention in the UK. Perhaps now, the growing risks and uncertainties 
associated with interdependencies (e.g. the failure of the electricity network may cause a 
failure of transportation or water treatment processes) make it pertinent that the current 
governance system is able to address these interdependencies and harness opportunities 
associated with them. Buldyrev et al. term this as catastrophic cascade of failures in 
interdependent networks (Buldyrev et al., 2010). The interdependency may also trigger 
an inverse effect or trade-off between sectors. For example, improvement in water quality 
due to use of water and wastewater treatment water technology may manifest in energy 
intensity, increase in GHG emissions, and energy security issues. However, besides risks 
and trade-offs, interdependency also creates opportunities that allow interdependent 
sectors to benefit from each other. For example, waste and wastewater produce energy; 
water efficiency may induce energy efficiency; or energy efficiency may reduce excessive 
usage of water for cooling purposes. This section of the chapter briefly discusses the 
extent to which infrastructure governance in the UK recognises interdependencies. It then 
uses examples from the water and energy sectors to show how governance can harness 
opportunities or constrain investments that cut across more than one infrastructure sector. 
There is some evidence of cross-sectoral analysis within government – and attempts to 
work across different sectors. For example, Defra is leading the cross-sectoral Climate 
Change Risk Assessment that attempts to enhance the resilience of infrastructure 
sectors to future changes in the climate. Under the auspices of Infrastructure UK, 
the Engineering and Interdependency expert group has a specific remit to consider 
interdependencies. However, such initiatives do not focus on the governance implications 
of interdependencies per se. One forum which could do this is the Joint Regulatory Group 
(JRG) which includes senior representatives from all of the sector-specific economic 
regulators in the UK. However, minutes from JRG meetings give little evidence of attention 
to cross-sectoral issues.5 
5  http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/organisations-we-work-with/joint-regulators-group42
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Similarly, a recent Department of Business (BIS) report Principles for economic regulation 
includes only two short paragraphs on cross-sector working (BIS, 2011b). This section of 
the report focuses on developing common approaches by regulators. It is not concerned 
with identifying ways in which governance might need to change to deal more effectively 
with cross-sector synergies interdependencies which will be dealt with in future phases of 
the ITRC.
3.4.1 WATER AND ENERGY
Turning to a specific example, the water sector is heavily dependent on electricity for 
its processes such as pumping water and treating water and wastewater. Most water 
treatment technologies are highly energy intensive, for example, UV disinfection, 
desalination, etc. Water and wastewater sectors are currently responsible for 3% of energy 
usage in the UK (CST, 2009). Whilst the frequency of water shortages has reduced since 
privatisation, a combination of demographic and climate change, alongside EU regulations 
means that further effort will be required to ensure security of supply in the future (ASC, 
2011). Alongside other supply-side measures, this resulted in the construction of the 
first desalination plant by Thames Water (in 2008), to cater to the peak demand of South 
of East of England. However, any further initiatives to develop desalination plants are 
under question, and on hold, due to objections to the energy intensity of the desalination 
technology (e.g. by former London Mayor, Ken Livingstone). On the other hand, the 
electricity sector is also a highly water-intensive sector requiring sufficient water supply for 
its cooling systems. 
Despite such interdependencies, the regulatory system has evolved over the years in a 
fragmented manner, which discourages companies to harness the opportunities that exist 
amongst interdependent sectors (for example, the use of renewable energy for the water 
sector). The current system encourages investors to operate within their own spheres of 
activity (CST, 2009). For example, a recent Ofwat review has shown that the regulatory 
system prefers utility companies to stick to mainstream technologies such as hydro-
generation, or CHP linked to sludge treatment instead of encouraging renewable energy in 
water and sewerage plants. Although Ofwat has allowed companies to take up renewable 
schemes in the 2009 Price Review process (PR09), the uptake is far less than the potential. 
Ofwat argues that they do not intend to discourage the water companies from promoting 
renewable energy. However, they will only allow the costs of investments in renewable 
energy to be recovered from consumers if such projects have natural synergies with their 
core business. If they do not, they are not considered to be part of the Regulated Capital 
Value (RCV) of the water company concerned. A recent report by Defra concludes that this 
acts as a financial barrier to the implementation of many potential renewable schemes 
(Defra, 2011c). 
At the implementation level, some EU and UK actions have been instrumental in ensuring 
synergies between sectors. For example, the UK’s Renewable Obligation (RO) scheme has 
encouraged water utility companies to opt for solutions that use electricity generated 
from renewable sources (in water distribution and treatment). Various utility companies 
have large hydropower schemes in place to generate electricity from dams and reservoirs 
(for example, United Utilities, a water company, has 11 hydropower projects). Many utility 
companies have also begun finding opportunities in low head hydro technologies. 43
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Recent attention has also gone towards opportunities that exist within conjoint actions 
in relation to energy and water efficiency. According to a Defra study, the end use of 
water, particularly domestic water heating, accounts for 5.5% of UK’s total GHG emissions 
and thus it is the most significant water related energy use (Defra, 2008; Rothausen and 
Conway, 2011). Despite this recognition, various regulations have largely focussed on 
building standards and codes for energy efficiency in homes, and little attention has been 
given towards efficiency in end use of water. As a result, discussions have sprung around 
promoting water efficiency measures through the Green Deal, for example, the eligibility 
of water efficiency measures under the retrofit (home improvement) finance available 
under Green deal (by the Energy Bill committee at the House of Commons) (House of 
Commons, 2010-2011). The committee sees a clear case of including hot water efficiency 
measures in the deal in order to save water and energy, however, cold water measures are 
seen as separate from energy efficiency realms of the scheme. NGOs such as Waterwise 
feel that even though various water efficiency measures are not included in the green 
financing scheme, they still could be recognised as a part of the holistic package where 
water companies can link up with energy companies during the retrofit process. In the 
past major barriers to such joint actions have been due to fragmentation of the regulatory 
authority, as observed in the case of partnerships between energy and water companies 
under CERT schemes (Waterwise, 2011). Nevertheless, multiple opportunities exist in these 
conjoined actions in water and energy measures and potential regulatory reform may 
allow joint partnerships between water and energy companies.
3.4.2 THE LOW CARBON NETWORK FUND
Another good example of a governance arrangement that cuts across more than one 
infrastructure sectors is the recently introduced Low Carbon Networks Fund (Ofgem, 
2011a). It focuses on electricity network companies – specifically the distribution network 
operators (DNOs), and was introduced as part of Ofgem’s 5th Distribution Price Control 
which runs from April 2010 and March 2015. Apart from energy (or more specifically, 
electricity), it has implications for at least two other ITRC sectors: ICTs and, in some cases, 
transport. Within the eligibility criteria for the Fund, there is an explicit requirement that 
projects should accelerate the development of a low carbon energy sector as defined by 
the previous government’s Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC, 2009; Ofgem, 2010a). Within 
this Plan, explicit reference is made to the need to adapt networks to facilitate electric 
vehicle charging and to use ICTs to become ‘smarter’ and more flexible.
The Fund allows up to £500m to be spent by projects led by DNOs – funds that can then 
be recovered from consumers via network charges. There are two tiers to the Fund. The 
first focuses on small projects, with a proportion of DNO costs recovered from consumers. 
Up to £80m is available over 5 years. Eleven projects have been registered in year 1. The 
second tier includes an annual competition for ‘flagship’ projects which are larger in size. 
A sum of £64m was allocated to four projects in year 1 (this is the maximum allowable 
expenditure each year). The competition for year 2 is underway, with six projects in 
contention for funding. The first round of successful tier 2 projects includes:
•  Customer-led Network Revolution (CE Electric, £26.8m). Includes integration of smart 
meters and consumer technologies (e.g. electric vehicle charging points, solar PV 
panels) with network technologies. Partners include Durham University and British 
Gas.
•  Low Carbon London – A Learning Journey (EDF Energy Networks, £24.3m). New 
network technologies in an urban setting. Partners include Logica and Imperial 
College.44
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•  Low Carbon Hub (Central Networks, £2.8m). How technologies can increase the 
capacity of wind in rural networks, including new commercial arrangements.
•  LV Network Templates for a Low-carbon Future (Western Power Distribution, £7.8m). 
Impact of demand side technologies on networks. Linked to existing Welsh Assembly 
and RWE power programmes.
Ofgem is evaluating the Fund as it progresses. It is much too early for a full ex-post 
evaluation of costs and benefits. Therefore, it is also too early to evaluate the extent 
to which the Fund has broken down some of the traditional barriers between sectors, 
and whether it has unlocked positive synergies – for example, by harnessing existing 
ICT investments to benefit the electricity sector. So far, a ‘high level’ review of year 1 has 
been carried out to examine the LCNF bidding and evaluation process (Ofgem, 2011a). 
Ofgem states that the cost benefit calculations carried out by those proposing projects 
were so different that they were hard to compare quantitatively. In future, there will be a 
requirement for a standardised assessment of costs and carbon emissions benefits against 
a ‘base case’ in which the project was not implemented. 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of governance arrangements conducted in the FTA leads to a number of 
tentative conclusions:
1.  The infrastructure sectors that are the focus of this report have governance 
arrangements that have developed over long periods of time, and do not follow 
a common pattern. One important way in which these arrangements differ is the 
relative importance of governance at different levels, i.e. at the European level, the 
national level and the local level. Taking local governance as an example, this is very 
significant in some sectors (e.g. waste), but almost non-existent in other sectors (e.g. 
energy). With respect to EU regulations, there are cases in which these have driven 
action in the UK (e.g. through the landfill tax which was a partial response to the 
Landfill Directive) and also cases in which the reverse is true (e.g. through the UK’s 
early move into emissions trading and energy liberalisation).
2.  There has been a general shift towards liberalisation, private provision and 
competition in infrastructure provision. The nature and extent of this varies, but 
in general this process has led to a more complex governance landscape in which 
national and local government has to negotiate with a range of other actors to 
effect change. Private companies now play a large role in all sectors, and in many 
cases these companies are multinationals rather than UK-owned. Furthermore, the 
implementation of policies and regulations is carried out by a range of agencies such 
as sectoral economic regulators (e.g. Ofwat) and the Environment Agency. There 
is significant debate about the extent to which the ‘liberalisation project’ is able to 
meet the current challenges facing these sectors. 
3.  This complexity of governance has disadvantages, for example, where there are 
overlapping or unclear responsibilities amongst government agencies. However, it 
is also important to note that the plurality of institutions involved in infrastructure 
governance can also be positive in promoting transparency. There is arguably more 
independent scrutiny of infrastructure investments and their sustainability than 
there was in the days of State ownership. This suggests that the challenge may not 
be complexity per se (though there are likely to be cases where some simplification 
could be beneficial). Rather there is a need to ensure that different institutions 
governing a particular sector – or across sectors – are sufficiently co-ordinated to 
provide clear incentives to infrastructure providers.45
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4.  The regulation of monopoly networks (e.g. in electricity, gas and water) via the 
‘RPI-X’ formula has been useful to some extent in making firms more efficient. But this 
approach has been less successful in prompting the investments and innovations 
that are required for the medium and longer term. As this section has noted, there 
are some examples of reform (e.g. in the electricity sector) which are starting to deal 
with these deficiencies.
5.  The governance of most sectors includes multiple policy objectives such as keeping 
services affordable for consumers, protecting the environment, and maintaining 
security. This can lead to opportunities for interventions that can meet more than 
one objective simultaneously. But it also leads to inevitable trade-offs between 
objectives which need to be negotiated by stakeholders within governance systems.
6.  UK infrastructure governance pays too little attention to cross-sectoral 
synergies and interdependencies. Whilst examples have been found of governance 
arrangements that have started to break down boundaries between sectors, most 
infrastructure governance continues to operate in isolated sector-specific silos. 
Furthermore, there is too little evaluation of instances where there have been 
attempts to deal with cross-sectoral issues. In these cases, there is not enough 
evidence about the positive or negative consequences. 
Future phases of the ITRC will elaborate upon this analysis and then go on to explore 
the regulatory arrangements that may help to deliver a more integrated approach to UK 
infrastructure provision.47
The starting point for analysis of future infrastructure provision is to 
understand the current system and trends that have been identified for the 
near term. In the FTA, a review of current infrastructure provision has been 
conducted in each of the five NI sectors: energy, transport, water supply, 
waste (comprising wastewater and solid waste) and ICT. 
4.1 ENERGY
 Reliability of the energy sector is high. Major investments are anticipated in 
electricity generation and distribution in order to maintain and increase capacity, 
meet the UK’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction commitments and 
address EU directives. All other infrastructure sectors are dependent upon the 
energy sector, but of these only transport represents a significant proportion of 
energy demand (34%). Yet the energy sector is also dependent upon transport 
infrastructure and ICT and is responsible for 32% of fresh water abstraction, 
though 96% of that cooling water is eventually returned to rivers.
4.1.1 THE INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM 
Reliability of supply is the primary criterion for performance of the energy sector by the 
three fuel distribution systems: petroleum products, natural gas and electricity. Figure 
13 (overleaf) presents the percentage of final demand for each fuel. The other driving 
performance indicators are environmental; principally emissions of greenhouse gases 
and other harmful combustion products – primarily sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides 
and particulates. End use of energy is highly distributed with vehicles and buildings the 
dominant end users of energy in the UK (Figure 14, overleaf).
4.1.1.1 Petroleum products
The petroleum products system is the energy system’s major point of interaction with the 
transport system (Figure 15, overleaf). This is both because the road and rail tankers form 
the key distribution system for liquid fuels, and more importantly, because the transport 
system is currently fuelled predominantly by these liquid fuels.
4  Status and trends in UK  
  National Infrastructure48
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Figure 13: UK final energy 
demand by fuel in 2010 (DECC, 
2011b).
 
 
Figure 14: UK final energy 
demand by sector 1981–2009. 
Services includes agriculture 
(DECC, 2011f).
 
Figure 15: UK petroleum 
product demand by sector 
(left) and by mode of travel in 
transport (right) in 2010 (DECC, 
2011b).
 
Figure 16: UK natural gas use 
by end use 1981–2009 (DECC, 
2011b).49
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4.1.1.2 Natural gas
Natural gas replaced coal-derived town gas in the 1960s following the discovery of large 
reserves in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS). Initially using the same distribution mains, the 
natural gas system additionally developed a national high pressure transmission network 
to ship gas from (largely East coast) terminals, which now reaches all significant population 
centres in GB. Heating, both in buildings and industrial processes, is dominated by direct 
use of gas (Figure 16). Following market liberalisation, gas also became the fuel of choice for 
power generation in the 1990s, further increasing its share of primary energy. 
European market liberalisation and the decline of UKCS production in the last decade, 
have led to stronger interconnection of the GB gas system to other sources of supply, both 
by interconnection to continental Europe and Ireland, and with liquid natural gas (LNG) 
terminals for marine imports. International pipelines, such as between Bacton (UK) and 
Zeebrugge (Belgium) can transport gas in two directions to facilitate both export and 
import. LNG development is fairly recent in the UK with the first import terminal becoming 
operational in 2005, and four terminals currently in operation (Figure 17). LNG is becoming 
more readily available at a better price from the recent shift in US demand from LNG to 
domestic natural gas (from shale-gas) and greater export from mid-east and south-east Asia.
Figure 17: Map of natural gas 
transmission network (source: 
National Grid, 2011).
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4.1.1.3 Electricity
The GB electricity system has developed incrementally from the post-war system of 
local and regional distribution systems. A high voltage transmission network has been 
developed which enables the GB system to function essentially as a single market (Figure 
18). In 2005, interconnectors joined previously separate grid systems of N. Ireland, 
Scotland, England and Wales. Subsequently, grid systems of England and Wales and 
Scotland are integrated. Three electricity transmission companies own the National 
Electricity Transmission System (NETS). In addition to the existing network, several 
projects to build transmission networks in the UK are either underway or planned by the 
transmission owners.
Figure 18: Electricity 
transmission network with large 
power stations (source: NETS, 
2011).
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Electricity supply was historically dominated by coal with a small hydropower share (Figure 
19). Coal remains a significant fuel in power generation, with production now mainly in the 
central coalfields of Yorkshire and the East Midlands. The share of nuclear increased in the 
1960s and 70s, rising to 27% by 1997, but has since fallen to 15% (DECC, 2011f). Efforts to 
diversify into oil were ended by the oil crises of the 1970s. Gas took an increasing market 
share from the 1990s onwards and is now the largest single fuel. Gas generation is mainly 
close to the point of landing and therefore much closer to the main coal generation sites, 
resulting in a requirement for transmission to deliver a large north to south power flow to 
the population centres of southern England. This is likely to be exacerbated by renewables 
generation sites in the north and west of GB, particularly Scotland.
Electricity demand has grown consistently over the whole period of recent history (Figure 
20) due largely to the penetration of electrical equipment and increasing numbers of end 
uses for electricity in buildings. Future projections in the context of low carbon ambitions 
indicate this trend may stabilise in the short term but could well then increase driven by 
the electrification of both vehicles and heating.
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Figure 19: Electricity generation 
by fuel 1981–2009 (DECC, 
2011f).
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Electricity 
consumption by sector 1981–
2009 (DECC, 2011f).52
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 4
4.1.2 ROLE OF INTERDEPENDENCE
All infrastructure sectors have demand for energy (including the energy sectors itself), 
which is necessary for the operation of NI (Figure 21). The nexus between energy and 
the other sectors in the context of energy supply and demand is shown in Figure 22. The 
evaluation of critical interdependency of energy with other sectors is beyond the scope of 
this report and will be dealt with in future phases of the ITRC. 
Industry
Transport
Domestic
Services
Misc. (including agriculture)
Energy industry use 29%
9%
1%
9% 17%
34%
Water & wastewater Waste Transport
Energy
ICT Energy supply
Energy supply potential
Energy demand management/reduction
Figure 21: Energy by demand 
sector in 2010 (excluding 
non-energy use) (DECC, 2011f).
 
Figure 22: The nexus between 
energy and other ITRC sectors 
in the context of energy 
supply and demand. No critical 
interdependencies are shown.
4.1.2.1 Transport
Transport energy demand is an important interaction as transport uses 34%6  of UK energy 
and 70% of petroleum based fuels. Transport systems are currently critically dependent 
on oil that is increasingly imported due to declining UKCS production. Transport demand 
for energy is the most challenging to reduce, which is why the exploration of alternative 
fuels is very important (e.g. notably electricity, biofuels and hydrogen). Major factors that 
can affect the energy demand regime include large-scale adoption of electric vehicles, rail 
electrification, and increasing biofuels use. With a high penetration of electric vehicles, 
systems such as Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) have potential to provide effective demand 
response services (see Section 5.2.2.2). It is notable that transport infrastructure is critical 
for efficient supply of fuel for power generation, generation and distribution of fuel 
products, and manpower movements. 
6   37% excluding energy industry use.53
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4.1.2.2 Water
Energy is essential for the operation of water treatment plants and pumping stations. 
It also represents the largest cost for the water industry at 28% of the total operational 
cost (Caffoor, 2008). Notably, the water sector demands for energy only accounts for a 
small portion (approximately 3%) of overall energy demand (Rothausen and Conway, 
2011). However, water may account for a more significant percentage of total energy 
demand if supply-side energy-intensive interventions such as inter-basin water transfer, 
desalination and effluent recycling for potable water use are employed (see Table 17). 
Such water treatment processes would have potential implications for electricity demand 
particularly in southern and eastern England. Energy use in the water sector increased by 
4% in 2009/10, and has increased 10% in the past 8 years mainly due to higher effluent 
standards. The energy sector is critically dependant on an adequate water supply for 
cooling purposes. For example, water required for cooling in electricity generation 
represents a significant share (more than 30%) of total abstracted non-tidal and ground 
water (see Figure 33), which is discharged back into the environment. Hence drought is of 
concern to energy supply, and future energy generation may choose a coastal location to 
avoid this risk (e.g. Nuclear New Build).
4.1.2.3 Waste
Almost half of the UK’s renewable energy generation currently comes from the waste 
sector (DECC, 2011a). The greatest part of this comes from combustion of biogas 
generated in landfills. This source of energy will diminish over the next one to two decades 
as the mass of biodegradable wastes (the source of the biogas) going to landfill is reduced 
in line with the requirements of the EU Landfill Directive (European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, 1999). It is likely that some or all of this shortfall will be met by the 
increasing use of other facilities for the disposal of biodegradable and other wastes (e.g. 
incinerators and anaerobic digesters). There is also scope for increases in the utilisation of 
heat from thermal waste treatments. The EA (2008a) reported that in England and Wales, 
energy is recovered from 11% of municipal wastes, which is lower than the EU average of 
17.3% and in countries like Denmark where recovery rate is about 54%. 
4.1.2.4 ICT
While energy use in ICT is relatively small compared to total energy demand, the sector is 
wholly reliant on electricity. The largest consumers of energy in ICT are by far Data centres 
used by businesses, universities and government. These centres are responsible for a 
quarter of ICT’s GHG emissions and 2–3% of UK’s total electricity use (POST, 2008).
The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection identified both ICT and 
energy as Critical Infrastructure sectors. Energy is critically co-dependent on ICT, and 
future electricity system security will likely increasingly depend on ICT for load balancing 
and control, electricity generation, and telecom systems. The use of ICT for improved 
control could induce an overall reduction in energy consumption even if its direct 
consumption increases. There are implications for energy demand through the improved 
use of information for demand reduction. Convergence between electricity and telecoms 
infrastructure in ‘smart grids’ seems very likely over the period to 2030 with government 
planning smart meter rollout to begin in 2014. 54
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4.1.3 KEY ISSUES
Table 8: Major policies/strategies affecting energy demand and supply
Sector Major policy/strategy Brief description/salient features
Energy Energy Act 2008 – implements Energy 
White Paper 2007
Offshore supply infra, CCS, renewables target, 
cash-back renewables incentives, smart metering 
and decommissioning of certain infrastructures
Climate Change Act 2008 Legally binding carbon targets for all sectors, 
carbon budgets, Committee on Climate Change
National Renewable Energy Action Plan 
(EU Renewables Directive 2009/28/EC)
Goal and roadmap for renewable electricity, heat 
and transport
Energy Act 2010 (effective 8 Apr 2010) CCS incentives & demonstration, social price 
support – fuel poverty, Ofgem power on penalty
Energy Act 2011 (effective 18 Oct 2011) Green Deal, minimum housing efficiency, new 
Energy Company Obligation (CERT, CESP)
Electricity Market Reform White Paper 
2011
Carbon price floor, new renewable incentives, 
capacity mechanisms, demand response, emission 
performance standard
Housing Act 2004 (EU EPBD Directive 
2002/91/EC)
Carbon reduction and energy efficiency targets 
and timeline in buildings
Large Combustion Plant Directive (EU 
LCPD, 2001/80/EC)
Retirement plan of 50+MW plants by 2025
EU Energy Services Directive (2006/32/EC) Electronic metering in energy saving measures
Transport Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation 
(RTFO) (under Energy Act 2004 and in line 
with EU Directive 2003/30/EC) April 2009
Biofuel blend from 2.56% in 2008–2009 to 5.3% 
from 2013 onwards
EU New Car CO2 Regulation (effective 
2012–2105)
Average CO2 emissions at 130 g/km in accordance 
with Regulation (EC) No, 715/2007. 95 g/km 2020 
onwards
Water and 
wastewater
EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) 
2000/60/EC (effective 2000, domestic law 
2003–2027
Control and manage impact on water bodies/
groundwater at source, higher treatment 
standards on wastewater
Waste European Landfill Directive (1999) 
(effective in UK 2002–2003)
Reduction of landfill by 25% in 2020 to 65% below 
1995 level. Potential to spur waste to energy, CHP55
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UK policy, across infrastructure sectors, is a major determinant for energy transition 
pathway and the demand supply regime. UK energy policies are geared towards achieving 
major carbon emissions reductions and renewables targets while keeping energy costs 
at an affordable level for consumers and maintaining security of supply. On the supply 
side, incentives are being used/planned to achieve the renewables targets through 
feed-in-tariffs, the Renewable Heat Incentives, Renewables Obligation and Renewable 
Transport Fuel Obligation. In transport, the Plug-in Car Grant provides incentives for 
ultra-low emission vehicles. Significant accelerated tax reliefs are available for businesses 
through Enhanced Capital Allowances scheme under the Climate Change Levy Programme 
when they invest in certain energy and water saving plant and machinery, low emission 
vehicles and natural gas and hydrogen fuelling infrastructure. Presently the Government 
is exploring the possibility of a Green Investment Bank to help fund low carbon projects, 
including renewable energy projects. Table 8 lists key UK and EU policies and strategies by 
sector that impact the energy regime at differing levels.
The UK is a participant in the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme, EU-ETS. On the demand 
side, the government has been pursuing energy conservation and efficiency through 
obligations on energy suppliers for households, the Climate Change Levy on businesses 
and the CRC for large companies outside the EU-ETS. Additionally, the government has 
been pursuing energy conservation and efficiency in energy generation and energy 
intensive entities through obligatory reduction schemes (CERT and CESP) and long term 
carbon pricing in its unique CRC EES scheme. A more detailed discussion on the UK energy 
policy and influences from EU policies can be found in Chapter 3.
4.1.3.1 Infrastructure options
Energy technology supply futures will likely be characterised by an increased reliance 
on low carbon technologies and new energy sources. While this will require a systemic 
change, it will enable the UK to meet its commitments to carbon emissions reduction, 
while preserving high levels of supply reliability and security. Existing scenarios literature 
assumes that these are the key drivers in option selection. 
The use of low-carbon electricity will be critical in the future. Thus, key technologies will 
be low carbon electricity generating technologies with high potential contributions to 
UK supply by the mid-century. These include nuclear fission, wind energy (onshore and 
offshore) and fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS). The mix is highly uncertain 
(as well as controversial) and has major implications for transmission infrastructure. 
Major uncertainties include how much of each of these resources will be developed, the 
continuing role of gas and the future fuel demand and mix in transport. Implications for 
transmission system from electricity exports from distribution networks include reduction 
of power flow in opposite direction resulting from embedded generation, and large-scale 
renewables penetration are not likely to be major. Rather, location, volume and direction 
of power flows from such generation are likely to demand changes in the transmission 
system (NETS, 2011). (See Annex E for more explanation.)
Biomass and the vectors through which it is used (solid, liquid and gaseous) will likely 
play an important role, as well as other renewables (e.g. marine and solar). The latter is a 
possible component in a decentralised generation arrangement, which represent a radical 
departure from existing networks. CO2 disposal infrastructure will need to be considered in 
scenarios with CCS. Gas may remain a viable option.56
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The role of gas, as the least carbon intensive fossil fuel, in low carbon futures is more 
contentious. Gas is currently the dominant fuel for heating in buildings and industry. Many 
scenarios foresee very extensive electrification, but there is no doubt that such a transition 
faces significant technical, social and economic challenges. The scale of change required 
for any given carbon target is reduced by demand reduction.
The key options for energy demand management fall into two broad categories: those 
with potential to reduce demand, and those implied by transitions to low carbon vectors 
(primarily electricity). Demand reduction technologies tend to be grouped at the sectoral 
level (buildings, transport, industry) in the energy futures literature. The implications of a 
transition to a low carbon future have supply assumptions. High levels of electrification will 
need to be considered, particularly to account for the widespread use of electric vehicles 
and heat pumps. Both of these technologies have significant implications for power 
networks, and supply and demand balancing. 
4.1.3.2 Risks
Environmental risks. The main environmental risk is the possible failure to deliver 
ambitious carbon targets. Current plans rely on substantial investment programmes 
being successful in a number of areas, including for technologies that are not yet 
commercially demonstrated (e.g. CCS). Possible scenarios that do not meet targets 
include underinvestment, and perennial delay/failure in deployment of key technologies 
and reduced investment due to financing and/or planning permission difficulties. Other 
environmental risks result primarily from the challenges of these of low carbon supply 
options, notably ionising radiation from all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, CO2 escape 
(from CCS), and landscape /amenity impacts from all large projects, but especially onshore 
(e.g. large wind projects).
Economic risks. Very large energy infrastructure investment is needed to meet the 
requirements of a secure low carbon system under any scenario. These are estimated 
at £200bn by 2020 in Ofgem’s ‘green transition’ and ‘green stimulus’ scenario under 
Project Discovery (Ofgem, 2011b). Very large investment costs are also associated with 
electrification of heat and transport. These will rely on the willingness of private sector to 
invest, often in globally competitive markets. As discussed in Chapter 3, this will rely on a 
stable and sufficiently attractive policy framework.
Whilst future scenarios universally project a large investment requirement in electricity, 
there is significant uncertainty about other infrastructures. Notably the projected decline 
of gas and oil very sharply in some scenarios implies risks of stranded investment. Different 
scenarios also envisage very different potential futures for new energy infrastructures, 
including for carbon dioxide disposal (contingent of CCS) and the possible rise of CO2 heat 
(depending on the widespread use or not of district heating).
Inevitably for long term scenarios, there are major uncertainties about key drivers, 
parameters, and their interrelationship. These uncertainties define energy futures such 
as cost of technology, rate of economic growth, and the relationship between economic 
growth and rate of technological innovation. All of these contribute to investment risks.
Security and social risks. Other infrastructure systems, most economic activity, and many 
key services depend on reliable and continuous supplies of energy, particularly electricity, 
which makes energy security a key driver of social as well as economic risk.57
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Uncertainty of fuel supply options availability has been a well-established risk since the 
1970s, and now increasingly prominent with the decline of UKCS production. While oil 
supply is most likely to be curtailed for geo-political reasons, gas supply seems more likely 
to be continued at a reasonable price and from low-risk countries for decades to come 
(especially from shale gas and increased LNG trade). At the same time, supply and cost of 
key renewable technologies may be significantly affected by change with non-availability 
of rare-earth minerals, for which there is already globally competition, notably a scenario 
of export embargo by China and non-development of mines elsewhere.
Deployment of demand reduction and decentralised supply options will rely on re-training 
and upskilling of very large workforces in key trades, especially in the construction sectors. 
Rapid market introduction may therefore be constrained by non-availability of sufficient 
skilled labour force.
Technology and policy risks. Policy uncertainty and risks of lack of commitment of climate 
change targets by governments may slow the flow of needed private investments. Current 
Government commitment is high, but the prospect of a lack of international agreement 
inevitably raises concern that broader global trends may be less optimistic and eventually 
affect UK investment. 
While technologies such as CCGT, hydro, solar PV and onshore wind are considered 
low-risk technologies with some higher certainty about their future performance and 
market penetration (hence cost profile), there are significant uncertainties arising from 
the technical viability and performance of some other potentially critical low-carbon 
electric generation technologies; game-changing technologies such as CCS, new nuclear, 
offshore wind and other marine technologies are commercially uncertain, as are some key 
technologies for low carbon heat and transport including some biomass technologies and 
heat pumps or wave/tidal.
The major risks identified in the existing energy literature are the failure to deliver low 
carbon and/or energy security goals because of under-investment in demand reduction 
and/or new supply. These may be for technical, economic, social and political reasons, 
or more likely a complex mix. In particular, the main low carbon supply technologies – 
nuclear, CCS and large-scale renewables – all face challenges which, whilst very different, 
may all be characterised as public acceptability for ‘socio-environmental’ reasons. There is 
no sensible way to predict the outcome of such concerns. 
There are also potential threats to the resilience of energy systems from other 
infrastructure systems. These include critical dependencies on water (e.g. for power station 
cooling), transport (e.g. for liquid fuel transportation) and ICT (e.g. for network control). 
These are the focus of ongoing work in ITRC and elsewhere, and are not reported here.
Reliability of ‘wires’ infrastructure is currently relatively low risk and somewhat easier to 
evaluate. One assumption is that very high levels of reliability continue to be required 
in power systems, partly because of the co-dependence of other infrastructure systems. 
Compared to power generation, transmission and distribution will be less affected 
by climate mitigation, but potentially more affected by extreme weather. Reliability 
requirements for other existing energy infrastructures (gas, liquid fuels) are lower, as lower 
availabilities are acceptable and storage is easier. These issues are not included in this 
assessment phase. 58
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4.1.4 CONCLUSION
The UK energy sector has provided a very high level of service reliability, with only 
occasional failures associated with extreme events. Our assumption is that this level of 
security of supply will continue to be required in future, at least for the electricity system. 
Ageing supply infrastructure and statutory UK emissions targets (as well as the effect 
of EU directives and the ETS) mean that the energy sector will see major changes (and 
corresponding investment requirements) over the coming decades.
4.2 TRANSPORT
Demand for transport infrastructure has grown steadily over the years for a 
variety of reasons, including economic growth combined with relatively low 
costs making travel affordable for most, population growth and societal changes 
such as increasing numbers of female drivers. Growth seems likely to continue, 
although demand for passenger car transport may reach a saturation point. 
Continued growth in demand will result in increased congestion and delays, 
particularly on roads and rail, which will in turn tend to inhibit further growth. 
Ambitious carbon reduction targets will drive development in vehicle and fuel 
technologies and result in increased use of electric vehicles on roads, increased 
rail electrification and lower use of carbon fuels. This will require substantial 
investment in energy infrastructure, particularly for electricity. For example, 
ports infrastructure will be affected by changes to shipping if fuel imports were 
to change in the future. Building new transport infrastructure will alleviate 
congestion and delays in the short term but will also induce further demand. 
If transport costs continue to increase, it will inhibit demand, and so adversely 
affect the economy, unless transport growth can be decoupled from economic 
development. 
4.2.1 THE INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM
The transport infrastructure system being considered in the ITRC comprises the trunk road 
network, the rail network, major airports and major seaports. Although vehicles are not 
normally considered to form a part of ‘infrastructure’ they are nevertheless an important 
consideration in this study, in particular in terms of vehicle technology and alternative 
fuels. Measuring the performance of transport systems is complex because (i) performance 
is highly variable both geographically and temporally, and (ii) unlike other sectors there 
is no assumption that ‘security of supply’ should be preserved – whilst undesirable, 
congestion is commonplace on the network. Thus a range of metrics are employed to track 
the performance of the transport network, including:
•  Vehicle kilometres
•  Passenger kilometres
•  Tonne kilometres (freight)
•  Delays on the trunk road network7
•  CO2 emissions
•  Fuel and energy use8
7  Measured in minutes per 10 miles, and recorded for the slowest 10% of routes (as published by the 
Department for Transport).
8  Fuel use for road vehicles is estimated in terms of litres of gasoline equivalent (using data from the 
Tosca project (www.toscaproject.org) to convert electricity use into gasoline equivalent). Energy 
use by rail transport is estimated in units of joules (again using data from the Tosca project).59
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4.2.1.1 Trunk road network
The trunk road network (or strategic road network), managed by the Highways Agency in 
GB, comprised a total of just over 12,000 km, of which 3,500 km was motorway (Table 9). 
Road capacity is defined not only by the length of road but also by the number of lanes 
available. Dividing the total length of trunk road lane kilometres (estimated as 43,656 
lane km, based on unpublished statistics) by the total trunk road length (Table 9) gave 
an average number of lanes of 3.6 (the number of lanes is counted across the whole 
carriageway, i.e. both directions of travel).
Table 9: Trunk road length (km) (as at August 2010) (DfT, 2011d)
Region/country Motorway Other 
trunk 
(rural)
Other 
trunk 
(urban)
Total trunk
North East 55.6  291.2  51.3  398.1 
North West 616.9  310.3  32.2  959.4 
Yorkshire & Humber 380.0  354.7  15.7  750.4 
East Midlands 195.4  518.3  34.7  748.4 
West Midlands 427.0  414.8  41.3  883.1 
East of England 265.0  736.5  33.8  1035.3 
London 60.1  60.1 
South East 644.0  626.1  44.8  1314.9 
South West 326.8  710.4  27.5  1064.7 
England 2970.8  3962.3  281.3  7214.4 
Wales 141.3  1498.6  48.0  1687.9 
Scotland 406.6  2718.2  87.8  3212.6 
Great Britain 3518.7  8179.1  417.1  12,114.9 
Published statistics for total distance travelled (vehicle km) are only available by region for 
all major roads (trunk and principal), rather than for just the trunk road network (Table 10, 
overleaf). However, the trunk road element can be estimated for GB (based on separate 
data indicating the ratio of trunk roads to principal roads, and given that only 1.2% of 
motorways (41 km) are not part of the trunk road network). If regional data on trunk road/
principal road splits are available, they do not appear to have been published. 60
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Growth in traffic has been steadily increasing over the years at an almost linear rate (Figure 
23). This growth has been influenced by many different factors relating to demographics, 
economics, prices, transport options, service quality and land use (Victoria Transport Policy 
Institute, 2010).9 While a review of these factors is outside the scope of this study a few 
comments are pertinent:
•  The number of full driving licence holders has steadily increased over the years as has 
the proportion of female drivers (37% in 1986 to 45% in 2010 – DVLA).10
•  The affordability of travel is an important consideration. Over the past few decades 
relatively low prices, in relation to income, have resulted in lifestyles where car 
ownership and travel have been commonplace. However, this may change with 
rising fuel prices and other travel costs.
•  The development of out-of-town retail parks and hypermarkets close to the trunk 
road network has led to increased demand and reliance for car trips.
9  http://www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm132.htm
10 http://dft.gov.uk/dvla/pressoffice/stats.aspx
Table 10: Distance travelled on major* roads (billion vehicle km) in 2009  
(DfT, 2011c)
Region/country Motorway  Other 
Rural
Other 
Urban
Total
North East 1.1 6.3 3.9 11.3
North West  18.0 9.0 10.8 37.8
Yorkshire & Humber 9.5 10.1 7.2 26.9
East Midlands 6.6 15.8 4.8 27.0
West Midlands 12.4 10.3 7.9 30.6
East of England 8.5 20.6 5.5 34.6
London 2.3 0.6 16.6 19.5
South East 22.4 24.3 10.0 56.5
South West 8.7 17.2 5.0 30.9
England 89.5 114.1 71.8 275.4
Wales 3.4 10.9 3.2 17.7
Scotland 6.6 16.9 5.5 29.0
Great Britain 99.5 141.9 80.5 321.9
Trunk road element 98.3 58.1 5.5 161.9
* Major = trunk roads and principal roads61
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4.2.1.2 Rail network
The rail network is managed by Network Rail (established in 2002), who are regulated by 
the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). The whole rail network track length of approximately 
20,000 miles (32,160 km) (Network Rail, 2011) was used for the FTA (although it was 
originally envisaged that ITRC would focus on a mainline railway network; there is no 
common definition of ‘mainline rail’ nor any readily available statistics for such an entity). 
The National Rail Travel Survey (NRTS) indicated that there are around 2.7 million rail 
journeys undertaken in GB on any typical working day, with morning and evening peak 
periods; a breakdown by region is shown in Table 11 (overleaf). The ORR reported 1258 
million franchised journeys in 2009–2010 . 
There has been a trend of increasing demand for rail transport over the last 20 years 
(Figure 24, overleaf).
Total rail freight moved in 2009–2010 was 7.6% lower than 2008–2009, at 19 billion net 
tonne km, while the total coal freight moved was 21.2% lower (at 6.2 billion net tonne km). 
Oil and petroleum moved by rail also decreased (by 4.5%), but the following commodities 
increased in 2009–2010 compared to 2008-09: metals by 6.8%, construction by 3.0%, 
international by 5.7% and domestic intermodal by 6.5% (ORR, 2011).
The amount of freight lifted was 87.2 million tonnes in 2009–2010, a 15.1% decrease from 
2008–2009. There was an 18.7% decreased in the amount of coal lifted (37.9 million tonnes 
in 2009–2010). The amount of ‘other’ freight lifted was 49.3 million tonnes in 2009–2010, a 
fall of 12.1% compared to 2008–2009.11
11 Non-franchised journeys totalled around 2 million, so are negligible by comparison. The ORR 
pointed out that their figures may be considered to be inflated, since a journey involving two 
trains would be counted as two journeys, whereas, for the NRTS, this would only be counted as one 
journey.
Figure 23: Growth in traffic in GB 
(1950–2009) (Glaister, 2010).
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Table 11: Total number of passenger rail journeys, by country and region of origin 
(GB)
Region / country 000s %
North East 26  1
North West 198  7
Yorkshire & Humber 127  5
East Midlands 52 2
West Midlands 121  5
East of England 209  8
London 1275 48
South East 373  14
South West 73  3
England 2454  91
Wales 48  2
Scotland 181  7
Great Britain 2683 100*
*Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding
 Figure 24: Passenger kilometres 
(1987–2010) (billions) (ORR, 
2011).
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4.2.1.3 Airports
Airports are privately owned and managed. For example, BAA own Heathrow, Stansted, 
Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Southampton airports. They are regulated by the Civil 
Aviation Authority and by the Competition Commission. 
Airport capacity is usually described either in terms of terminal capacity (number of 
passengers) or runway capacity (number of flights). There seems to be rather limited 
information available about these (Table 12). The figures suggest that Heathrow is 
operating at 95% runway capacity; Gatwick at 80%; Stansted 59% and Manchester 53%.
Considering all UK airports (not just international ones), the headline statistics given by the 
Department for Transport were: 
•  In 2009 there were 2.1 million air transport movements (take-offs and landings) and 
218 million terminal passengers at UK airports. 
•  20% of air transport movements and 11% of terminal passengers were on domestic 
services. 
•  Heathrow was the UK’s busiest airport, handling 22% of air transport movements, 
30% of terminal passengers and 62% of freight tonnes. Heathrow also handled 
the majority of transfer passengers at UK airports; in 2009, 38% of passengers at 
Heathrow were transfers. 
•  The five London airports accounted for 60% of all terminal passengers at UK airports 
in 2009, down from 65% in 1999. 
•  Between 1999 and 2009, overall terminal passenger numbers increased by 48% 
at the regional airports compared with 20% at the five London airports. However, 
regional airports experienced a proportionally larger fall between 2008 and 2009 at 
11% compared with a 5% fall at the London airports. 
Table 12: Airport usage and capacity in 2010 (terminal and runway). Source: BAA, 
individual airport and Airport Coordination Ltd websites)
Airport Terminal 
passengers
Terminal 
capacity 
per year 
estimate
Total 
movements 
per year
Capacity 
flights per 
year*
Heathrow 65,881,680 90,000,000 454,823 480,000
Gatwick 31,375,290 46,000,000 240,500 300,000
Stansted 18,573,803 25,000,000 155,140 264,000
Manchester 17,759,015 25,000,000 159,114 300,000
Luton 8,738,717 12,000,000 94,575 not available
Edinburgh 8,596,715 13,000,000 108,997 not available
* From capacity declaration.64
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4.2.1.4 Seaports
Seaports are privately owned and managed. The largest owner is ABP (Associated British 
Ports), who operate 21 ports, including Southampton, Hull, Grimsby & Immingham and 
Port Talbot. They are regulated by various port authorities. Port capacity is described 
here in terms of quay length, with an estimated volume of TEU (twenty-foot (container) 
equivalent unit) per annum derived from this (Table 13).
Figure 25: Trends in air traffic at 
UK airports (1991–2009) (DfT, 
2010c).
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Figure 26: International sea and 
channel tunnel passengers (DfT, 
2010a).
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Table 13: Port usage and estimated capacity in 2008/2009/2010 (thousand tonnes)
Ports (all traffic) Quay 
length 
(m)
Capacity 
in TEU/
annum
Port Group 2008 2009 2010
Grimsby & Immingham 2289 2,540,790  Humber 65,267 54,708 54,029
London 3750 4,162,500  Thames and Kent 52,965 45,442 48,060
Milford Haven 520 577,200  West and North Wales 35,875 39,293 42,788
Southampton 1357 1,506,270  Sussex and Hampshire 40,974 37,228 39,365
Tees and Hartlepool 660 732,600  North East 45,436 39,163 35,697
Forth (incl. Dunfermline) Scotland East Coast 39,054 36,690 34,335
Liverpool 1097 1,217,670  Lancs and Cumbria 32,204 29,936 30,063
Felixstowe 2793 3,100,230  Haven 24,988 24,267 25,756
Dover 660 732,600  Thames and Kent 24,344 25,087 24,093
Belfast   Northern Ireland 13,040 12,050 12,827
Clyde incl. Ardrossan Scotland West Coast 14,338 12,552 12,283
Medway 650 721,500  Thames and Kent 14,971 13,150 12,235
Sullom Voe Scotland East Coast 14,539 11,217 11,270
Hull 300 333,000  Humber 12,249 9771 9236
Port Talbot 290 321,900  Bristol Channel 8147 5156 8832
Bristol 1050 1,165,500  Bristol Channel 11,527 8999 7272
Manchester Lancs and Cumbria 7438 6670 7127
Glensanda Scotland West Coast 6336 5591 5846
Note: Capacity in TEU/year is given as [Quay length (m) x 1100]; Maximum weight of 1 TEU is 14 tonnes.
Since the opening of the Channel Tunnel in 1995 there has been a steady decline in 
the number of passengers using Britain’s sea ports (Figure 26). The 3.1 million domestic 
passenger journeys in 2010 were on the three major routes (between mainland Britain and 
Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands) virtually unchanged compared 
to 2009. Dover, the largest UK ferry port, handled 13 million journeys in 2010 (virtually 
unchanged from 2009 and 18% lower than in 2000). However, the next busiest ports in 
2010 were Portsmouth (2.2 million passengers) and Holyhead (2 million passengers), 
where there were increases of 3 and 7% respectively on 2009. Of these sea passenger 
journeys, 1.3 million were for cruises and 55,000 long sea journeys.66
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4.2.1.5 Inland waterways
Movement of freight by inland waterway (canals, rivers) forms a relatively small but 
important proportion of the total amount of freight that is moved in the UK: DfT domestic 
freight statistics (TSGB0499) for 2009 indicated that of the total 221 billion tonne km of 
freight moved, 22% was by water (short sea shipping and inland waterways) and about 
one third of this was by inland waterways. The majority of freight lifted on inland waters 
is transported to or from ports outside the UK: only about 7% of freight lifted is wholly 
internal (i.e. non-seagoing). 
British Waterways manages 80% of the canals and rivers (3500 km) in GB.12 Inland 
waterways have substantial spare capacity for carrying freight: studies carried out by 
British Waterways indicated that London’s waterways carried up to 17,000 tonnes of freight 
in 2003 and there was the potential to carry 800,000 tonnes alone on the West London 
Canal network.
4.2.2 ROLE OF INTERDEPENDENCE
Transport is a derived demand and, as an intermediate good, an input into the production 
of most other economic sectors. All infrastructure sectors rely in some part on the 
transport network, to enable staff and goods to reach their destinations, and failures of 
the transport network can have serious cascading effects for other sectors. However, the 
main interdependency lies between transport and its future energy needs, particularly 
if a substantial increase in electricity generation is needed to power electric vehicles 
and for increased electrification of the rail network. While the majority of electric vehicle 
recharging is likely to take place at home, it also seems likely that substantial battery 
recharging infrastructure will be needed in the field (e.g. at garages, supermarkets, 
workplaces, etc.). Moreover, electrification of the transport sector would require large 
investment in additional generating capacity, national transmission networks and local 
distribution networks.
4.2.3 KEY ISSUES
In the past, demand growth has been strongly correlated with GDP growth, especially for 
freight. Some recent evidence has suggested decoupling of the two (McKinnon, 2007), 
however it remains to be seen if this is a new long-run phenomenon. Some limited cross-
modal effects exist, such as the low cross-elasticity of car demand to rail price (Preston, 
2009). 
National and EU transport and energy policies are likely to be influential on transport 
supply and demand. Particularly important will be the response to the ambitious carbon 
emissions reduction targets that are in place. The Committee on Climate Change’s 
(CCC) 4th carbon budget, in its chapter on decarbonising surface transport (Committee 
on Climate Change, 2010), proposes cuts in transport emissions in the 2020s through 
improved efficiency of conventional vehicles, increased penetration of electric vehicles 
(battery electric, plug-in hybrid and, potentially, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles), increased use 
of biofuels, change in behaviour (Smarter Choices, eco-driving, speed limit enforcement/
reduction), road pricing, freight efficiency improvement and electrification of rail. Some of 
these options (and others) also apply to aviation, as discussed in ‘Meeting the UK aviation 
target – options for reducing emissions to 2050’ (Committee on Climate Change, 2009). 
12 http://www.britishwaterways.co.uk/67
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4.2.3.1 Infrastructure options
The ways in which transport is taxed, and the amounts levied, will influence mode choice 
and future transport demand. Existing transport taxes include airport tax, vehicle excise 
duty (road tax) and fuel tax (e.g. on petrol and diesel). Toll charges and road pricing 
schemes (e.g. M6 motorway toll; London congestion charge) will also have an influence on 
transport demand. Depending on their implementation, the introduction of road pricing 
schemes may be equivalent to increases in fuel tax in terms of their impact on travel 
demand. Mills et al. (2011) considered it likely that road pricing will become a necessity to 
replace declining fuel duty, as electric vehicles become more commonplace. 
Infrastructure investment will affect transport supply. For rail, the modelling includes 
additional route km provided by the introduction of specific schemes (Crossrail, HS2 and 
HS2+), which seem likely to go ahead. Mills estimated required road investment of  
£9 billion a year (a two-thirds increase over the past decade), with renewing existing road 
assets costing £5 billion a year and the remaining £4 billion required to address ‘choke’ 
points and to expand capacity on the most congested arteries.
Figure 27. Train travel times 
(DfT and HS2 Ltd, 2011) to 
London with and without 
HS2 phases 1 and 2. Phase 3 
times (Greengauge21, 2009) 
for Glasgow and Edinburgh 
are indicative, based on an 
England–Scotland extension. 
Figures rounded to 5 min.
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In addition to, or instead of, building new roads, additional capacity may be realised 
through the use of intelligent transport systems (ITS), employing advanced ICT. Existing 
examples include the use of variable speed limits on motorways to improve vehicle 
flow and allowing use of the hard shoulder at certain times, supported by ITS. Future 
systems may involve communications between individual vehicles and/or with roadside 
infrastructure, with various potential applications and benefits, in terms of capacity, 
safety and information provision. Such systems may provide information about queues 
ahead and other hazard warnings, or could actively control the vehicle to some extent 
(e.g. to regulate speed or vehicle headway or to avoid collisions). Vehicle flow may also 
be increased by raising the speed limit, as has recently been suggested for motorways 
(Stratton, 2011), however there are safety concerns about speed, particularly associated 
with variations in speed between different drivers, alongside concerns about resultant 
increased emissions. Limited additional capacity at Heathrow airport may be facilitated 
by allowing the use of both runways for arrivals or departures under prescribed 
circumstances.13
Current year (2010/11) spending on railways was reported as £7.584 billion (HM Treasury, 
2011). Major schemes under development are Crossrail (scheduled for 2018) and the HS2 
scheme from London to Birmingham (410 track km to be opened in 2026) and subsequent 
extensions (HS2+) to Leeds and Manchester (1072 track km to be opened in 2035) (HS2, 
2011) HS2 would effectively increase capacity by 4.6%. In practice, it will be a greater than 
this: segregating homogenous high speed services will mean that initially 10 trains per 
track per hour will be provided on the busiest section, with an aspiration for this to reach 
18. By contrast the average for the rest of the system is less than 2 per hour. Removing fast 
trains from the West Coast Main Line would also mean more homogeneous train speeds on 
that line which would also increase potential capacity.
Analysis for the 2010 White Paper implies demand of around 44 million passengers per 
annum for HS2 but around 57% of these would be abstracted from existing rail. The net 
gain of around 19 million passengers is small compared to the 1260 million journeys made 
on the National Rail network (1.5%). However, the mean trip length of current journeys on 
the National Rail Network is only around 40 km. For HS2 it might be in excess of 200 km. 
This would suggest an increase in passenger km of around 7.5%.
The main policy and technology options are associated with the carbon reduction targets. 
Conventional vehicle technology advances will reduce emissions and individual vehicle 
fuel consumption but in the past this has been counteracted by increased car use and/
or the use of heavier/more luxurious vehicles. Fully electric and hybrid vehicles seem 
likely to gain a significant penetration of the car market but the timescales are difficult to 
predict, being dependent on advances in battery technology to increase range, allowing 
longer trips to be made, and the extent to which consumers overcome range fears. Other 
future fuel sources include biofuels and hydrogen fuel cell technology. The infrastructure 
requirements for electricity and other alternative fuel technologies will be large and may 
inhibit their rate of growth. Rail electrification will increase. 
The increase in use of electricity in transport will have a significant impact on energy 
infrastructure and on electricity prices. The switch from highly taxed petrol/diesel to lower 
taxed electricity will also have an important fiscal impact, requiring government to reduce 
expenditures and/or find alternative income streams. Road user charging could be one 
such income stream. Glaister and Graham (2004) estimated that a national congestion 
charging scheme would increase car costs from 10.4p per km to 15.2 per km at 2003 prices, 
that is, an increase of 46%. 
13 http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/national_infrastructure_plan291111.pdf69
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Other policy options include parking charging and emissions trading. In extreme, a future 
policy option could be personal carbon credits and there may be tighter land use planning 
controls. 
Transport efficiency could improve through growing utilisation of ‘embedded’ 
technologies, resulting in ‘intelligent’ vehicles, using combinations of ever cheaper sensor 
technology with real-time GPS tracking, vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure 
communications and enhanced data processing and modelling, resulting in better 
optimisation of UK-wide transport networks, increased fuel efficiencies and reduced levels 
of congestion, alongside better freight management systems. Possible developments in 
aviation include open rotary engines and blended wings, while a possible development in 
shipping is the sky sail. Solar and nuclear power may be used by both air and sea transport 
but there is likely to be a continued high dependency on fossil fuels and close substitutes 
(biofuels).
The overall demand for personal transportation could be reduced if attitudes towards 
cycling, car-sharing, home-working and the use of public transport could be changed, 
although without a reliable and cost-effective public transport system, such changes may 
be difficult to achieve.
4.2.3.2 Risks
Future energy availability might constrain demand. In the short term, the price of oil will be 
a significant factor influencing the level of demand for transport, particularly for the use of 
private and freight road vehicles. Demand will be highest where prices are relatively low, 
combined with high GDP and population growth. 
In the medium term, a risk may be the failure of uptake of new technologies, or if there 
is a lock in to a sub-optimal technology (e.g. plug-in electric vehicles rather than battery 
swaps).
In the longer term, climate change may require large-scale infrastructure adaptations to be 
made. For example, materials may need to be more resistant to extremes of temperature 
and infrastructure may need to be adapted to deal with greater variations in precipitation 
and rises in sea levels. Significant changes in the energy market for transport and other 
sectors could have significant impacts on requirements for port infrastructure; changes to 
fuel imports in the future will affect many aspects of fuel shipping and storage.
4.3 WATER SUPPLY
Great Britain supports a diverse range of consumptive and non-consumptive 
uses for water, all of which possess stringent levels of service with respect to 
both water quantity and water quality dictated by a complex legislative and 
regulatory framework. As well as significant geographical and seasonal variability, 
pressures including escalating consumptive demand, an ageing and deteriorating 
infrastructure, affordability, and a potentially critical redistribution of resource 
under future climates. This provides a potent set of challenges for the water 
sector through the 21st century. It is unlikely that even revolutionary change in 
the behaviour of consumers will be sufficient to alleviate such pressures without 
additional investment in infrastructure. Thus, a broad programme of measures 
combining systematic management of supply capacity and the growth in 
consumptive demand across all users of the water environment is necessary.70
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4.3.1 THE INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM
The water environment of GB consists of coasts, estuaries, rivers and lakes, and 
groundwater sources. It supports a wide spectrum of uses both consumptive and 
non-consumptive, with variable requirements of both water quantity and water quality 
(Table 14). Consumptive uses alter the quantity or quality of water available to other users; 
non-consumptive uses do not. Both may involve the relocation of water.
In order to meet consumptive (and some non-consumptive) demand, the abstraction, 
re-purposing or relocation of water is necessary, achieved via networks of infrastructure 
capable of aggregating, treating and distributing water from many sources. This 
infrastructure aims to provide water that is fit for purpose at the point of use, subject to 
specified levels of service defined by continuity of supply, pressure and water quality that 
vary according to the intended use. It typically comprises dams that regulate river flows 
and create artificial lakes; means of abstracting raw water from tidal sources; groundwater 
sources; non-tidal rivers and lakes; treatment works for rendering abstracted water suitable 
for consumption; and networks of conduits and local storage facilitating the transmission 
of either raw or potable water to the point of use.
Flood defence infrastructure on rivers and costs reduces the risk of flooding. Urban 
drainage systems mostly have a dual function shared with sewage infrastructure, as 
discussed in Section 4.4.
All consumptive uses of water, and some non-consumptive uses, require elements of 
infrastructure. Their locations, and quantification of their interactions with the water 
environment, are necessary for a fully comprehensive analysis of the water supply 
infrastructure. Although a database of physical water infrastructure asset ownership and 
operation across all sectors is unavailable, it is probable that the public water supply 
constitutes the greatest volume of infrastructure. 
The performance of the system is defined by the balance between the demand for water 
and the capacity of infrastructure components to abstract, store, treat, and deliver water 
to consumers; however, only a finite volume of water exists in the environment at any 
one time, shared between all consumers, including the environment itself. Thus, the 
performance of water supply infrastructure is constrained by the availability and quality 
of raw water in the environment. This is a function of climate as well as land-use and 
management practices, and requires regulation to ensure that exploitation of the water 
environment by one sector does not impinge disproportionately upon the uses of water by 
other sectors.
Table 14: The classification of water uses as consumptive or non-consumptive
Consumptive uses of water Non-consumptive uses of water
Agriculture and irrigation Environmental regulation
Electricity generation (as cooling) Hydroelectric electricity generation
Industry and manufacturing Recreation
Public water supply Transportation71
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It is not a national system of infrastructure: abstraction, impoundment and other 
interactions with the water environment are only possible where sufficient water exists; 
thus, regional or local networks distinguished by hydrological boundaries and asset 
ownership have developed around these foci. Few strategic interconnections exist 
between regions, but those that do are indispensable.
The regulation, planning and management of water resource occurs on the scale of these 
regional networks; strategic oversight is accomplished via a number of independent 
bodies with well-defined but limited remits.
In England and Wales, water utilities are in private ownership regulated by Ofwat 
(the economic regulator), the Environment Agency of England and Wales (EA – the 
environmental regulator) and the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI – the drinking water 
quality regulator). Scotland’s only major actor in the water environment, Scottish Water, 
is state-owned and regulated via the Water Industry Commission for Scotland (WICS), the 
Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and the Drinking Water Quality Regulator 
for Scotland (DWQR) (see Figure 12).
Targets for the regulation of the water environment are established by the EU and 
enshrined in UK law; however, it is the responsibility of the UK to implement and enforce 
them.
4.3.1.1 Water abstraction
Between 1995 and 2008, more abstraction was made from non-tidal surface waters than 
from either tidal surface waters or groundwater sources (Figure 28).
Abstraction for electricity generation and public water supply combined accounted for 
around 85% of abstraction from all surface waters between 1995 and 2008, while the 
public water supply represented 75% of abstraction from groundwater sources for the 
same period. 
Whether for consumptive or non-consumptive use, the electricity generation sector 
usually constitutes the principal consumer of water abstracted from the tidal (Figure 
29, overleaf) and non-tidal (Figure 30, overleaf) surface waters of England and Wales. 
Its demand is volatile; abstraction for hydroelectric electricity generation in particular is 
depressed during periods of intense water scarcity and increases opportunistically when 
water is relatively abundant; abstraction for public water supply is generally more uniform 
(Figure 31, overleaf), and is consistently the largest abstractor from groundwater by 
volume (Figure 32, overleaf). 
Figure 28: The division of 
abstraction between water 
sources in England and Wales by 
volume (1995–2008 data).
Non-tidal surface waters
Tidal surface waters
Groundwater surfaces
52%
37%
11%72
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Figure 29: Estimated abstraction 
from tidal surface waters 
(England and Wales).
 
Figure 30: Estimated abstraction 
from non-tidal surface waters 
(England and Wales).
 
Figure 31: Abstraction from 
non-tidal surface waters for 
the electricity generation and 
public water supply sectors 
(England and Wales).
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The public water supply is the principal abstractor from non-tidal surface and groundwater 
sources, composing some 45% of total abstraction from these sources by volume on 
average between 1995 and 2008 (Figure 33).
There are some important regional differences, determined by environmental constraints 
and land-use management decisions.
Table 15 indicates that abstraction from non-tidal sources in Wales and abstraction from 
tidal surface waters in the northwest of England constitute 17% and 11% of all abstraction 
in England and Wales between 2005 and 2008, respectively. Further subdivision by sector 
indicates that this is ostensibly attributable to abstraction for electricity generation and, to 
a lesser extent, public water supply, in both cases.
Figure 32: Estimated abstraction 
from groundwater sources 
(England and Wales).
Figure 33: Abstraction from 
non-tidal surface waters and 
groundwater sources as a 
proportion of total abstraction 
from non-tidal surface waters 
and groundwater sources (1998 
to 2005 data).
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4.3.1.2 Public water supply
Great Britain possesses a large public water supply infrastructure network, many 
fundamental components of which are antiquated remnants of the country’s industrial 
heritage: reservoirs and aqueducts constructed at massive financial, human and 
environmental expense over the preceding 150 years. Supplemented and augmented 
by more recent developments, the lifetime value of these assets is almost incalculable, 
although some estimate £250 billion (Water UK, 2009), and significant periodic investment 
is necessary to mitigate deterioration. Total investment in the water supply of England and 
Wales since 1990 now exceeds £80 billion (Water UK, 2009), and continues to grow at a rate 
greater than £4 billion per year (EA, 2008b; Water Industry Commission for Scotland, 2011).
Metrics to assess the performance of the public water supply include the pressure of 
water at the point of delivery, the frequency and duration of service interruptions, and 
the frequency and duration of restrictions on the use of water. A particular example of 
the latter, the number of drought orders issued across GB exhibits a decrease between 
1976 and 2008 (Figure 34) and in particular since privatisation of the water industry in 
1989; however, it should be noted that this may not be a robust performance metric as the 
granting of Drought Orders involves multiple considerations (ASC, 2011).
Across England and Wales, the public water supply constituted only 8% of all abstraction 
licences in force in 2008, and 21% of the total licensed abstraction, but accounted for 
almost 50% of estimated actual abstraction from non-tidal surface and groundwater 
sources of water. Public water supply networks serve almost 100% of the population of GB, 
with few, isolated, local exceptions, and comprises over 1000 reservoirs, nearly 3000 water 
treatment works (House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2006) and 450,000 
km of conduit (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2011). Although not necessarily indicative of 
poor performance, a significant proportion of these infrastructure assets are underground 
and of variable age and condition. Approximately 17,000 Ml/d are supplied with a total 
capacity of some 20,000 Ml/d (Ofwat, 2011b).
Table 15: The proportion of national abstraction contributed from each source by 
each Environment Agency region (2005–2008 data)
EA region Groundwater 
sources (%)
Non-tidal surface 
waters (%)
Tidal surface 
waters (%)
Anglian 2 3 7
Midlands 2 8 2
North East 1 8 4
North West 1 4 11
South West 1 6 4
Southern 2 2 8
Thames 3 5 2
Wales 0 17 075
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Figure 34: The number of 
drought orders issued in GB.
 
Figure 35: The ownership of 
water supply undertakings 
in the UK by revenue as a 
proportion of total revenue 
(OFT, 2010).
 
Figure 36: The volume of water 
lost from the water supply 
infrastructure of England and 
Wales, 1992–2010 (Defra, 
2011c).
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The majority of water supply undertakings are under private ownership (Figure 35, 
previous page), derived from historical patterns of ownership, demand and investment. 
This is reflected in the spatial distribution of the capacity of the water supply infrastructure, 
which exists as regional networks with fragmented offshoots serving populations of 
consumers too remote for connection to the regional networks in a cost-efficient manner.
Contemporary models highlight 11 million households across the south, southeast and 
east of England as being of ‘serious water stress’ to an extent necessitating the imposition 
of mandatory measures intended to reduce the demand for water across the regions (EA, 
2011).
Approximately 20% of the water put into the public water supply is lost via leaks in 
distribution and local supply infrastructure. Subject to an annual investment of some 
£2bn in asset remediation, the volume lost per day in England and Wales fell by over 30% 
between 1992 and 2010 (Figure 36, previous page), and also by a similar proportion in 
Scotland between 2002 and 2011 (Figure 37), the total loss from the network exceeds 4000 
Ml/d by some accounts (Water UK, 2010). This is sufficient for the needs of some 25 million 
people of average consumption behaviour. In Scotland, the volume of water lost per 
property can be between two and six times that lost per property in England and Wales; 
however, losses per kilometre of network are comparable (Ofwat, 2008).
Exhibiting a range of some £55m, there is significant variability in the rate of investment in 
leakage reduction between the 10 largest water service providers, contingent on a number 
of economic and environmental factors.
Figure 37: The volume of water 
lost from the water supply 
infrastructure of Scotland, 
2002–2011. http://scotland.gov.
uk/Publications/2011/09/ 
05154117/24 
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4.3.2 ROLE OF INTERDEPENDENCE
4.3.2.1 Energy
There is a two-way interdependency with the energy sector, which requires water for 
cooling and hydroelectric electricity generation, while the water industry consumes 
significant electrical energy through the pumped abstraction and distribution of water 
and the treatment of abstracted water for consumption. Flooding (i.e. a surplus of water 
that exceeds the capacity of the water infrastructure), poses a significant hazard to energy 
infrastructure in particular.77
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Consumers of water typically couple their consumption of water and energy through 
the heating of water in cooking and cleaning, and the cooling of their environments via 
air conditioning, and further demands on energy are likely to arise from many of the 
technological adaptations to increased water scarcity (e.g. desalination, pumped storage, 
inter-basin transfer, effluent recycling, etc.).
4.3.2.2 Transport
Historically, the transport network has provided a means of transporting water during 
emergencies; the movement of water bowsers via road to remote areas disconnected from 
the main regional water supply networks remains a key component of many providers’ 
drought plans.
4.3.2.3 Waste
Leaching from landfill poses a potential risk for contamination of the natural and 
engineered resources comprising the water supply infrastructure network. There may 
be potential for transporting elements of solid waste via the conduits of the wastewater 
network, which relies on a sufficient supply of water.
4.3.2.4 Wastewater
Water consumption, in combination with other biological processes, naturally generates 
a demand for wastewater conveyance and treatment. However, the wastewater system 
is affected by the volume of water entering; hazardous flooding and failure of the 
wastewater system may result if the capacity of the network is exceeded, but a paucity of 
water entering the wastewater infrastructure network may result in an inability to convey 
and treat wastewater effectively and safely.
Insufficient river flows at the point of discharge from wastewater treatment works, whether 
from natural variability or anthropogenic influences, may also limit the ability to treat and 
discharge wastewater safely.
Effluent recycling, which is an increasingly popular technological intervention, relies on the 
wastewater infrastructure network to convey raw material and waste products.
4.3.2.5 ICT
The management of water resources is increasingly reliant on ICT, with real-time telemetry 
playing an increasingly important role. Failure of the related ICT components could 
precipitate a diminution of the water supply network capacity. As for energy, water is often 
necessary for cooling of large data centres. The resurgent interest in, and subsequent 
growth of, such infrastructure may indicate a growing demand for water by the ICT sector.
4.3.3 KEY ISSUES
The water supply infrastructure must meet consumers’ demands for water, but competition 
for the limited quantity of water in the environment and the capacity of the infrastructure 
to provide water that is fit for purpose at the point of use constrain its performance. Much 
of this conflict occurs as a consequence of the changes in consumers’ demands for water 
associated with the transition of the UK from an industrial to a post-industrial society, 
compounded by persistent pressure to improve continually the benefit of water use to all 
consumers, including the environment.78
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The majority of the existing strategic water supply infrastructure of the UK resides from 
the industrial expansion of the 19th and 20th centuries. It is expensive to maintain and 
extend, requires constant investment and intelligent management to remain effective 
and relevant, and exists in discrete management areas inherited from historical patterns 
of demand and infrastructure asset ownership that possess limited interconnectivity. Its 
cost, design lifetime, semi-permanent nature and location limit its flexibility to meet rapid 
changes in use, as do the mechanisms of regulation imposed and the available methods of 
raising investment.
There are two commonly cited adaptation measures: constrain consumers’ demand for 
water, thereby prolonging the useful life of existing infrastructure assets, and improve the 
capacity of infrastructure in order to meet demand.
4.3.3.1 Infrastructure options
Table 16: The demand-side interventions available to the water sector
Demand-side 
interventions
Description
Non-revenue water 
(NRW) / leakage 
reduction
• NRW includes controlled and uncontrolled losses from the water infrastructure;
• In 2008, NRW accounted for 25% of water input to the public supply (Water UK, 
2010);
• Between 2002 and 2010, annual investment in assets of £2 billion reduced leakage 
by 105 Ml/d each year;
• Potentially reducible to zero losses, although there is no economic incentive to do so.
Water metering and 
smart-metering
• Most household consumers of water are charged a flat rate per annum;
• Per-volume charging via metering of each household provides improved information 
on consumption patterns and losses;
• Annual reporting window (or better);
• Allows for more targeted investment;
• Often has the benefit of inducing behavioural change in consumers.
Per-volume charging 
and tariffs
• Active mechanism for inducing behavioural change by charging consumers based 
on patterns of consumption;
• Differential charging by volume;
• Existing economic models unproven with respect to consumers’ demand for water.
Education • It is believed that most consumers of water are wasteful through ignorance;
• Coupled with other measures, education of consumers provides them with 
additional information;
• Armed with this information, it is thought that their behaviour will change to 
become less wasteful in their patterns of water use.
Water efficiency 
improvements
• Many technological interventions are possible that reduce water consumption 
without the need to elicit significant behavioural change in consumers;
• Some technologies, although effective, are not cost effective at the household level 
(e.g. rainwater harvesting).79
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Table 17: The supply-side interventions available to the water sector
Supply-side 
interventions
Description
Abstraction from rivers 
and groundwater
• The majority of water abstracted in GB is sourced from non-tidal surface waters and 
groundwater;
• These resources possess a threshold beyond which further abstraction is infeasible 
without damage to the environment; 
• Most of the natural resources of England and Wales are either approaching, or are 
beyond, this threshold (EA, 2011);
• Further development of rivers and groundwater is unlikely to be entertained in the 
south, south east, and east of England;
• Susceptible to climate change.
Reservoirs • Reservoirs allow the adaptation of rivers or naturally occurring surface water bodies 
to provide a less variable, more reliable, source of water;
• The use of reservoirs to augment river flows and thereby facilitate river abstraction is 
preferable to direct abstraction from reservoirs;
• Large capital costs and land-use change;
• Historically designed to meet specific needs, often in the face of significant public 
opposition, and difficult to redeploy flexibly;
• Useful for establishing the means to meet baseline demand;
• Time consuming to build, fill and recharge;
• Susceptible to climate change.
Inter-basin transfers • Relatively expensive means of transporting either raw or treated water between 
demand centres;
• Particularly dependent on energy availability and cost;
• Powerful and flexible means of redeploying water resource for short periods during 
times of excessive water stress;
• Requires an excess of water resource at donor locations, which may require the 
construction of other resources;
• Un-quantified environmental costs;
• Used extensively elsewhere in the world where water is scarce or where populations 
are remote from water resource.
Desalination • Relatively expensive means of meeting peak water requirements;
• Particularly dependent on energy availability and cost;
• Can be placed anywhere there are brackish or saltwater resources;
• Conceptually robust to climate change;
• Produces waste byproducts;
• Used extensively elsewhere in the world where water is scarce.
There are a number of interventions available which either reduce the consumptive 
demand for water, or which directly augment the capacity of the water supply 
infrastructure network and/or the water resources of the natural environment. They are 
divisible into demand-side measures (Table 16) and supply-side measures (Table 17). 80
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4.3.3.2 Risks
The water supply sector faces future pressure from two directions.
Firstly, total water abstraction must meet the demands of consumers according to the 
specified level of service, driven primarily by abstraction for the purposes of public water 
supply. Future growth in demand is likely to be due to the increasing population of 
domestic consumers, and, to a lesser extent, the population of non-domestic consumers. 
For future levels of service to remain constant, or increase, there will need to be a 
reduction of the per-capita demand for water through behavioural change, technological 
intervention, or capital investment in the infrastructure network to improve its efficiency; 
however, there are hard limits to the impact of any one method of reduction, particularly in 
the absence of incentives for the further reduction or elimination of leakage (Walker, 2009).
Secondly, the performance of the infrastructure is constrained by resource availability. In 
addition to the traditional inconveniences of conveying water from locations where it is 
most plentiful in the environment to centres of distribution and demand, it is evident that 
climate variability has uncertain impact on the distribution of water both geographically 
and seasonally. The critical concern is that existing resources located in regions anticipated 
to experience the greatest negative change in water availability will become unable to 
meet existing levels of service. 
Modelling of the impact of climate change on water resource has, until very recently, been 
rudimentary in its analysis of the inherent uncertainties. Such analyses, undertaken by 
water service providers, suggest a national aggregate decrease in the deployable output of 
water resources of some 3% by 2034–2035.14
More sophisticated analysis of the impact of climate change on mean river flows using 11 
models of a comparable scenario show spatially variable impacts across GB by the 2050s 
(EA, 2011), the majority of the country projected to experience increases in winter of up to 
40%, and decreases in summer of up to 80%. This could have particularly profound impacts 
on regions without strategic storage that are dependent on abstraction or regional from 
river sources.
14 From water companies’ AMP5 Water Resource Management Plans.
Table 17 (ontinued)
Supply-side 
interventions
Description
Effluent recycling • Converts wastewater into potable water;
• Conceptually robust to climate change;
• Feasible anywhere wastewater is produced;
• Hazardous byproduct.81
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Precipitation and air temperature are key indicators of water availability: the former 
determines the total amount of water entering the environment, while the latter plays a 
crucial role in determining the amount of water available for use. UKCP09 projections for 
the 2050s under the Medium emissions scenario (Figure 38) suggest:
•  The central estimate of projected increase in the mean winter temperature is < 2ºC 
(0.6 to 3.0ºC) across Scotland and the north of England, and < 2.2ºC (1.1 to 3.5ºC) 
across the rest of GB.
•  The central estimate of projected increase in the mean summer temperature is  
< 2.7ºC (0.9 to 4.6ºC) across GB.
•  The central estimate of projected increase in winter mean precipitation is 9–17% 
across GB (1 to 38%).
•  The central estimate projected decrease in summer mean precipitation is 10–20% 
across GB (–41 to +7% change).
The values in brackets reflect a projected wider range of uncertainty. The values are, 
respectively, the value that the projected change is very unlikely to be less than to the 
value that the change is very unlikely to more than.
Figure 38: Changes in winter 
mean temperature, summer 
mean temperature, winter 
mean precipitation and summer 
mean precipitation projected 
for the 2050s under a Medium 
emissions scenario (© UKCP09 
Climate Projections, 2009).
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The Government White Paper ‘Water for life’ (Defra, 2011d) warns that current water stress 
is set to worsen and makes several proposals to enable more efficient abstraction whilst 
maintaining environmental protection. Key commitments are reform of the regulation of 
abstraction to enable transitions under climate change and increasing interconnection and 
the trading of bulk supplies of treated water. A further commitment is for Government, the 
Environment Agency and the water industry to consider whether strategic NI projects are 
required.
Adaptations to this increasing vulnerability include superior distribution of existing 
water resource through inter-basin transfers and the development of new sources via 
impoundment or desalination. All are long term strategies incurring significant capital and 
operating costs, and face uncertainty as to their future performance and financial viability. 
In addition, there are major issues of affordability and governance requiring resolution.
Contemporary estimates of the impacts yielding a risk-based approach to analysis are 
forthcoming; however, they are not available at this time.
4.4 WASTEWATER
In its day, the provision of sewers, and latterly sewage treatment was a triumph 
of British engineering and a totemic example of civil works as a civilization. Today 
there are over 347,000 km of sewers collecting over 11 billion litres of wastewater 
every day. There has been extensive investment in wastewater treatment in order 
to improve water quality standards in rivers and coastal waters, though improved 
treatment standards has raised energy costs. Energy use in wastewater treatment 
now averages roughly 300 MW. Both sewage treatment and sewerage are capital 
intensive, with a long design life ranging from 40–100 years. Options that would 
reduce or eliminate energy input to wastewater treatment are needed to ensure 
the future affordability of service. Projected changes in rainfall patterns due to 
climate change and major and minor flooding pose a risk to the existing drainage 
infrastructure.
4.4.1 THE INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM
The wastewater sector consists of networks of sewers, pumps and sewage treatment works 
that vary tremendously in size with most people being served by a relatively small number 
of large systems and small numbers of people being served by a relatively large number of 
smaller systems. Large systems are typically far more efficient. These infrastructure systems 
have a long design life: 40–50 years for the civil works in sewage treatment plants and 
potentially over 100 years for the sewerage infrastructure. Though sewerage assets are still 
functioning adequately 150 years after construction, change to many of the assets could 
imply a very significant write off cost.
The overall strategy of large reticulated sewers collecting wastewater and surface drainage 
that is transported to a centralized treatment facility is 19th century in origin. Sewers 
were proposed to meet fears about the health, and associated economic impacts of 
miasma.15 Sewage treatment technologies were then developed to prevent the associated 
river pollution. The relevant technologies are still sometimes referred to as public health 
engineering. Miasma are no longer feared and the public health aspects of sewerage and 
sewage treatment are now often overlooked or forgotten. 
15 Miasma was considered to be a poisonous vapour or mist filled with particles from decomposed 
matter (miasmata) that caused illnesses.83
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Nevertheless, strong evidence, both epidemiological (Germany in 1946) and anecdotal 
(Iraq in 2007) suggests that a breakdown or abandonment of the sewerage infrastructure 
will lead to severe public health problems both today and in the future. 
The management philosophy and the technology for sewerage and sewage treatment 
have evolved over the years. These changes are frequently driven by increases in 
environmental standards, latterly driven by European legislation. However, rising customer 
expectations and the introduction of new technology (often, but not always, in response 
to environmental regulations) can also drive change. At its best the industry considers the 
entire network holistically, integrating loads placed on the sewerage network by people 
and rainfall with the location and performance of the treatment plant and the capacity and 
sensitivity of the environment. However, such an effective and integrated approach is not 
always attained.
Improvements to the infrastructure system, though substantial, have been largely 
incremental; it is widely recognized that step changes may be required to cope with 
plausible change in energy costs, climate, carbon-costs and environmental regulation in 
the future.
Capacity and demand
Today there are over 347,000 km of sewers which collect over 11 billion litres of wastewater 
per day which is treated at around 9,000 sewage treatment works before being discharged 
to inland waters and the sea (Defra, 2002). It accounts for the majority of the total asset 
value of the UK water industry (> £250 billion), with capital expenditure on sewerage 
services programmed to exceed £12 billion between 2010 and 2015 (Ofwat, 2009). The 
system requires sustained multi-billion pound investment to remain operational, efficient 
and to ensure compliance with environmental regulation. The services are owned and 
managed by the 10 regional water companies in England and Wales and by state owned 
Scottish Water respectively. The private companies in England and Wales are subject 
to economic regulation overseen by the Office of Water Regulation. Environmental 
regulation, which is key to the industry, is overseen by the Environment Agencies for 
England and Wales, and Scotland.
The energy required to collect and treat 1 Ml of wastewater in England and Wales varies 
with location and effluent standards, typically varying between 600 kWh/Ml and  
800 kWh/Ml: a figure that is broadly in-line with other countries, despite recent attempts to 
reduce it (Figure 39, overleaf).
For the same regions, greenhouse gas emissions per mega-litre of wastewater treated 
increased from 0.64 tCO2e to 0.70 tCO2e between 2004 and 2010 (Figure 40, overleaf).
 A key performance metric of the wastewater infrastructure network is the frequency 
and severity with which the volume of wastewater collected by the network exceeds its 
hydraulic capacity, of which there are two principal consequences: intermittent discharge 
from the sewer network into receiving waters, and flooding.
There are approximately 25,000 intermittent discharges from the sewer network across 
England and Wales. Investment influenced by a number of water quality and aesthetic 
drivers, including the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and its subordinate 
instruments, has dramatically reduced the number of these considered unsatisfactory 
(Figure 41, overleaf).
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Figure 39: Energy consumption 
attributable to wastewater 
collection and treatment by the 
UK water industry 2002–2007.
Figure 40: GHG emissions 
attributable to wastewater 
treatment by the UK water 
industry 2004–2010.
 
Figure 41: The number of 
unsatisfactory intermittent 
discharges in England and 
Wales, 2002–2011 (Ofwat, 2007; 
Ofwat, 2010).85
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The Thames Tideway is a major scheme of this type, collecting 39 million tonnes of sewage 
per year from 35 of the most polluting discharges on the River Thames. With an estimated 
cost of some £3.6 billion, it comprises a programme of improvements to five sewage 
treatment works and some 30 km of tunnel anticipated to reduce both spill frequency and 
volume by around 95%.
Between 1990 and 2010, around 0.03% of properties in England and Wales remained 
subject to flooding from sewers although the proportion of properties at risk from sewer 
flooding declined over the same period (Table 18).
Demand for wastewater treatment is a function of population and industrial growth 
and the costs are dictated by the technologies and effluent standards. The prevalence 
of energy-intensive processes within the existing wastewater treatment infrastructure, 
coupled with the long design-life of infrastructure assets, creates a binding 
interdependency between the wastewater sector and energy prices. The energy demand 
is affected by the effluent quality and so plausible climate change scenarios might lead 
to greater demand for wastewater reuse and lower flows in receiving waters and thus 
higher standards and even greater energy demands. Population density is more important 
than the total population for both sewerage and sewage treatment and is vital to the 
scaling of cost and the relative merits of maintaining the existing large-scale networks or 
transitioning to a new, decentralised system. 
Demand for the drainage function is strongly linked to the rainfall and land use. Changes 
in the intensity of rainfall would be a particular issue and, in certain areas, changes in land 
use. Finally economic changes and the related cost of capital are particularly important to 
both sectors. Though obviously physically linked, the drainage and treatment functions of 
the system have differing drivers and interdependencies. 
Table 18: The performance of the water industry in England and Wales with respect to sewer flooding: 1990–2010 
(Ofwat, 2010).
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DG5: Properties subject to sewer 
flooding incidents (overloaded 
sewers and other causes)
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.032 0.02 0.03
DG5: Properties at risk of sewer 
flooding incidents (once in ten 
years)
0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
DG5: Properties at risk of sewer 
flooding incidents (twice in ten 
years)
0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0186
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4.4.2 ROLE OF INTERDEPENDENCE
The primary interdependency in wastewater treatment is the energy sector, since 
treatment and, to a lesser extent, transit are wholly dependent on a constant electricity 
supply. However, environmental standards may reflect the prevailing water resource (e.g. 
the need for reuse) and will affect costs, especially electricity demands. Other subtler 
interdependencies include agriculture and the demand for the water and nutrients 
in wastewater. Though the functioning sewerage system only impinges modestly on 
transport, any substantial revamping of sewers causes a great deal of disruption to road 
traffic.
4.4.3 Key issues
The sewerage network is designed to carry both the wastewater from the contributing 
population (about 150 litres/capita) and the run-off that depends on the amount of 
rainfall and land use. Change in any of these factors could lead to problems in system 
performance. However, the quantity of organic matter and other pollutants in the 
wastewater, and the effluent treatment standards primarily determine the wastewater 
treatment costs. As the generation of organic waste is inevitable, and it is inconceivable 
to not dispose of waste in a sanitary manner, affordability and sustainability are key issues 
especially with respect to sewage treatment. 
The amount of organic matter is typically a function of the number of people served and 
is thus an inexorable fact of life. In some regions, industrial wastewaters, which are subject 
to seasonal and economic variation, are important. Energy use is a notable aspect of 
treatment costs and the energy use per unit volume of wastewater has been increasing 
steadily for a number of years. However, there is far more energy (8–17 kJ/l) in wastewater 
than is required to treat it, assuming that this energy can be utilised.
To enable the water industry to make the transition to a low carbon low energy future 
will require the implementation of technologies (e.g. zero power treatment plants) and 
management strategies (e.g. real time drainage management) that, though conceivable, 
do not yet exist in the UK. Three interlinked policy issues have been identified to assist in 
this process
•  Economic regulation that permits and promotes transformative innovation to ensure 
that these technologies and management strategies are brought forward in a timely 
fashion;
•  Excellent risk based environmental regulation to avoid overdesign and excessive 
running costs;
•  Continued access to affordable capital to help minimise the costs of implementation.
4.4.3.1 Options
Both sewage treatment and sewerage are at present, capital intensive. A move towards 
more decentralised systems could permit much of the existing sewerage system to be 
abandoned. However, this would have to be set against the benefits of high-density living 
and the increased costs and lower effluent standards associated with smaller works. A 
more extreme option still would be to abandon the use of water to convey human waste 
all together and a return to a night soil system. Though treatment would still be necessary, 
resource capture would be facilitated. Such systems are in use in Japan and should be 
evaluated for British application. Neither decentralisation nor a night soil system would 
obviate the need for drainage, but they might simplify the provision of such infrastructure.87
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Options that would eliminate energy use in wastewater treatment would reduce the 
sensitivity of affordability to the price of energy. This is thermodynamically conceivable, 
as wastewater contains 16–20 kJ/k COD: more than twice the energy required to treat 
it. Wastewater treatment could, therefore, become energy neutral, or even a net energy 
producer. Furthermore, the resources in the waste, notably nitrogen and phosphorous are 
already becoming more valuable, the former due to the cost of energy, and the latter due 
to absolute scarcity. However the capture of these resources, nitrogen, phosphorous or 
energy at a reasonable scale presupposes the development of technologies that do not yet 
exist. 
Table 19 summarises the range of technological options available for wastewater 
treatment. Specific energy demand will reflect the technology chosen with local variation 
attributable to geography and effluent standards. For example, the inclusion of UV 
disinfection to ensure compliance with bathing regulations may add 10% or more to the 
electricity demand of a treatment works.
Sludge disposal is a particularly important issue. Conventional aerobic treatment generates 
800–900 kg of sludge per tonne of organic matter treated, while anaerobic wastewater 
treatment technologies (still experimental in temperate regions) yield approximately  
100 kg/tonne. Although its disposal is costly, sludge is a significant source of energy 
(through anaerobic treatment and incineration or pyrolysis) and nutrients. Increasing 
the benefit of sludge generation via reuse on the land requires managing and meeting 
the needs and expectations of farmers, their customers in the grocery business and 
consumers, particularly with respect to issues of food safety. Wastewater reuse, though at 
present rare, is also heavily influenced by health concerns and standards.
Table 19: Summary of current and future technology options within the wastewater sector
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Technology Example Energy cost Relative 
sludge yield
Comment
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Suspended 
growth
Activated 
sludge
Positive 
(High)
High High-density, 
high-throughput 
technology; scope for 
energy reclamation
Attached 
growth
Trickling filters Positive 
(Moderate)
Low Reliable; infeasible on 
large scale
Extensive Wetlands Neutral 
(Zero)
Very low Significant land area 
required; impractical in 
urban areas
Anaerobic 
digestion
Upflow 
Anaerobic 
Sludge Blanket 
(UASB)
Negative Very low Only used thus far in 
the tropics
Fuel cell Microbial 
electrolysis
Negative Negligible Could be used to 
produce high-value 
products, e.g. H288
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Considerable investments have and will be made in sludge digestion in the UK. In 
principle, the capital efficiency of sludge digestion could be improved by digesting 
domestic wastes, especially food, in sludge digesters; however, this too must meet 
stringent public health criteria.
4.4.3.2 Risks
A key risk to wastewater infrastructure services is rising energy costs, which raise questions 
of affordability of treatment and operational costs. Hence, the development of options that 
reduce or eliminate energy use in treatment would help to reduce these risks. Similarly, 
more stringent environmental legislation is a risk which would demand increased capital 
investment. Another risk is a change in rainfall patterns and the risk of major and minor 
flooding as existing drainage infrastructure is found wanting in the face of more intense 
rainfall. Options in this eventuality include rebuilding the drainage system and the more 
intelligent management of the existing system, or an appropriate combination of the two. 
More intense storm events could also precipitate the discharge of greater volumes of 
untreated wastewater from the infrastructure network: studies (UKWIR, 2006; EA, 2007a) 
suggest increases of up to 180% by the 2080s, coupled with between 3 and 12 additional 
spills per year, depending on location. To maintain current levels of service would require 
additional storage volumes of between 10 m3/ha and 70 m3/ha at a cost of some £15 
billion, with particular stress placed on networks discharging to shellfish waters and/or 
waters supporting salmonids.
Although changes in the flow-to-treatment at wastewater treatment works are unlikely to 
seriously impede treatment processes: a decrease in water quantity in the receiving waters 
is significantly more hazardous to water quality, and may be exacerbated by regional 
changes in precipitation.
Finally, there is an overarching risk that technical and institutional inertia and complacency 
will prevent solutions being sought, found and implemented on a sufficiently rapid time 
scale to prevent technical or economic failure. There is a lack of urgency, funding and 
training with respect to the needs to transform this infrastructure in the 21st century. 
Research activity is low in relation to the asset base at risk, the environmental and 
economic consequences of failure and the required time scales of change. The conception 
and implementation of the necessary reforms, whatever they prove to be, will as great and 
as necessary a triumph as that of our 19th century predecessors. 
4.5 SOLID WASTE
The UK solid waste sector deals with approximately 300 million tonnes of waste 
annually. In the last decade, the sector has transformed rapidly, responding to 
EU and national legislation. This has increased the amount of waste recycled, 
composted or reused and nearly halved waste going to landfill. Historically, 
economic growth and household waste generation were coupled, but there is 
some evidence that this may no longer be true. National and EU directives (e.g. 
possible banning of all biodegradable municipal waste to landfill in the next 
decade) for reducing solid waste will affect the levels of investment needed in 
the near term. There is the possibility of a complete paradigm shift towards solid 
waste becoming a resource recovery industry. 89
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4.5.1 THE INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM
The solid waste infrastructure system includes both waste management and resource 
management (i.e. not only waste going to landfill but also resources reclaimed by recycling 
and processing). The infrastructure comprises landfill, material recovery facilities (MRFs);16 
transfer stations,17 recycling or other processing facilities and incinerators. There are three 
main sub-systems of the infrastructure system, including collection, treatment and final 
disposal. 
Waste tends to be categorised by generating sector, for example, by households,18 
commercial and industrial (C&I), construction and demolition (C&D), mining and quarrying, 
agricultural, and hazardous waste. For household waste, collection is from the kerbside 
or bring site. Some commercial and industrial waste is collected along with green waste 
from parks and gardens and household waste from the kerbside; this forms municipal solid 
waste (MSW) or local authority collected waste. Licenced waste management companies 
collect the majority of remaining commercial and industrial waste.
MSW recycling, recovery and disposal are the responsibility of the local authorities, 
often county councils or unitary authorities. These bodies are also responsible for waste 
planning; providing facilities; assessing suitability of sites; producing policy through their 
Development Plans and approving planning applications. MSW collection is often the 
responsibility of district councils and unitary authorities. Much of the MSW collection and 
the majority of waste treatment, recycling, recovery and disposal are actually performed by 
large, multinational, waste management companies. 
4.5.1.1 Waste generation
Household, C&I and C&D wastes together amount to two thirds of total UK waste arisings, 
with mining and quarrying wastes accounting for most of the remaining third (Figure 
42). Until recently, total UK waste generation was increasing, but the latest figures show 
a decline from 325 Mt in 2004 to 289 Mt in 2008 (Figure 43, overleaf). Household waste 
generation rates have remained relatively unchanged over this period. The latest figures 
from 2009–2010 reveal that household waste generation was 31.5 Mt per annum, an 
average of 457 kg per person per year. While household waste reduced between 2006 
and 2008, this may be due to the economic downturn. Historically, economic growth 
and household waste generation were coupled, but there is some evidence (Figure 44, 
overleaf) that this may no longer be true (for additional information see Annex I). C&D and 
C&I have both shown reductions since 2004, but this is based on limited data.19
16 That is, where waste is sorted prior to transport for recycling.
17 That is, sorting, recovering and consolidating waste prior to onward carriage to processors or 
disposal.
18 Often used interchangeably with municipal solid waste (MSW) and local authority collected waste.
19 For example, C&I figures are extrapolated from a single national survey in 2002/03 and subsequent 
regional surveys.
Figure 42: Waste generation by 
sector. Data from Defra (2007).
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Figure 43. UK generated waste 
mass (Mt) by sector: 2004–2008.
 
 
Figure 44. Recent relationship 
between household waste 
generation and GDP: have they 
decoupled?
Figure 45: Waste landfilled in 
England and landfill capacity: 
1999–2009.
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4.5.1.2 Waste capacity
The amount of landfill capacity in the UK is declining (Figure 45). For example, capacity 
in England and Wales decreased 19% from 2000 to 2009 to 614 million m3. In 2007, the 
Environment Agency raised concerns about the rapid reduction of landfill capacity, 
especially in the southeast of England. However, the overall amount of waste going to 
landfill has declined (e.g. from 64 Mt in 2007 to 45 Mt in 2009 in England and Wales) as a 
result of government policy that encourages the recovery of resources from waste. The 
economic recession may be responsible for an 18% decline in material landfilled between 
2008 and 2009. In England and Wales, at any given time the void space at landfill sites 
is typically 8–10 years of landfilling, suggesting that capacity is problematic. However, 
operators are currently searching for alternate revenue streams from landfill suggesting 
that capacity is not likely to be a problem in the near future, although this situation may 
well change as landfill becomes a less profitable sector and hence attracts less investment.
There is currently significant overcapacity in MRF, but by 2015 nearly all of the current 
capacity will be utilised, with almost 60% of areas having insufficient capacity (WRAP, 
2007). This is mainly due to the increase of dry recyclable arisings in order to comply with 
the waste reduction and diversion targets. Notably, the amount of dry recycling in England 
alone was considerably greater than the amount processed in MRFs or their total capacity 
for 2006/2007 (5 Mt). This suggests that the bulk of dry recyclables are not sorted in MRFs. 
Further, there would seem to be a significant over-capacity or underutilization in EfW plant 
(WRAP, 2007). However, this is an overestimation of capacity in mass terms, as permitted 
capacity is calculated on the basis of a maximum calorific value of waste that can be 
processed in a given period of time, and then converted to mass on the basis of the waste 
with the lowest feasible calorific value. 
4.5.2 ROLE OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
4.5.2.1 Energy
Solid waste infrastructure depends on the energy sector. For example, the failure of 
electricity or loss of fuel supply would affect waste treatment, necessitating the storage 
or stockpiling of waste and disposal to landfill. It could also prevent leachate pumping 
in landfills, increasing the risk of pollution events.20 Waste management infrastructure 
uses energy (electricity, gas and liquid fuels), but energy is also recovered from waste by 
combustion, recovery of high calorie materials such as plastic and paper in the form of 
fuels and the generation of electricity from landfill gas or biogas from anaerobic digestion. 
Whilst energy generated from waste forms a very significant portion of renewable energy, 
the overall contribution of renewables to the energy sector is small at present. However, 
it may become more important in the drive to increase the use of renewable fuels. In 
addition, recycling saves energy when compared to the use of virgin material; however, 
this will only appear to affect the UK directly if the recycled materials are reused here (i.e. 
closed loop recycling). Energy outputs are primarily electricity with the potential for heat, 
biogas (from AD or landfill) and syngas (from gasification or pyrolysis) to become more 
important in the future. Energy also contributes to the cost of solid waste services, for 
transportation and processing of waste. 
20 This risk can be mitigated through the use of on-site generators.92
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4.5.2.2 Transport
The majority of waste is moved by road transport involving refuse collection vehicles 
(RCVs) collecting from households and businesses and haulage vehicles moving 
consolidated wastes and treated recyclables for recovery or disposal. Increasing demand 
for waste management will therefore increase the number of vehicle movements, these 
are unlikely to make large demands on transport infrastructure but the energy used 
by collection and haulage vehicles may be significant. In the event of failure of road 
infrastructure (e.g. heavy and prolonged snow fall), delays in getting putrescible waste to 
treatment or disposal facilities may cause health or nuisance problems. However, if delays 
are caused by snow, the risks are at least partially mitigated by the low temperatures. 
It is likely that periods of disruption to collection (e.g. snow, floods, fuel shortages, etc.) 
would create a backlog of waste which treatment plants would struggle to clear, hence a 
requirement for landfill.
As most waste is dealt with locally, this will primarily involve the road network. Some 
large sites and co-combustion sites (those which burn waste along with other materials to 
generate electricity (e.g. coal fired power station,) or heat (e.g. cement kilns) are located by 
railways or rivers (e.g. Rainham landfill and Belvedere EfW which is London’s largest MSW 
treatment plant are both dependent on the Thames for delivery of waste to site). In the 
future, the availability of low energy transport options may be a requirement for siting of 
new plants.
In the first half of 2011, the EA granted permits for the shipping of 713,000 tonnes of UK 
RDF to continental Europe, although only 13,000 tonnes were actually shipped during 
this period (letsrecycle.com, 2009a). The EA stated that this was a short term solution due 
to lack of UK markets for RDF, which is principally sent to cement kilns, many of which 
may have been affected by the economic downturn. Observations have previously been 
made of shortages of waste for mainland European incinerators, which could potentially 
be a driver for future shipments. This would have some impact on the transport sector 
(although it is not clear how large).
Waste arising from the transport sector is likely to be primarily end of life vehicle (ELV) and 
construction waste (from building of transport infrastructure). Both of these are likely to be 
influenced by the scenario.
4.5.2.3 Water
Some waste treatment facilities require a water supply for treatment of wastes, e.g. 
composting and anaerobic digestion, in which water is used to aid biodegradation. Failure 
of water supply to such facilities would lead to cessation or a reduction of treatment 
capacity and the need to dispose of the waste by alternative means. 
4.5.2.4 Wastewater
Landfill produces large amounts of potentially polluting leachate which is typically treated 
on site before being disposed of through the wastewater network or direct to rivers. If local 
wastewater treatment facilities failed, the leachate could be tankered to alternative plants 
or treated to a higher standard, so the impact on landfilling would be minimal. Changing 
waste streams may make the leachate impossible to treat with the current biological 
systems. As has previously been mentioned, sewage AD plant could be used to process 
biodegradable municipal waste (BMW). 93
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This would significantly increase the plant throughput (especially in high growth 
scenarios), significantly increase gas yields and would necessitate plant upgrades and 
probably upgrading the transport network but at present seems not to be cost effective 
due to the need to macerate the MSW first. It may be that AD systems suitable for solid 
wastes could be developed on sewage treatment sites which could than treat MSW 
without pre-treatment, as well as sewage, farm wastes and other material suitable for AD.
4.5.3 KEY ISSUES
EU Directives relating to waste and the UK regulations transposing them are the main 
drivers for reduction of waste generation and the increase in recovery of waste. This is 
likely to continue for the foreseeable future, however, additional drivers such as low carbon 
and energy from renewables may gain importance. The possible banning of the disposal 
of all biodegradable municipal waste to landfill in the next decade may require new 
infrastructure. However, the rate at which MSW is being sent to landfill has reduced faster 
than has been required either by the 1999 EU Landfill Directive or subsequent national 
policies (e.g. Waste Strategy for England 2007). 
The UK strategy for waste management follows the EU Waste Framework Directive (WFD) 
waste hierarchy: prevent waste, prepare for reuse, recycle, recover energy from waste, 
and dispose to landfill as a last resort. The need to adhere to the hierarchy now applies 
to businesses as well as those who manage waste. Waste is increasingly being viewed as 
a resource to recover, rather than material to be disposed of. Waste that is disposed in 
landfills is currently taxed at £56/tonne (2011/12), and a rate that will keep rising £8/tonne 
until it reaches £80/tonne in 2014/15, persisting at this level at least until 2020. 
The 2007 Waste Strategy for England (Defra, 2007) gave targets for recycling of household 
waste and for reduction of waste going to landfill. Currently, local authorities are meeting 
targets for diversion of biodegradable waste from landfill, but it remains to be seen 
whether this will be achieved in future. In terms of recovery of resources from waste, the 
UK lags behind many other countries in the EU. This is in part because of our legacy of a 
large number of landfill sites and historical reliance on this type of waste management, as 
well as a very strong public antipathy towards any kind of waste combustion. There is very 
little data available for C&I or C&D wastes with the bulk of the data coming from surveys 
of companies in a single region (e.g. Northwest England) which is then extrapolated both 
spatially and temporally. Without good data, targets cannot be imposed or checked, as 
recognised in the 2011 National Infrastructure Plan21 (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 
2011). It is clear that the landfill tax has had and will continue to have an effect in reducing 
C&I disposal to landfill.
The UK government has supported a number of initiatives to help increase recycling 
(e.g. the creation of WRAP – the Waste and Resources Action Programme), reduce the 
production of waste and to promote the use of waste management treatment (e.g. 
through the Defra New Technologies Demonstrator Programme); examples include 
mechanical biological treatment, mechanical heat treatment, anaerobic digestion and 
composting. Energy from Waste (EfW) plays a significant part in waste management and 
the production of solid recovered fuel (SRF) from waste will be increasingly important as 
the percentage of energy recovery from renewables increases in line with government 
policy. However, most waste disposal techniques still produce greenhouse gases (e.g. fossil 
carbon is burned in incinerators and fossil fuels are used in the aerobic composting of 
waste). 
21 The Responsibility Deal with the waste management industry requires sharing C&I data with Defra 
by 2014.94
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An alternative approach may be to bury carbon rich wastes including both fossil and 
non-fossil carbon (e.g. plastics and paper) in carbon sinks. However, there are currently 
no policies that include this strategy, and the current European opposition to the use of 
disposing of waste to landfill makes this exceedingly unlikely in the near future.
4.5.3.1 Options
Waste may be transported to large-scale waste treatment facilities for processing. The 
number of transfer stations and processing facilities involved in the recovery of recyclables 
from waste has increased over recent years. For example, the number of treatment facilities 
in England and Wales has increased from 950 in 2007 (EA, 2007b) to 1380 in 2009 (EA, 
2009a). Treatment facilities may include:
•  Materials Recycling Facilities (MRFs) – of two types: dirty and clean. Dirty takes 
black bag MSW and clean takes dry, co-mingled recyclables, although the former 
are becoming less common. In both cases, the mixed waste is mechanically, and/or 
hand-sorted. Outputs include recyclable fractions including paper, cardboard and 
metals. The non-recyclable residue will either be sent for further processing, e.g. 
in-vessel composting (IVC), be used as refuse derived fuel (RDF), be recovered to land 
(i.e. used to replace fertilisers for soil improvement) or sent to landfill. 
•  Mechanical Biological Treatment Facilities (MBT) – an extension of MRFs with an 
anaerobic or aerobic biological treatment stage to reduce the biodegradability of 
residual material. Outputs include recyclables, sometimes solid recovered fuels (SRF), 
and treated residual waste which may go to landfill. 
•  Mechanical Heat Treatment Facilities (MHT) – an MRF where the mixed residual 
waste is heat treated to sanitise it. Outputs include recyclables, SRF and a residual 
waste fraction to landfill. 
•  Composting Facilities – large-scale open windrows treating garden waste. IVC for 
food and green waste. Outputs include mature compost which may be used for soil 
improvement, the nature of which depends on the waste stream and the treatment 
process. 
•  Anaerobic digestion plants (AD) – to treat food and green wastes. Outputs include 
digestate (which may be used for soil improvement) and biogas (fuel).
•  Energy from Waste (EfW) – including incineration plants. These may be combined 
with an MRF to recover recyclables prior to incineration. Outputs include electricity 
(& heat), recyclables, aggregate and ash as well as CO2 and nitrous oxides.
Other technologies, such as gasification, pyrolysis and plasma arc gasification of waste, 
are relatively new to the GB market and have only had limited trials here. Although more 
experience is available elsewhere (e.g. two MSW plasma gasification plants at commercial 
scale in Japan), there is still some debate about the large-scale future of all of these 
technologies. Any residual waste not recovered by treatment is diverted to landfill. Despite 
the Defra-funded New Technologies Demonstrator Programme showing the commercial 
viability of waste management technologies less commonly used in the UK, further 
funding support for these technologies may be required due to the reluctance of banks to 
finance relatively unproven technology for waste management infrastructure. This tends 
to force operators to propose more commercially proven recycling, composting or waste 
to energy technologies that may not always be the most effective solutions for maximising 
utility from waste. 95
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It is notable that landfill operators currently make most of their profits from the sale of 
landfill gas (LFG) or the energy it produces. The amount of biodegradable wastes being 
landfilled is declining due to the EU Landfill Directive. It is very likely that future regulation 
will lead to decreased production of LFG and hence profits for operators, making landfill 
less attractive to investors. Whilst this may not be problematic in the near future, there will 
be some requirement for landfill for the foreseeable future to dispose of residual wastes 
(e.g. 10% of waste input into MRFs is not suitable for recycling) and to deal with waste 
backlogs due to disasters (e.g. floods, terrorist attack) or treatment plant failure. There 
may be a need for a contingency for publicly funded and operated landfill to meet this 
need. Discussions with operators and the EA suggest that operators are attempting to find 
alternate sources of revenue for their landfill sites due to an insufficient supply of waste for 
landfilling. The situation in Scotland is broadly similar. 
Waste reduction targets have two forms: obligatory targets imposed by the European 
Union and policy or strategy targets set by individual nations. Failure to meet the EU 
targets results in fines for member states. Nations’ own targets (Table 21) are not as 
rigorously enforced. 
Table 20: Examples of technology options is the waste sector 
Technology Current status
Gasification Energos built UK plant using Defra New Technologies 
Demonstrator Project funding. Not clear if there was any 
advantage over conventional incineration. 
Plasma arc gasification Two commercial scale plants in Japan processing MSW. 
Gasification to 
synthetic liquid fuels
British Airways is developing a London plant to convert 
500 kilotonnes per annum (ktpa) of varied waste into 
61 million litres of aviation fuel. Production starting in 
2014.* Not clear if this would be viable without European 
Industrial Bioenergy Initiative assistance.
Pyrolysis of plastics to 
liquid fuels
SITA planning 10 plastic to diesel plants a year to convert 
60,000 tonnes/year. First plant end of 2011.** Fuels to be 
used for site and collection vehicles. Not clear if there is 
any energy/emissions advantage over incineration.
Landfill mining Extracting materials from existing landfill. This has 
been discussed by at least one operator. Raw materials/
fuel prices would not need to rise much before it was 
financially viable to mine landfills. Trials have been run 
elsewhere in Europe but not in UK. 
Pneumatic collection 
systems
Have been used elsewhere (notably in Finland) but are 
best suited to new developments, particularly new towns. 
With proper implementation can monitor and charge 
households for their waste.
*    http://www.waste-management-world.com/index/display/article-display/1306426883/
articles/waste-management-world/volume-12/issue-6/features/biowaste-driving-fuels.html
**  http://www.cynarplc.com/news-display.asp?action=change&ID=55 downloaded 8/12/1196
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Table 21: Summary of key municipal solid waste (MSW) reduction targets and 
regulations
Location Reduction Targets and Regulations
England • Recycling & composting 40% by 2010; 45% by 2015; 50% by 2020 
(Defra, 2007) 
• Recovery of value (above + energy recovery) 53% by 2010; 67% by 
2015; 75% by 2020 (Defra, 2007) 
• Reduction of mass not reused, recycled or composted from 22 Mt in 
2000 to 15.8 Mt in 2010 and 12.2 Mt in 2020 (Defra, 2007) 
• Reduction of BMW going to landfill (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, 1999) 
Scotland Landfill Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, 1999) and the Waste Framework Directive (WFD) (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2008) require that: 
• by 2010 no more than 1.32 million tonnes of biodegradable 
municipal waste (BMW) can go to landfill; 
• by 2013 no more than 880,000 tonnes of BMW to landfill; 
• by 2020 no more than 620,000 tonnes of BMW to landfill; and 
• by 2020, 50% of household waste and similar to be reused or 
recycled. 
Scotland’s ambitious zero waste policy for MSW also requires that: 
• MSW arisings do not increase after 2010; 
• EfW is limited to a maximum of 25%; 
• <5% waste to landfill by 2025; and 
• recycling & composting rates of at least 40% of MSW arisings by 
2010, rising to 50% by 2013, 60% by 2020 and 70% by 2025.
Wales Comply with the Landfill Directive and landfill no more than 35% of its 
1995 levels of BMW by 2020. 
• by 2010 no more than 710,000 tonnes of BMW to landfill; 
• by 2013 no more than 470,000 tonnes of BMW to landfill; 
• by 2020 no more than 330,000 tonnes of BMW to landfill; and 
• by 2020, 50% of household waste and similar to be reused or 
recycled. 
Zero waste targets are set out below: 
• by 2025 all sectors should be recycling at least 70% of their waste; 
and 
• by 2050, the Welsh Assembly “hope to have achieved zero waste” 
(Welsh Assembly Government, 2009). 
The WFD (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2008) has for the 
first time added transnational targets for non-MSW wastes. This joins the target for waste 
reduction that has been adopted by the UK construction industry:
•  To reduce the levels of C&D waste going to landfill to 50% of 2008 levels by 2012 
(BERR, 2008).97
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•  Reuse, recycle or recover 70% non-hazardous C&D waste by 2020 (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2008).
As in other infrastructure sectors, there is a complex relationship between demand 
and capacity in the solid waste sector. The final destination of a discarded item may be 
influenced by the availability of particular waste facilities. For example, the provision of 
bottle banks or kerbside collection schemes has a positive effect on recycling behaviour 
and demand for such services in reinforced. Reducing waste generation would result in less 
demand for waste management capacity. However, there is a lack of transparency in the 
cost of waste management services to the public in the UK, so that there is no economic 
pressure to reduce waste generation by householders. The introduction of ‘pay-to-throw’ 
is a potential waste reduction strategy, although not current UK policy and comes with 
attendant risks of illegal and irresponsible disposal. 
4.5.3.2 Risks
Local authorities are currently meeting government targets for reduction of waste disposal 
to landfill and recycling targets, which demonstrate that infrastructure capacity is currently 
meeting demand. The waste management sector is relatively robust, and there has been 
significant investment in the industry over the last 10 years. However, lack of investment, 
due to economic recession, reduction in demand, or lack of support from government, 
may pose a risk to development of infrastructure especially for large-scale treatment plant, 
and complex or untried technologies. The nature of municipal waste finance has meant 
that in order to secure funding for large infrastructure projects (e.g. EfW plant), long term 
contracts (typically of 25 years) are often required. This could lead to a waste disposal 
authority being locked into a treatment technology even when better waste disposal 
options may be available. 
Short term, localised increases in demand (e.g. as flood events) or reduction in treatment 
capacity (e.g. through breakdown) may present difficulties. In the past, landfill has been 
available and able to deal with sudden increases in waste inputs after such events. A 
decreasing trend in landfill capacity may present problems, at least in some regions since 
other waste facilities have limited waste treatment and storage capacity. 
Hotter, drier summers and warmer, wetter winters due to climate change may promote 
increased disease transmission and nuisance from pests, together with odour and dust 
at open air waste management facilities. Increased seasonal precipitation may impact on 
landfill hydrology with potentially increased runoff and pollution from sites. Stability of 
landfill sites may be affected by extreme weather events, though there is limited data on 
the impacts of climate change on waste infrastructure or demand.
Climate change policy is likely to affect waste management, leading to further reductions 
in the amount of biodegradable material going to landfill which will reduce the amount 
of renewable energy derived from waste and may even increase total GHG emissions from 
landfill as the long period of low LFG emissions will be impossible to utilise and difficult 
to collect and manage. Uncertainty regarding policy changes coming from the EU or 
UK government may impact on investment and supply of the necessary infrastructure. 
Any future waste management targets should have a maximisation of resource use and 
sustainability at their core, rather than a dogmatic opposition to certain technologies, e.g. 
landfill. 98
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4.6 ICT
In comparison to the physical infrastructure sectors already discussed, ICT is a 
new and rapidly changing sector, but it is less clearly defined and understood. 
ICT infrastructure is considered to comprise communication (including fixed 
and mobile telephony, broadband, television and navigation systems) and 
computation (including data and processing hubs) systems. Significant increases 
in ICT capacity have been provided via a competitive industry, which has 
innovated to provide new technologies and respond to consumer demand 
(which is itself largely driven by innovations in consumer technologies and 
business practices). Further rapid increases in coverage, in particular in superfast 
broadband, are anticipated, though there are some locations where the market 
alone cannot deliver. Use of the electro-magnetic spectrum may also become a 
constraint without spectrum reallocation and technological solutions to support 
more efficient use of existing spectrum. ICT has a critical role in infrastructure 
interdependence and failure, which will be the target of future work in ITRC. 
4.6.1 THE INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM 
ICT infrastructure is the collection of all IT technologies, physical facilities and human 
systems that are operated in a coordinated way to provide these services, namely to 
provide for transmission, processing and storage of information, which for most purposes 
is now in some digital format.
ICT is a combination of communications technology and information technology (IT):
•  Communications cover the whole of networks, systems and artefacts which 
transport and store data. These include wired and wireless networks and their 
components (cables, masts, satellites, etc.), as well as broadband, voice, data, 
positioning and broadcast services. 
•  Within IT, software and systems that store and process the information are included. 
This is generally shared with the different sectors or infrastructures, such as transport, 
health, governance, etc. Examples include traffic control, smart grid, health, bank and 
other IT systems.
•  Within both communications and IT, people must also be considered as part of the 
systems. These include operators, developers and other ICT specialists.
Many reports on ICT consider only the communications part of the ICT infrastructure, 
using the term ‘digital communications’ to describe the infrastructure sector. However, IT is 
considered to be part of ICT infrastructure as well, because these systems manipulate and 
transform the information and participate in the information routing process. 
The ICT sector differs significantly from physical infrastructures. The rapid growth and 
frequent changes of ICT sector, with continual introduction of new technologies and usage 
patterns, make it harder to use the methods of analysis and forecasting appropriate to the 
physical infrastructures. The ICT sector is mostly commercially driven with private providers 
responding rapidly to changes in technology and consumer demand. The sector also has 
a strong international dimension and dependence, which further increases the complexity 
of analysis.99
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ICT artefacts are generally smaller, less expensive and have shorter lifetimes, thus 
infrastructure expansion can mostly be made in a rapid fashion without constructing large, 
physical objects. However, some artefacts such as IT systems can be considered large, 
expensive and with long development times. Furthermore, ICT systems are subject to 
‘generation’ upgrades, development and deployment of which is also significant and costly.
4.6.1.1 Current state of ICT in the UK
The overall strength of ICT infrastructure in the UK is among the leading in the global 
context. The evaluations differ in various reports, but the UK is ranked within the top 15 
global economies. According to the ICT Development Index, the UK is 10th out of 152 
world economies. The index reflects the level of network infrastructure and access to ICTs; 
the level of use of ICTs in the society; the result/outcome of efficient and effective ICT use 
(ITU, 2011). The World Economic Forum ranks the UK at 15 for ICT infrastructure strength 
using Network Readiness Index22 (WEF, 2011b).
Remaining competitive in the ICT industry and keeping up with the development in a 
global context was stated as a goal for ICT infrastructure investment strategy in the UK. It 
must however be remembered that having led the world in computer innovation, currently 
the UK has hardware companies only in niche markets and that there are very few major 
software manufacturers (Hendry, 1989). 
Table 22 provides a short overview of the current state of ICT sector.
22 The Networked Readiness Index (NRI) featured in the report examines how prepared countries 
are to use ICT effectively on three dimensions: the general business, regulatory and infrastructure 
environment for ICT.
Table 22: Current State of ICT
ICT Area Overview of the current status
Computation The speed increase of raw computation is exponential (well 
described by Moore’s law*). It can be argued that available 
computation power will be enough to support foreseeable 
developments of physical infrastructures. 
The power efficiency of computation has on average doubled 
every 1.57 years over the period of years 1975–2009 (Koomey 
et al., 2011). 
Radio spectrum The radio spectrum is used by all wireless services: mobile 
communications, sound and television broadcasting, satellite 
and others. The resource is finite and certain users (e.g. mobile 
communications) are at their allocation limits. The public sector 
is a major holder of spectrum with almost 50% of spectrum 
below 15 GHz allocated (DCMS, 2011b). The radio spectrum 
allocation results in inequalities and inefficiency of spectrum 
use: according to some reports, less than 14% of radio 
spectrum is busy at any given time (Rubenstein, 2007). The UK 
government is auctioning parts of public spectrum to satisfy 
the demand (DCMS, 2011b).
*      Moore’s law: The number of transistors that can be placed inexpensively on an integrated   
  circuit doubles approximately every 2 years. (The common simplification that “computing  
  capacity doubles every two years” is thus not quite accurate.)100
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Table 22 (continued)
ICT Area Overview of the current status
Communication Analogue terrestrial TV and Dial-up Internet have become 
things of the past. Their take-up in the UK in 2011 is 4% and 
2%, respectively. Fixed line telephony continues to decline: the 
saturated fixed-lines market has been overtaken by mobile-
cellular telephony. 
Mobile-cellular telephony has also reached saturation levels 
recording penetration rates of over 91% (Ofcom, 2011a). 
Ofcom reports an increase of fixed-broadband take-up from 3% 
in 2002 to 74% in 2010. 
Current (May 2011) average actual broadband speeds are at  
6.8 Mbit/s (Ofcom, 2011a).  
Mobile Internet – at broadband speeds – was practically 
non-existent in year 2000. Now, the take-up of mobile 
broadband continues to rise and stands at 17%, while 7% of 
population rely solely on a mobile broadband service in 2011 
(Ofcom, 2011a). 
The UK government has allocated £830m to assist in providing 
the UK broadband network of at least 2 Mbit/s broadband to all 
UK homes by 2012. In addition, superfast broadband should be 
available to 90% of people in each local authority area.***
Satellite 
communications
The global demand for fixed satellite services is within the 
available capacity, expected to be at about 79–82% of available 
capacity in 2011, according to various estimates (GAO, 2011). 
The global satellite industry posted growth of 11% in 2009 and 
5% in 2010 (SIA and Futron, 2011). The growth is expected to 
continue. Euroconsult estimates 1145 satellites will be built and 
launched in the period 2011–2020, an increase of about 51% 
compared to the previous decade (2001–2010) (Euroconsult, 
2011).
IT & data 
processing
IT is a significant component of all physical infrastructure and 
of government itself. Large IT projects are time consuming and 
expensive parts of the ICT infrastructure. In 2003, government 
had 100 major IT projects with a total value of £10bn (POST, 
2003). Newer data shows £16bn annual expenditure on IT in 
2009, with some IT projects being huge (e.g. £12bn NHS IT 
project, National Programme for IT) (HM Treasury, 2009).  
The recent emergence of cloud computing is providing greater 
business efficiency and lower start-up costs. Private cloud 
computing is being considered within the UK government 
(G-Cloud, which could enable £3.2bn savings (Cabinet Office, 
2010a)) and academia (e.g. e-Science Central).
**    2nd generation mobile services (2G) only provided SMS data services, but no internet (this  
  was 2.5G).
***  Recent information about investments on 14 August 2011 in Guardian 
  http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/14/superfast-broadband-go-uk-wide101
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4.6.1.2 Digital communications infrastructure
Upgrade to the next generation of super-fast fixed broadband is underway, started in 2010. 
This is driven by the private sector (primarily Virgin Media and BT) and the UK government. 
Over half of all UK households are within easy access to super-fast23 broadband lines, with 
possible speeds of 40–100 Mbit/s (Ofcom, 2011a).
Figure 47 (overleaf) shows increase in broadband take-up – Internet penetration 
now exceeds PC penetration. The use of the Internet on a mobile phone has grown 
substantially, driven by the growth in the smartphone market and mobile networks 
offering competitive mobile data packages, both allowing easier and more affordable 
access to mobile Internet services than before.
 The demand for mobile Internet is increasing with the ‘smartphone revolution’: 27% of UK 
adults now claim to own one, 32% of people use their mobiles to access the internet. Year 
2010 saw a 67% increase in data transferred over the UK’s mobile networks (Ofcom, 2011a). 
23 Super-fast broadband is classified as connections with headline speeds above ‘up to’ 24 Mbit/s.
Table 22 (continued)
ICT Area Overview of the current status
GNSS • The US-owned GPS is used most widely for navigation 
services but Europe’s Galileo and the latest generation of 
Russian GLONASS systems are expected to be completed in 
the near future (European Parliament, 2011; GPS World, 2011).  
• Each system will have full global coverage and it is expected 
that new consumer devices will support more than one GNSS 
system (Amos, 2011; BBC, 2011b; RAE, 2011).
Legislation and 
regulation
The UK communications industries are regulated by Ofcom as 
well as various international bodies.
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Increase in demand has shifted the strategic focus of telecoms service providers towards 
driving up the availability of higher-speed networks. Mobile operators are continuing to 
upgrade their 3G24 networks to offer higher data speeds. Next-generation 4G25 networks 
would exceed super-fast fixed broadband speeds.
4.6.1.3 The radio spectrum
Wireless communications and broadcasting infrastructure depend on available radio 
frequency spectrum to transfer the information. Demand for radio communications grows 
both in number and variety of applications: mobile communications, sound and television 
broadcasting, aviation, railway and maritime transport, defence, medical electronics, 
emergency services, remote control and monitoring, radio astronomy and space research.
The radio spectrum is a finite resource and is controlled by the government. It controls 
the frequency usage and sells licenses. The public sector is a major holder of spectrum 
with almost 50% of spectrum below 15 GHz allocated (see Figure 48) (DCMS, 2011b). The 
historical circumstances yielded the most desirable ranges of the radio spectrum to radio 
and television broadcasting. Furthermore, certain parts of the spectrum work the best for 
certain radio applications (Rubenstein, 2007). 
24 3G specifies 100 kbit/s broadband speeds.
25 specification defines 100.Mbit/s speed for moving (cars, trains), 1 Gbit/s for pedestrians & 
stationary.
Figure 47: Household 
penetration of broadband: 
2005–2011 (Ofcom, 2011a).
Figure 48: Weighted use of 
spectrum and composition of 
public sector spectrum holdings 
below 15 GHz (DCMS, 2011b).
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The radio spectrum allocation results in inequalities of spectrum use. For example, mobile-
broadband technologies are limited by the available spectrum, while other applications 
do not use their spectrum efficiently. By some accounts less than 14% of radio spectrum is 
truly busy at any given time (Rubenstein, 2007).
The finiteness of radio spectrum availability is an important issue for wireless 
communications. Various options to address this, e.g. by increasing the efficiency of 
spectrum use via better technology or spectrum reuse, are available. See further discussion 
in Annex J.
4.6.1.4 Satellite communications
Satellite communications are comprised of satellites orbiting the Earth and a number 
of ground stations communicating with the satellites. The satellites mostly act as signal 
reflectors, whereas ground stations can send signals to satellite (e.g. telephones, TV 
broadcaster), receive the signals (e.g. telephones, TV receivers) or both (Hart, 2000).
The main advantage of satellite services iss  that it requires little terrestrial infrastructure, 
thus services can be available in remote areas with poor or no communications 
infrastructure. The most common consumer services include satellite television, radio, 
broadband, telephony, positioning, and others (SIA and Futron, 2011).
The satellite industry is a subset of both telecommunications and space industries, with 
very high involvement of non-commercial organisations. As shown in Figure 49, of the 986 
satellites on orbit, 37% are commercial communications satellites. The industry represents 
only 4% of telecommunications industry revenues, and 61% of space industry revenues 
(SIA and Futron, 2011).
The global demand for fixed satellite services is within the available capacity, expected 
to be at about 79–82% of available capacity in 2011, according to various estimates(GAO, 
2011). The global satellite industry posted growth of 11% in 2009 and 5% in 2010 (SIA and 
Futron, 2011). The growth is expected to continue. Euroconsult estimates 1145 satellites 
to be built and launched for the period 2011–2020, an increase of about 51% compared to 
the previous decade (2001–2010). This is fuelled by expansion of satellite services, by both 
government and commercial organisations (Euroconsult, 2011).
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Figure 49: Operational satellites 
by function (June 2011) (SIA and 
Futron, 2011)).104
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4.6.1.5 Global navigation satellite systems
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) provide position, navigation and timing 
services via satellites. The original implementation of GNSS is the Global Positioning 
System (GPS), which is operated by the US. Alternative GNSS systems also exist or are being 
developed, notably Russian GLONASS system, Galileo in Europe and Compass in China, 
which operate in approximately the same way (RAE, 2011).
The demand for and reliance on navigation systems is growing, with applications 
encompassing road, air, maritime and rail transport, cellular and data networks, emergency 
services, and others (RAE, 2011). The high reliance on GNSS services requires improved 
resilience, which could be achieved with availability of multiple systems and technological 
upgrades. 
The US-owned GPS is used most widely for navigation services, but Europe’s Galileo and 
the latest generation of Russian GLONASS systems are expected to be completed in the 
immediate future (European Parliament, 2011; GPS World, 2011). Each system will have full 
global coverage: GPS had 32 satellites in service in January 2011, GLONASS had 24, Galileo 
will also have 24 satellites and it is expected that consumer devices will support more than 
one GNSS system (Amos, 2011; BBC, 2011b; RAE, 2011). For example, Galileo is designed to 
be inter-operable with GPS and GLONASS (ESA, 2011).
4.6.2 KEY ISSUES
This section outlines main issues appearing within the ICT sector, with an issue upon issue 
of reliability and interdependence. The ICT sector has been witness for rapid change and 
a number of issues relate to keeping with the change and growth for the upcoming years. 
Some of the options given for the issues are already being put in place, or are in the future 
plans. Within ICT, the majority of options are technological – this comes from the fact 
that ICT is highly privately driven. Furthermore, reports advise against prescriptive policy, 
instead encouraging creating economic pull-through. The government cannot drive the 
sector – government decisions should be driven by the requirements/developments in the 
ICT sector (Horrocks et al., 2010).
4.6.2.1 Increasing dependability of/dependence on ICT
Many computers are deployed in systems that are financially, militarily or safety critical. 
Computer failures can stop a bank functioning (seen most rapidly in the loss of ATM 
support to customers); the primary protection systems of nuclear power reactors are 
commonly computers running software designed to protect safety; modern cars contain 
tens to hundreds of embedded computers that control things as crucial as their braking 
systems.
Any complex system can fail but today the failure can come from other than the obvious 
physical components such as turbines and motors; system failure can be caused by 
embedded control systems. This can be hardware (although this is the easiest thing to 
protect by redundancy), software or malicious attack. A dramatic example of software 
failure contributing to a major power outage was the U.S. Northeast Blackout of 2003.
4.6.2.2 Rapid development
ICT components (especially end-user ones) have short lifetimes and are frequently 
updated and refined to meet changing needs. However, certain components are planned 
for longer lifetime (e.g. networks, cables/masts, data centres, etc.). To accommodate the 
rapid growth, each generation of networks is planned with exponential growth in capacity.105
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4.6.2.3 Security
The role of ICT has been increasing within the national infrastructure and general usage, 
making it a more important target for various threats, such as hackers, viruses, identity 
thieves, etc. The general threat of hacking and cyber espionage (e.g. banking fraud 
and identity theft) has been a persistent concern for general public and organisations. 
Cyber-crime has been estimated to cost as much as $1 trillion per year globally (Cabinet 
Office, 2010b). Furthermore, a recent example of Stuxnet virus26 shows that cyber-attacks 
have become sophisticated, and can be stealthy, directed and able to disrupt critical 
infrastructure around the world. Cyber security has been identified by the UK Government 
as a high priority risk (Cornish et al., 2011).
New challenges for cyber security appear, with ICT usage trending towards information 
mobility and cloud computing: the data needs to be readily accessible yet secured. The 
points of attacks can be small and plenty, and the vulnerabilities often go unrecognised 
within the wider supply chain. The growth of such attacks has triggered reports from 
organisations that the volume and sophistication of cyber threats are outstripping their 
capacity to respond (Cornish et al., 2011).
The UK Government has allocated £650 million to National Cyber Security Programme 
in 2010. Furthermore, recent attacks have prompted increased awareness of cyber 
dependencies and vulnerabilities within the private sector as well (Cornish et al., 2011). The 
legislation to improve security and resilience in communications sector is being developed 
within EU as well as UK government offices (Cabinet Office, 2010a).
4.6.2.4 Resilience of communications infrastructure
ICT performance under stress (and human performance when the technology does fail) 
can be unpredictable and it is subject to node failure in which damage or compromise 
of a key element (a node, router, switch or exchange) causes a service failure to multiple 
users. Risks of failure increase where ICT network systems are working close to capacity (i.e. 
above 40%) (CST, 2009).
The resilience of ICT networks is improved by their nature and availability: multiple 
networks and/or ICT services (e.g. wired or wireless) are available to switch among, 
networks can utilise multiple links simultaneously and re-route dynamically in real time. 
Still, link failures can be of high severity, causing stress on bottlenecks in the network 
and producing a cascading failure (Horrocks et al., 2010). The ripple would affect a large 
number of users due to shared ICT infrastructures (e.g. several providers share the same 
cables or masts), outsourced data and computation (clouds, data centres), which require 
high connectivity, etc.
4.6.2.5 Supplier and international dependencies
The ICT infrastructure is almost exclusively commercially driven. While this improves 
resilience with multiple suppliers (and thus solutions) available, recent trends show 
that it is increasingly dependent upon a small number of major suppliers of component 
subsystems (Microsoft, Google, Cisco and Intel) (CST, 2009). Massive investments necessary 
for ‘next generation’ improvements in the sector may result in the reduction of the number 
of providers in the future, and therefore pose dependency (lock-in) issues.
26 Stuxnet virus was designed to target Iran’s nuclear power plants directly and succeeded in 
disrupting operation of a nuclear power plant for months (Nicol, D. M. (2011). Hacking the lights 
out. Scientific American 305: 54–59.)106
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The international presence of ICT sector makes it susceptible to foreign laws and 
international dependencies. Most of ICT hardware is manufactured abroad; a large amount 
of IT services are based in foreign countries as well. Changes in international relations 
could have impact on the provision of these ICT components. A significant issue is using 
public data centre services, e.g. for data storage, which are located in a foreign countries. 
In many cases, laws within the country would apply to that data, e.g. USA PATRIOT act of 
2001, which would allow US government agents to access sensitive data stored in data 
centres on US soil.
4.6.2.6 Satellite communications and GNSS
Satellite communications have a number of vulnerabilities that can impact signal strength 
and service availability. Satellite signal strength has to travel great distances, and can be 
reduced by terrestrial weather conditions (e.g. rain), as well as events in space, such as solar 
flares or scintillation (Rooker, 2008). A prominent problem in satellite communications is 
signal interference. Jamming is the simplest form of attack, when a noise signal of a correct 
frequency is used to overpower the actual signal.
The availability of GNSS (GPS) has led to over-reliance on the system. A study by the Royal 
Academy of Engineering has identified that no alternative or back-up systems are in place 
when GNSS is used (e.g. paper maps). With increasing use of GNSS in life critical systems, 
its integrity is insufficient for these applications, if inadequate alternatives or backups are 
available (ESA, 2011). This is in particular important when considering that GNSS can be 
jammed easily (see above).
4.6.2.7 Radio spectrum
The radio spectrum is a finite resource – bands below 15 GHz are considered the most 
valuable part of the radio spectrum due to the technical characteristics used by various 
applications. For mobile communications, frequencies below about 4GHz are used, with 
the prime bands being in 300 MHz–3 GHz area (see ESA, 2011; DCMS, 2011a). 
The mobile communications have been the fastest growing market that utilises the radio 
spectrum. While wired-broadband can be expended (theoretically) unlimitedly, the quality 
and speed of mobile-broadband connectivity relies on the available spectrum. The limited 
amount of spectrum means a limited amount of bandwidth, and hence speed (ITU, 2011). 
The demand for mobile bandwidth has been surging with increase of smartphones, 
tablet and mobile computing devices. Cisco expects the mobile data traffic to have 
a compound annual growth (CAGR) rate of 91% in 2010–2015 (see Figure 50) (DCMS, 
2011b). Furthermore, the move to HD television will also increase demand for similar radio 
spectrum range.
Several options have been proposed to address the so-called ‘spectrum crisis’, including 
technological and governmental actions. Service providers are investigating more efficient 
use of the available spectrum. Moving to digital signal (e.g. for TV or radio broadcast) could 
save three quarters of the bandwidth, next-generation networks (e.g. 4G, LTE-Advanced) 
also aim to reduce the bandwidth required for signals (BBC, 2006). Cognitive radio 
techniques (e.g. software radio, ‘white space’ wireless broadband) would allow devices to 
utilise assigned but unused spectrum areas (Ofcom, 2011b).107
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Furthermore, large ranges (close to 50%) of radio spectrum are allocated to public sector 
use, especially military (Figure 48). These bands are not effectively used; therefore the 
UK government aims to release significant amounts of this spectrum to commercial use, 
especially for mobile bandwidth. The current government plans consider releasing at least 
500 MHz of public sector spectrum below 5 GHz within the next 10 years (DCMS, 2011b).
4.6.2.8 Grid capacity/power shortage
The rapid rates of growth in data centre electricity use that prevailed from 2000 to 2005 
slowed significantly from 2005 to 2010, yielding total electricity use by data centres in 2010 
of about 1.3% of all electricity use for the world, and 2% of all electricity use for the US 
(Koomey, 2011). Nonetheless grid capacity is at limits in some places, so there are places 
where new data centres are not allowed (e.g. Canary Wharf). Companies are building data/
cloud centres in areas where energy is cheap and plentiful (to a lesser extent, the same is 
true of cooling). 
4.6.2.9 Climate change
The impacts of climate change to the ICT sector are likely to be at most minor ones. While 
specific incidents (e.g. floods, winds) may impact certain components, there seems to be 
no substantial empirical data evidence to indicate more significant effects.
Furthermore, international design standards for ICT components also aid mitigation of 
climate change effects, where components are designed to operate in extreme heat or 
cold (i.e. the same kit may be used in different climate areas); for example, for this reason 
heat and drought are not considered an issue by ICT network operators (Cabinet Office, 
2011).
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Figure 50: Mobile data traffic 
forecast – Western Europe 
(2010–2015) (DCMS, 2011b).109
This chapter presents an analysis of long term strategies for future National 
Infrastructure (NI) provision in Great Britain. The analysis is a demonstration 
of the feasibility of the quantified system of systems approach being 
pioneered by the ITRC. The Fast Track Analysis (FTA) is limited to the future 
scenarios identified in Chapter 2, and the three representative cross-
sectoral strategies for NI provision. Where possible, each of the NI sectors 
has made use of existing quantified models to conduct the analysis. This is 
a first step, and the methods and modelling tools now being developed in 
ITRC will enable much more extensive quantification of the range of future 
possibilities and strategies, including considering interactions between 
sectors and addressing the views of our stakeholders.
5.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE FTA TRANSITION STRATEGIES
In this report we have argued that the benefits of infrastructure can be more effectively 
achieved, and the systemic risks minimised, through the development of an integrated, 
long term strategic approach to infrastructure provision. This involves proposing an overall 
direction for NI systems and developing of pathways to achieving the desired outcomes 
in the long term. In order to demonstrate this approach in practice, we have introduced 
the concept of NI transition strategies, which are cross-sectoral strategic plans for NI service 
provision, comprised of sequenced, sector-specific governance and technology options. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the transition to a sustainable NI system is the process that leads, 
over a period of decades, to a system configuration that performs well with respect to 
multiple economic, social and environmental criteria.
In order to demonstrate this approach, in the FTA we have developed three contrasting 
transition strategies, which are intended to provide the opportunity to explore a range of 
approaches to NI provision, and associated levels of investment. These three strategies are 
called: Capacity-Intensive (CI), Decentralisation (DC), and Capacity-Constrained (CC). They are 
described in more detail in the following sections. 
5  An analysis of long term strategies  
  for National Infrastructure110
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Each of the transition strategies has goals and principles that guide the individual selection 
of options for each infrastructure sector in the strategy portfolio. As the legacy of today’s 
infrastructure system is a key characteristic of NI, all of the strategies have as a starting 
point the current infrastructure systems, which limits, to some extent, the potential for 
radical change. 
5.1.1 CAPACITY-INTENSIVE (CI) TRANSITION STRATEGY
The Capacity-Intensive (CI) transition strategy is a high investment strategy that focuses 
on the use of centralised options across sectors, both in terms of governance and 
technology. The aim of this strategy is to minimise the capacity constraints on demand, 
creating surplus27 capacity across the sectors and potential for unconstrained growth 
in supply of infrastructure services. Cost-effective demand management measures are 
included, but are not a priority in this strategy. The strategy includes a commitment to 
decarbonisation of the energy and transport sectors. 
5.1.2 DECENTRALISATION (DC) TRANSITION STRATEGY
The Decentralisation (DC) strategy seeks to orientate infrastructure provision towards 
decentralised options, while existing centralised infrastructure (e.g. national grid, highways 
network, intercity rail) is still maintained. Whilst the level of service provision and reliability 
is not necessarily as high as in the CI strategy, we do not assume major resource constraints 
– we find in practice that a DC strategy involves major investment. This strategy focuses on 
the utilisation of beneficial local interdependencies between electricity and heat, energy 
and solid waste, as well as wastewater and water. The focus on decentralised technology 
options creates a more varied strategic portfolio than the CI strategy. This transition 
strategy includes environmentally friendly objectives; investment in the transportation 
sector, for example, concentrates on energy efficient options (e.g. electric vehicles and rail). 
5.1.3 CAPACITY-CONSTRAINED (CC) TRANSITION STRATEGY
The Capacity-Constrained (CC) strategy is a low investment strategy that focuses on 
maintaining near current levels of NI capacity, while ensuring security of supply through 
demand management. Demand is reduced through a combination of demand-side 
technologies (e.g. options that increase efficiency, thus reducing demand), policy options 
(e.g. tax or regulation), and behavioural change. While new capacity is not added in this 
strategy, existing capacity is replaced when it reaches the end of its life with lower-carbon 
technologies. 
5.1.4 EXPLORATION OF KEY QUESTIONS
The performance evaluation of the above three strategies across the three growth 
scenarios enables the exploration of the key questions in NI provision. For example, the 
CI strategy gives an impression of the level of infrastructure that could be provided with 
investment levels that are high by historical standards. Comparing the performance of the 
CI and DC strategies provides insight into whether accounting for local interdependence 
in NI unlocks performance increases. Evaluating the performance over time of the 
DC strategy provides insight into the attributes and benefits (or lack thereof) of a 
decentralised arrangement. Additionally, evaluating the performance of the CI strategy 
gives perspective on the level of service that could be provided at fairly modest levels of 
capital investment. 
27 Except in road transport, where complete elimination of congestion (a capacity constraint) either 
via supply-side measures or increased capacity is likely to be unrealistic.111
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KEY QUESTIONS:
1.  What are the implications of growing demand for infrastructure services? 
2.  What are the implications of constrained investment in UK infrastructure 
capacity?
3.  What are the implications of a carbon-constrained future? 
4.  What are the implications of a decentralised National Infrastructure system? 
5.  What are the implications of interdependence between infrastructure sectors?  
Thus, the key dimensions explored by the transition strategies are centralism to 
decentralism, low to high investment, and carbon constraint (e.g. environmental 
friendliness). Figure 51 illustrates these key dimensions with the associated transition 
strategy. 
5.1.5 POTENTIAL FUTURE NI INVESTMENT LEVELS
Specification of the infrastructure transition strategies requires an indication of the level of 
investment across infrastructure sectors. The historical and current levels of investment in 
NI were explored in order to provide sensible bounds on these levels of investments. 
High investment
Low investment
Centralised provision Decentralised provision
Capacity-intensive 
(CI)
Capacity-
constrained
 (CC)
Decentralisation
(DC)
Figure 51: Dimensions of the 
FTA transition strategies.112
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In the Strategy for National Infrastructure (NIP) (2010b), HM Treasury (HMT) and 
Infrastructure UK (IUK) state that £150 billion was invested in infrastructure in the UK 
in the past 5 years. This represents an investment of approximately 2.1%28  of GDP. 
According to the NIP 2010,29 over the next 5 years, HMT/IUK estimate £195 billion of 
planned investments in infrastructure. Using projected UK GDP data30 for 2011–2015, this 
investment would represent 2.59% of GDP. The planned investment is lower than OECD’s 
projections of £50 billion per annum (i.e. approximately 3.32% of GDP). A summary of this 
analysis can be seen in Table 23. 
These figures provide median infrastructure investment levels over the next 5 years at 
2.5% of GDP. Hence, ‘High’ and ‘Low’ investment levels are taken at 5% and 1.5% of GDP, 
respectively. These values are near to the upper (5.2%) and lower (1.5%) bounds of public 
investment in infrastructure for the last 40 years (Blanc-Brude et al., 2007).
28 UK GDP data used for calculation from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) from 2005 to 2009.
29 Values from NIP 2010 were used for the construction of the transition strategy investment levels, as 
the NIP 2011 values were unavailable at the time of the analysis.
30 UK GDP data used for calculation from the IMF’s WEO from 2011 to 2015.
Table 23: Per cent GDP investment in infrastructure over a five year period
Period (source)      GDP (%)
2005–2006 to 2010–2011 (HMT/IUK), Actual 2.1
2010–2011 to 2014–2015 (HMT/IUK), Planned 2.59
2010–2011 to 2014–2015 (OECD), Expected 3.32
Figure 52: High and low 
investment levels by sector as a 
percentage of GDP (right axis). 
Absolute investment by sector 
per annum for the high and 
low investment over the next 5 
years is provided for illustrative 
purposes, with values assuming 
an equal annual investment 
over the 5-year period (left 
axis).The percentage of total 
NI investment by sector is 
provided in parenthesis below 
the sector name. All values are 
in 2009 prices.
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To allocate investments across infrastructure sectors, the planned distribution31 (in 
terms of percentage of total investment) was used for the next five years (HM Treasury 
and Infrastructure UK, 2010b). These values were then translated into percentage GDP 
investment for each NI sector. Figure 52 summarises these results, and provides the 
average absolute annual investment value using UK GDP projections for the next 5 years 
for illustrative purposes.
5.2 ENERGY
The FTA adapts and uses several of the numerous studies of energy futures for the 
UK. Specifically, the MARKAL model is used to evaluate the three ITRC transition 
strategies. The UKERC Energy 2050 low carbon and low-carbon lifestyle scenarios 
are modified to correspond to the ITRC FTA scenarios. 
Under the current policy landscape, UK energy system transition will be driven by 
low carbon and renewable goals, security of supply and affordability of energy. 
Thus, these aspects are used to evaluate the performance of the three transition 
strategies. The Capacity-Constrained strategy was found to be consistently 
least cost and the Decentralisation strategy consistently produced the least 
CO2 emissions with greatest diversity of supply sources to 2050. Evaluating 
the overall performance of strategies across the three metrics suggests that 
the Decentralisation and Capacity-Constrained strategies had the best overall 
performance.
5.2.1 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
A review of a range of existing energy models, scenario exercises, and their outputs, 
revealed that the UK Energy Research Centre’s (UKERC) Energy 2050 exercise was most 
appropriate to model demand and supply options of the energy sector. The outputs of 
the Energy 2050 exercise use an internationally peer-reviewed energy model (MARKAL) 
that is technologically disaggregated, and therefore consistent with the ITRC approach. 
The Energy 2050 scenario set is extensive, providing the scope of choices that match 
the needs of the FTA. Further, the model and results have been extensively used for UK 
public policy analysis. The input assumptions and outputs are well documented and in 
the public domain. Similar scenarios and underpinning logics are evident in other major 
scenario exercises, notably those of the DECC 2050 pathways analysis and the work of the 
Committee on Climate Change.
The UKERC MARKAL modelling work was completed in early 2009. The UKERC Energy 
2050 scenarios use a back-cast approach, but additionally constrain the rate at which 
infrastructure is built to ensure technically feasible solutions. MARKAL has models for both 
supply- and demand-side technologies. The temporal resolution in MARKAL is limited and 
therefore intermittency and peak demand modelling is handled in a crude manner. 
31 The proportion of water and wastewater allowed capital expenditure (Ofwat, from 2010 to 2015) 
was used to disaggregate water and wastewater investment. Note that the absolute values are 
provided for illustrative purposes.114
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In the UKERC scenarios, security of supply is ensured with sufficient capacity margins 
and reliability checks with the Wien Autonomous System Planning (WASP) model. The 
MARKAL and WASP models used in the UKERC analysis take into account plant closure 
and decommissioning, costs, emission factors and technology availability to determine 
capacity to be installed. WASP uses three sophisticated reliability indicators: the value of 
lost load (VOLL), loss of load expectation (LOLE) and number of years in a century to ensure 
capacity is installed to meet demand (Skea et al., 2010). These capacities are generally 
above the capacity margin of 20% considered satisfactory by NGC. The actual capacity 
margin in 2010/11 was 36% for electricity and 20% for gas (DECC, 2011f). These capacity 
margins are extremely important in generation and transmission (of electricity and gas) 
to ensure planned and certain unplanned outages are dealt with in an orderly manner 
without loss of load. 
Due to capacity margin requirements, different patterns of demand are associated with the 
different transition strategies. The FTA approach to modelling energy demand is therefore 
a combination of engineering and behavioural demand modelling. For each transition 
strategy reference case, a simple econometric approach was utilised to evaluate sectoral 
fuel demand, driven by price, GDP and population in the underlying transition strategy, 
and an econometric approach to the effects of population, income and price. The range 
of econometric drivers and the elasticities employed in the demand space may differ 
substantially depending on these assumptions. The mathematical formulation of this 
approach can be seen in Annex E.
There are a number of simplifications for the FTA. The treatment and the separation of 
demand projections and supply changes are a significant simplification for the assessment. 
More integrated and spatially disaggregated treatment will be undertaken in the later 
phases of the ITRC. Similarly, expected changes to power systems pose challenges for 
supply and demand balancing due to increased use of inflexible and intermittent plant. 
This is a complexity that will not be addressed in detail in the FTA. While elasticities are 
assumed to be constant over time, they would likely change significantly over the four 
decades for which the assessment has been applied here.
5.2.2 DESCRIPTION OF TRANSITION STRATEGIES
The implication of the capacity margin requirement adopted in the FTA analysis is 
that future demand scenarios inform the energy sector transition strategies (i.e. are 
not independent). Thus, different energy supply scenarios are developed in parallel to 
the transition strategies. Generally, the UKERC scenarios are adapted to mimic the FTA 
transition strategies. An overview of the supply options and technologies assumed in each 
of the strategies is given in Table 24, and further discussed below.
5.2.2.1 Capacity-Intensive transition strategy
Capacity-Intensive (CI) strategies for the energy sector (i.e. transitioning the electricity 
sector to capital-intensive low carbon supply options) such as renewable electricity, 
nuclear power, and the addition of carbon capture and storage (CCS) to fossil fuel 
generation all require significant investments. Further, most scenarios imply that the 
decrease in direct use of fossil fuels in heating and transportation would result in an 
increase in demand for centralised electricity capacity. 115
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For the CI strategy, the FTA uses the ‘low carbon scenario’ from the UKERC Energy 2050 
scenario set which has a high reliance on centralised power generation technologies 
to meet ambitious (80%) carbon mitigation targets. Centralised capacity is added to 
meet demand under a strict supply security criterion. Information on imminent plant 
closures and upcoming projects (at the time of modelling) is incorporated in determining 
capacity. Within these constraints, the MARKAL model generates a cost-minimum 
energy pathway. To simulate market barriers of investment in technology, a technology 
specific discount rate is employed. Supply options and mix are outputs from the UKERC 
Energy 2050 scenarios. A 26% CO2 reduction is achieved by 2020 (CCC interim target 
equivalent), extrapolated to -80% by 2050. The scenario includes near- and long term 
policies (according to the Climate Change Act 2008 and adopted by UK Government) 
along with the financial budget in 2009. The scenario pathway has explicit carbon emission 
constraints at 2015, 2020 and 2050, with a straight-line trajectory between 2020 and 2050. 
Table 24: Supply options, representative technologies and cost sources by transition strategy in the energy sector
Transition 
strategy 
Supply option  Chosen technology for cost 
calculation
Cost source (Capital & fixed 
O&M, learning rate)
Capacity-
Intensive; 
Capacity-
Constrained 
Coal USC retrofit (Existing coal – FGD) (Marsh et al., 2005; IPCC, 2007)
Coal CCS New PF with CO2 capture
Gas New GTCC
Gas CCS CCGT PC-CCS (Mott MacDonald, 2011)
Nuclear EPWR (URN) from 2010–2020 
Block of EPWR (URN) from 2020
(Sustainable Development 
Commission, 2006; IPCC, 2007)
Hydro Hydro small (1.25–20 MW) (Enviros, 2005; IPCC, 2007)
Wind Wind – off shore (two step 
resource curve)
Marine Offshore wave
Biowaste & others MSW-SRF (Mott MacDonald, 2011)
Solar PV Solar PV Crystalline
Decentralisation  Mini-wind Mini-wind (Assumed; IPCC, 2007)
CHP-Stirling Natural Gas Engine CHP plants (DTI, 2003)
Fuel cell-small Gas driven MCFC – CHP (Hawkins et al., 2005)
Fuel cell-large Gas driven MCFC – CHP116
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5.2.2.2 Decentralisation transition strategy
For the Decentralisation (DC) strategy, the need for increased electricity capacity remains 
unchanged, but production of electricity is at or near the point of consumption.32 
Decentralised variants of nuclear power and CCS are not considered able to meet the 
whole of projected demand, so are unfeasible for this strategy. However, decentralised 
renewables (e.g. onshore wind, solar and biomass) can make a substantial contribution.33 
Investment requirements remain much higher than historic trends, but much can be 
undertaken within the building stock (e.g. in photovoltaics or fuel cells) by energy users 
and therefore falls outside the usual definition of the infrastructure investment.
Building thermal efficiency improvements are not considered although penetration of 
decentralised energy often involves policies and incentives for simultaneous improvement 
of building energy performance of the type assumed in the CC strategy.
The DC strategy employs small-scale decentralised energy (i.e. microgeneration) from 
on-site renewable energy, small and medium combined heat and power (CHP) systems, 
and community-scale energy from waste (EfW) schemes. Under the EU Renewable 
Energy Directive goal, the UK has set a legally binding goal of 15% renewable energy 
by 2020, which UK Government translates to 30–35% of renewable electricity, 12% of 
renewable heat and 10% renewables in transport. In mid-2011, DECC unveiled its latest 
Microgeneration Strategy (DECC, 2011d) and UK Renewable Energy Roadmap (DECC, 
2011g) on how this goal would be achieved using microgeneration. Currently about 5% 
of generation is from decentralised energy. Elsewhere in the EU, decentralised energy 
generates up to 50% and 40% of electricity in Denmark and Netherlands respectively. 
Globally decentralised energy generation is rising and both EST (Walker, 2005) and AEA 
(AEA Technology, 2010) estimate substantial potential for decentralised energy in the UK, 
as is evident from recent estimates by the CCC (2011) Table 25.
However, with only 3% of total energy currently supplied from renewables, most 
renewables markets in the UK are in their early stage of growth and have barriers to reach 
their full potential. It would be impractical to meet electricity demand up to 2050 from 
microgeneration alone.
Additionally, balancing peak electricity demand and supply in a distributed supply system 
dominated by plethora of renewable generation and CHP will be challenging, since the 
generation output of renewable energy varies with weather conditions, and it is neither 
straightforward or desirable to modulate the output of renewables to follow a particular 
load shape (Strbac, 2008). Similarly, the electrical output of domestic CHPs will be primarily 
driven by the demand for heat rather than electricity. 
This intermittency creates limitations for renewable generation to displace conventional 
plant capacity. It will be necessary to retain a certain amount of flexible conventional 
capacity to ensure security of supply, or to deliver an equivalent service from storage 
or demand response. In the future, suitable storage technologies, innovative peak 
load levelling and Demand Side Management (DSM) methods will play a major role in 
compensating for this generation–consumption mismatch (Luo et al., 2010). 
32 Ofgem defines decentralised energy as energy from generating plant of under 50 MW connected 
to a local distribution network system, rather than to a high voltage transmission system.
33 Note that highly decentralised scenarios require a further contribution from ‘medium carbon’ 
options, notably small scale, gas-fired CHP, implying some trade-off with climate mitigation 
options.117
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Table 25: UK Practical renewable energy resources (Committee on Climate Change, 
2011)
Technology UK practical resource 
(tWh/yr)
New nuclear 175*
Onshore wind 80
Offshore wind 400
Tidal stream 18–200
Wave 40
Solar PV 140**
Tidal range 40***
*     From 8 approved sites with 20 GW;  
**    With current technology;  
***  About half of Seven Barrage.
Recent research finds that Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G), possible with high penetration of electric 
vehicles, when combined with DSM can substantially increase this compensation and save 
electricity purchase costs (Guttinger and Ahcin, 2011; Ricardo, 2011).
A DC strategy involves aggressive uptake of solar photovoltaic, and onshore micro/mini-
wind and CHPs (both stirling and fuel-cell type). The Energy Saving Trust (EST) (Walker, 
2005) assumes estimated generation by decentralised energy technologies in year 2030 
and 2050 as fractions of demand in 2005 (380 tWh) (see Table 26). The FTA assumes a 
conservative generation below those figures in 2030 and 2050 except for solar PV.
Solar PV on buildings and in small scale ground arrays is currently stimulated by a feed-
in-tariff (FiT) arrangement, although support levels are reduced from December 2011 
and a new FiT scheme with Contract for Difference over the current premium FiT is being 
proposed in the Electricity Market Reform white paper. Aggressive financial incentives for 
solar PV are assumed till 2030 delivering 25 tWh generation. Robust growth is assumed to 
continue till 2050 when all 20 million homes have adopted the technology with an average 
capacity of 2 kWp. Similar incentives operate in commercial and public buildings, with 
larger arrays averaging 50 kW on 200,000 buildings, giving a commercial capacity of about 
10 GW. A total generation of about 45 tWh in 2050 is targeted.
Small wind turbines can be located on buildings (up to 1.5 kW) or ‘pole-mounted’ (up to 
6 kW), although application is limited by wind speeds. A total of 10 TWh is assumed to be 
generated by 2050. Fuel cell CHP at the scale for individual houses is at the demonstration 
stage. Estimates for the UK indicate a potential of 10M homes. Calculations based on a  
3 kW device, a heat:power ratio of 1:1 and a typical heat requirement (for heat and hot 
water in a well-insulated home in 2050 of ~10 MWh/year) indicate a load factor of about 
40%. A total generation of 100 tWh by CHP is assumed.118
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The generation mix is temporally varied to increase the share of decentralised energy 
until it reaches the assumed generation amount (Table 26). Simultaneously generation 
from nuclear, coal and coal CCS is reduced while increasing generation from gas where 
needed to meet total generation needs. Thus, supply options under this transition are not 
consistent with the least-cost approach in the other two strategies. Installed capacities are 
then estimated using generation efficiency and availability from MARKAL-MED model and 
cost sources listed in Table 24. The CHP output is broadly correlated with heat demand, 
and therefore may be overall beneficial, it is assumed that no additional backup capacity is 
required. Also, CHPs will displace large number of heat pumps.
UKERC Scenario
The DC strategy is designed to meet the demand from the UKERC Low Carbon scenario 
from the UKERC 2050 scenario set, with the same set of energy demands, but with explicit 
modification of the electricity supply sector to increase the use of decentralised power 
generation technologies.
5.2.2.3 Capacity-Constrained transition strategy
Capacity-Constrained (CC) strategies have been examined in some detail in the literature. 
Usually, it is in the context of social change or energy security driven trends that focus on 
energy efficiency improvement and energy demand reduction. Under these conditions, 
energy demand trends vary from the conventional econometric assumption that they are 
driven principally by population, income and cost drivers. Lower demand is reflected in 
low demand growth, although climate mitigation still implies a very much higher trend for 
electricity demand than for direct use of fossil fuels. 
Table 26: Generations in EST (Walker, 2005) scenarios and assumed generation in the decentralisation strategy
Technology Assumption in EST 
(2005), % of 2005 
generation
Assumption in EST 
(2005), tWh/yr 
(P x 380 tWh/yr)*
Actual 
in 2010, 
tWh/yr
FTA assumption,  
tWh/yr
Year* 2030 2050 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
PV-domestic 0.10 0.30 0.38 1.14 0.0331 25.00 45.00
Small wind** 1.20 5.90 4.56 22.42 0.0552 3.50 10.00
CHP Stirling** 1.00 6.30 3.80 23.94 0.0103 5.00 25.00
Fuel cell small*** 0.70 9.40 2.66 35.72 0.0103 5.00 35.00
Fuel cell large*** 0.60 18.40 2.28 69.92 0.0103 2.00 40.00
*      EST(2005) assumes 2005 total generation as 380 TWh.
**    From EST(2005) Capital subsidies of 25% and cost reduction scenario.
***  From EST(2005) Energy export equivalence scenario.
1     RenewableUK, 2011.
2     NS, 2011a
3     Assumed by author119
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The ‘low-carbon lifestyle scenario’ is used for the CC strategy as lifestyle changes in 
residential and transport sector are incorporated to assist in achieving 80% CO2 reduction 
by 2050 (Eyre et al., 2010). The residential sector uses the UK Domestic Carbon Model 
(Palmer et al., 2006) which enables different scenarios of house building, demolition, 
fabric improvement, and installation of microgeneration. It also evaluates the effects of 
changes in lifestyle-related attributes such as in internal temperature, hot water use, and 
other energy saving behaviours. The transportation sector uses the UK Transport Carbon 
Model (Brand et al., 2012), a strategic transport–energy–environment model for simulation 
of passenger and freight transport. It uses detailed fuel consumption and vehicle stock 
projections from shifts in travel patterns (car occupancy, modal split, technology choice 
etc.). Further, energy service demand is based on an evidence review (Anable et al., 2006) 
of the impact of transport policies and travel patterns in and out of UK. The demands from 
both models are used as energy demand inputs into MARKAL which was again used to 
optimize costs to meet an 80% CO2 reduction. 
5.2.3 EVOLUTION OF THE TRANSITION STRATEGIES’ SUPPLY 
OPTIONS
Coal CCS is an early choice for decarbonisation in MARKAL-MED for power generation in 
both transition strategies from 2020 onwards as seen in the CI and CC strategies (Figures 
53 and 54). It remains a main supply option in both transition strategies with nuclear later 
selected in part to meet carbon target. With more wind electricity to the grid, gas capacity 
is also gradually increased. Interestingly, in the CC strategy, coal generation is present but 
as the need for new generation is reduced, the carbon goal is met through aggressive 
electricity demand reduction in all sectors, especially residential. Also, solar thermal, micro-
wind and solar PV penetrations are respectively at 50%, 5% and 15% of dwellings by 2050.
Figure 53: Supply options 
and capacity in the Capacity-
Intensive transition strategy 
(High growth scenario).  
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Gas remains a major supply option both in the CI (Figure 53) and DC (Figure 55) strategies 
in order to ensure sufficient standby capacity to account for intermittent supply options 
(e.g. wind) in the generation mix. A recent IEA special report (WEO, 2011) reports fewer 
uncertainties over the outlook for natural gas with both demand, and supply side forces 
pointing to a possible ‘Golden Age of Gas’. With recent discoveries of vast unconventional 
gas reserves (shale-gas) and favourable LNG trade, a high-gas scenario in future supply 
mix is also a reasonable possibility. A recent scenario analysis by Redpoint Energy for the 
Electricity Network Association found that gas could continue to play a major on-going 
role in GB market mix in the foreseeable future while meeting both renewable and carbon 
targets (ENA, 2010). The case for continued gas use becomes even more attractive with 
an existing network, given the uncertainties and risks associated with key emerging 
low-carbon technologies. However, it remains to be seen how environmental concerns 
regarding recovery of shale-gas (mainly from large amounts of freshwater use and 
disposal, and possible earthquakes from such operations) play out on the production 
volume.
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Figure 54: Supply options 
and capacity in the Capacity-
Constrained transition strategy 
(High growth scenario).
 
Figure 55: Supply options and 
capacity in the Decentralisation 
transition strategy (High growth 
scenario).121
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 5.2.4 FUTURE DEMAND UNDER THE FTA SCENARIOS
The CI and CC strategies provide the greatest contrast in future demand. Thus, Table 27 
presents the estimated sectoral fuel demand space for the UK for the high (scenario 3), 
medium (scenario 2), and low (scenario 1) growth scenarios to 2050. 
Low growth  Medium growth  High growth
Table 27: Estimated fuel-wise sectoral demand space for the UK to 2050. (Central demands are from the 
respective UKERC 2050 scenarios)
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Low growth  Medium growth  High growth
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In both CI and CC strategies, electricity generation from fossil fuel sources is decreased 
in line with ambitious carbon targets, and decarbonisation is achieved through end-use 
efficiency and demand reduction in end-use sectors. However, with the tightening of 
decarbonisation targets from 2035 to 2050, shifts in low carbon electricity outweigh the 
efficiency improvement and demand reduction and low carbon electricity generation 
rise to meet carbon goals across sectors. Transport petroleum demand falls sharply to 
decarbonise the sector mainly through electrification (efficient hybrid-plugin) with low 
ethanol and battery operated vehicles.
In the CI strategy, the residential sector decarbonises mainly by shifting from gas to 
electricity with increasing equipment of higher efficiency especially heat pumps for space 
and water heating. Demand reduction methods such as electric boiler night storage also 
play an important role. The service sector is decarbonised by shifting to biomass and 
electricity while employing efficient electric equipment such as heat pumps for heating.
In the CC strategy, gas demand is shifted to electricity in the residential sector while 
reducing this electricity demand through lifestyle changes in internal temperature, hot 
water use and other energy saving behaviours. Consequently, energy efficient appliances 
and equipment are used in the CC strategy and housing stock energy efficiency is 
increased with increased insulation. New houses after 2020 are built with improved 
building standards, passive and low-tech approaches (to tackle increasing heating degree 
days) and high insulation levels. Incandescent lighting is phased out and district CHPs are 
applied to about 10% homes by 2050. Transport lifestyle changes are obtained through 
a decrease in the average distance travelled, an increase in car occupancy, on-road 
fuel efficiency, transition to EV/PHEV/HEV, modal split from personal vehicles to mass 
transportation and decreasing share of large cars. 
5.2.5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
5.2.5.1 Cost
From 2011 to 2015, the lowest and highest investment requirements across transition 
strategies and demand scenarios were £4.3 billion and £19.4 billion respectively. The CC 
strategy is consistently least-cost over the three scenarios, followed by the CI and DC 
strategies over the time period 2011–2050 (Figure 56, overleaf). To evaluate the costs of 
transition strategies, capital (for installation of new capacity) and fixed O&M costs are 
included. Variable O&M costs and costs of plant decommissioning and closing are not 
included. Costs are often controversial, particularly for renewable technologies that are 
yet to mature and reach full market penetration. Representative technologies for supply 
options and sources of future costs used are listed in Table 24. Costs for solar PV, biowaste 
(MSF) and gas CCS are taken from estimations in MML (2011) for high renewables scenario 
until 2040. For coal, coal CCS, gas and nuclear, costs are linearly interpolated between 
2010 and 2020 from available costs in these years; costs for 2020 are assumed constant 
throughout to 2050. Costs for other technologies are estimated using published learning 
rates (mostly from IPCC (2007)) and technology costs in the year 2000. Table 24 lists the 
specific technologies considered for cost estimation with the relevant sources. 124
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Figure 56: Total cost of capacity 
installation over 40 years (2011–
2050) for the three transition 
strategies against the ITRC FTA 
scenarios.
Figure 57: Total electricity sector 
CO2 emissions (2011–2050) by 
transition strategy against the 
ITRC FTA scenarios.
 
Figure 58: Diversity of supply 
options, high growth scenario 
(Shannon–Wiener index). 
Higher index denotes greater 
diversity of supply.
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5.2.5.2 CO2 emissions from electricity generation
The DC strategy consistently produced the least CO2 emissions, following closely by the CI 
strategy to 2050 (Figure 57). The CC strategy resulted in the most CO2 emissions. Several 
assumptions were made in estimating CO2 emissions. With the exception of emissions from 
fuel used in electricity generation, other life cycle emissions were not considered. Thus, 
renewable generation technologies including nuclear effectively produce zero emissions. 
Also, emissions from electricity generated by CHP is taken as zero carbon. Any emissions 
generated by CHP are allocated to the generated heat part and are not considered in this 
estimation. Finally, emissions from electricity generation are estimated based on emissions 
factors and capture rates (for coal/gas CCS) from Killip (2005) and Skea et al. (2010). 
Emission factors are assumed constant through to 2050.
5.2.5.3 Electricity supply security 
The DC strategy resulted in consistently greater supply security using the the Shannon–
Wiener index (Stirling, 1994), a simple measure often used to assess security of supply 
emanating from diversity of supply options. This is particularly important for an 
increasingly net primary energy importer such as the UK. Since becoming a net importer, 
the share of UK’s imported primary energy to total has grown to 27%, with the major 
share belonging to coal and gas, the primary sources of fuel in hydrocarbon-based 
electricity generation. In a BaU case, the share of gas in primary energy supply is predicted 
to increase to 30+% by 2020 (Bolton, 2010). A single fuel system has a Shannon–Wiener 
index of 0. A value above 2 will indicate a system with diverse sources with none playing a 
dominant role – such a system can be reasonably considered secure in case of individual 
supply option interruptions. 
5.2.5.4 Summary
Figure 59 presents a visual summary of the performance of the three transition strategies 
across the three growth scenarios for the two time-periods: 2010–2030 and 2030–2050 for 
electricity generation. This visualisation was created using the highest and lowest figures 
for Cost and Emission as benchmarks, and relative value for supply security. 
As previously stated, the CC strategy resulted in the lowest cost, in part due to an emphasis 
upon demand reduction. The DC strategy resulted in the highest cost, with a possible 
reorganisation of the sector towards higher-cost distributed energy technologies requiring 
investment in the earlier years. The DC strategy offers benefits in terms of increased supply 
diversity, although the Shannon–Wiener index does not account for the security benefit 
provided by over-capacity in the CI transition strategy. Evaluating the overall performance 
over the entire time period revealed that the DC had the best aggregate performance 
across the time periods and the three metrics, followed by CI and CC.
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5.2.6 CONCLUSIONS
Under the current policy landscape, UK energy system transition will be driven by low 
carbon and renewable goals, security of supply and affordability of energy. Commitment 
to carbon targets is likely to be one of the biggest sources of uncertainty. The envisaged 
shift to a low carbon electricity system is critical in all scenarios. Potential major supply 
options are fossil fuels with CCS, nuclear and wind. Numerous previous studies have 
demonstrated that the change is technically achievable; however, it will require significant 
investments and the options each raise potential implementation problems. The 
challenges associated with such a change are exacerbated by the projected need for more 
capacity to electrify transport and heating. 
Nearly all end uses of energy are subject to significant quantitative uncertainty by the 
mid-century due to the combined effect of uncertainties in population, GDP and world 
fuel prices, as well as technical, social and policy change. The use of natural gas in buildings 
(residential plus services) may fall to low levels, driven by carbon emissions reduction 
targets with heating becoming largely electrified. A significantly reduced use of natural gas 
raises concerns about the economic sustainability of the distributed gas infrastructure by 
the mid-century. This requires further investigation. Re-use of the existing infrastructure 
for either hydrogen or biomethane is technically possible, however, is not considered in 
this report. The use of petrol and diesel in transport is subject to the same pressures of 
carbon emissions and therefore falls to low levels by the mid-century in scenarios meeting 
stringent carbon emissions targets (alternative fuels include biofuels and electricity).
The widespread electrification of both heating and transportation would reduce demand 
for the two fuels that are of most energy security concern – petroleum and natural gas – 
so that ambitious carbon emissions reduction targets are consistent with some energy 
security objectives. This shift would require significant changes to user practices in 
buildings and travel. The implied social changes have not been extensively studied, thus 
could present unforeseen challenges in adoption of the low carbon energy infrastructure.
Natural gas in industry is more difficult to substitute, reflecting the assumed need for 
(or major cost advantage of) gas in key industrial processes. Further attention to more 
fundamental process change is warranted. Continued use of gas at current and higher 
levels in the foreseeable future is a possibility given current developments on large 
discoveries of reserves and favourable LNG trade.
As the FTA scope is limited by design, the current analysis is limited in its ability to 
recommend policy options based solely on the analysis of infrastructure implications 
with the limited sets of given transition strategies. The next modelling step would aim at 
analysing numerous plausible transition paths and test them for robustness. Along with 
factors such as GDP, population and energy price, transition strategies influence final 
demand depending on supply technologies, behavioural changes and policy inventions 
etc., at play (as in MARKAL). Unlike in FTA, transition strategies are endogenous in the 
disaggregated demand model under development.127
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5.3  TRANSPORT
The approach taken in the FTA was to estimate transport demand using an 
elasticity model that relates changes in demand to change in population, fuel 
prices and GDP in the ITRC FTA scenarios. The low growth scenario is most 
consistent with previous trends. Demand suppression was modelled using 
feedback relationships between demand and resulting journey times to estimate 
constrained demand.
The Capacity-Intensive transition strategy (high investment and fast uptake of 
electric vehicles) would result in higher growth in demand (e.g. 23.4% more car/
van km in 2050 compared to the reference case) but reduced CO2 emissions 
(18.9% fewer emissions from cars and vans, and 25.2% fewer emissions from HGVs 
in 2050 compared to reference case) due to fuel efficiency improvements of 70%. 
The Decentralisation transition strategy (medium uptake of electric vehicles, 
introduction of a national congestion charging scheme) would result in around 
5% more car/van vehicle km but 10.7% lower CO2 emissions in 2050 compared to 
the reference case. The Capacity-Constrained transition strategy (low investment, 
low uptake of electric vehicle, introduction of a national congestion charging 
scheme) was estimated to reduce car/van km by 3% with reduced CO2 emissions 
of 7.3% for car/vans and 2.4% for HGVs in 2050 compared with the reference case.
5.3.1 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
The assessment approach taken in the FTA was firstly to estimate transport demand for 
the whole transport infrastructure, unconstrained by any capacity considerations, using 
an elasticity model to relate transport demand growth to growth in population, fuel prices 
and GDP, with any added taxes or charges also being factored in (e.g. national congestion 
charge). It should be noted that ‘carbon taxes’ were not included in the transport FTA so 
there was no assumption that carbon reduction targets would be met. It is noted that 
this differed from the energy FTA where it was assumed that carbon reduction targets 
would be met. Subsequent analyses will address these differences. Demand suppression 
was then modelled using feedback relationships between demand and resulting journey 
times to produce ‘constrained demand’. This procedure is elucidated in Section 5.3.1.2 
(unconstrained demand) and Section 5.3.1.3 (constrained demand). 
The constrained demand estimates were then used to derive projections of the 
performance indicators used here: delays on trunk road network (minutes per 10 miles); 
CO2 emissions (106 tonnes); and fuel/energy use (109 litres or Mjoules). Future year vehicle 
emission rates and fuel/energy consumption rates, for different types of vehicle and fuel 
type, were taken directly from the Tosca project.34 These estimates were based on what 
the Tosca project considered to be realistic future developments in fuel technologies and 
vehicle/engine performance, so these data take into account, for example, improvements 
in hybrid engines, both for passenger cars and for freight vehicles. These data were used 
as they were readily available and provided comprehensive coverage – one known ‘error’ 
associated with the use of TOSCA data is that the emission and fuel consumption rates are 
for new vehicles and the proportions of older vehicles being used have not been estimated 
– this is something that will be considered later in the study. It is also noted that the Tosca 
data included production emissions as well as emissions at the point of use, so there would 
be double counting if the transport FTA results were to be added to the energy FTA results, 
which already considered production emissions.
34 http://www.toscaproject.org/128
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It should be noted that the transport FTA is a broad brush assessment of transport 
infrastructure and travel demand as a whole and is not concerned with individual trip-
making behaviour. In reality, transport infrastructure has its highest stress levels at certain 
times of day (i.e. peak periods) and in certain locations (e.g. bottlenecks), however, the FTA 
has not considered these. These more detailed considerations of transport infrastructure 
will be investigated later in the ITRC study. 
5.3.1.1 The modelled infrastructure options
A single reference (base case) set of infrastructure options was used in the transport FTA. 
In the reference case there is a negligible use of electric road vehicles. However, different 
levels of electric vehicle take-up were modelled, in addition, to assess impact on demand. 
A ‘medium uptake’ level in passenger rail electrification of 0.75% per annum, resulting in 
80.7% rail electrification by 2050 and 100% by 2076, but a more limited increase in rail 
freight electrification. Increased road capacity of 100 lane km per annum on the trunk 
road network, corresponding to ‘medium capacity growth’. Increased rail capacity through 
the introductions of Crossrail, HS2 and HS2+ but no other increases. Finally, there is no 
introduction of congestion charging or similar road charging schemes. 
Delays on trunk road network 
Projected vehicle delays on the 10% slowest routes of the trunk road network (minutes per 
10 miles) are shown in Figure 60 for the low, medium and high growth scenarios. It can be 
observed that delay increases from around 3.5 min for the base year (2008) to around  
6.5 min for the high growth scenario, by 2050.
CO2 emissions
Projected CO2 emissions for cars/vans and lorries are shown in Figure 61 (similar data 
have been derived for rail transport but are not presented here as the emissions are 
considerably lower). It can be seen that emissions are modelled to increase in most cases 
due to increasing demand, with the exception of the low growth scenario for cars/vans, 
where the assumed improvements in vehicle engine technology counteract the increasing 
demand and bring about a small decrease in emissions.
Fuel/energy use
Projected fuel use (billion litres) for cars/vans and lorries (litres) is shown in Figure 62. The 
fan shape reflects the differences in demand between the scenarios. Projected energy use 
for rail transport, both passenger and freight, is shown in Figure 63. 
5.3.1.2 Unconstrained demand 
Unconstrained future demand for transport was estimated by considering demand 
elasticities with population, GDP and fuel prices. Fuel prices were modified by the 
introduction of a congestion charge or an added tax on electric vehicles, in some cases. 
A standard formula for treating elasticities was used which assumes that the elasticities 
are constant over time. A potential criticism of the approach adopted here is that future 
relationships may not necessarily be well predicted from previous observations and that 
elasticities may well change over time. For example, car driving rates may be reaching 
saturation levels with limited scope for expansion. Annex F presents the formulation of 
unconstrained demand. 129
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Figure 60: Delays in reference 
case.
 
Figure 61: CO2 emissions.
Figure 62: Fuel use in road 
transport.
 
Figure 63: Energy use in rail 
transport.130
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5.3.1.3 Constrained demand 
Demand constraints reduce demand to a lower level than might otherwise occur. They 
come in three main forms:
1.  Physical constraints such as the number of seats in a train or aeroplane.
2.  Delay constraints that deter people from making the journey or that encourage them 
to travel by an alternative mode of transport or at a different time.
3.  Cost constraints.
Constraining transport demand may have a negative impact on economic development, 
however, this may not necessarily be the case if transport growth can be decoupled 
from GDP growth through a combination of planning, pricing, policy, technology and 
assessment methods (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2010).35 Suppressed demand may 
either disappear (the trip is not made) or may transfer to another mode. Using diversion 
rates for interurban travel, 42% of those switching from car will go to rail while, in the 
reverse direction, 60% of those switching from rail will go to car (Balcombe et al., 2004). The 
number of people transferring from rail to car is likely to be modest whereas the number 
of people transferring from car to rail may be more significant. These effects have not been 
modelled in the FTA, however, but will be included in later analyses.
Road transport
An increase in road transport demand will lead to an increase in traffic and an increase 
in journey times. DfT’s Long Distance Model (LDM) (Scott Wilson et al., 2007) seems 
to suggest an elasticity of journey time with respect to traffic of around 0.3. However, 
increases in journey times will tend to inhibit demand: the LDM suggested an elasticity of 
–0.41. Annex F presents these two formulations. Iterating between the formulation results 
for journey time and demand inhibition gives convergence to a stable solution.
Rail transport
Capacity utilisation is based on the ratio of actual train km per track km to maximum 
capacity, with a typical existing utilisation of around 50%. However, increases in delays 
will tend to inhibit demand and capacity utilisation, with an elasticity of demand with 
respect to delays of –0.34 (Preston and Dargay, 2005). An iterative procedure, similar to that 
used for road transport above, was used to try to obtain convergence to the constrained 
demand. Annex F presents the formulation of the rail transport. 
Air transport
Capacity constraints for air transport are generally considered either in terms of the 
maximum number of passengers that can pass through a terminal or the maximum 
number of aircraft movements that its runway(s) can support (Scott Wilson et al., 2007), 
from which maximum passenger capacity can be derived. The latter approach was 
adopted by the comprehensive study of forecasting future UK air demand (DfT, 2009). This 
study also considered the potential for reallocation of demand between different airports 
and options for additional infrastructure (e.g. a second runway and associated terminal 
infrastructure at Stansted and a third runway and sixth terminal at Heathrow). 
35 http://www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm54.htm#_Toc218750000131
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Their forecasts for 2030 (low, central, high) went from unconstrained figures of (415, 
465, 500) million passengers per annum to constrained figures of (410, 455, 480) million 
passengers per annum, equating to fairly small reductions of (1.2%, 2.1%, 4%). These 
percentage reductions were adopted for use in the FTA, using linear interpolation and 
extrapolation to obtain reduction percentages for other years.
However, it was found that the unconstrained demand for air transport was very high 
(increasing by a factor of 120 by the year 2100 for the high growth scenario) so it seems 
that either additional capacity would be needed (not modelled in the FTA) or that the 
demand would need to be capped drastically (not modelled in the FTA). Also, the recently 
published National Infrastructure Plan  suggested considerably lower demand for air travel 
(335 million passengers per annum in 2030) than assumed here, based on an assumption 
of no new runways and only incremental developments of airport terminals. These issues 
will be considered in later analyses.
Sea ports
How sea transport is constrained has yet to be considered. The same formulae as used for 
road transport were used for the FTA in order to introduce some reduction in the modelled 
demand, however, it is recognised that this should be corrected in later analyses. 
5.3.2 ANALYSIS OF FUTURE DEMAND IN THE FTA SCENARIOS
The projected constrained growth (low, medium and high) in passenger kilometres, for 
road, rail and air, up to 2050, are shown in Figures 64–66 (65 and 66 overleaf). It can be 
seen that for the low growth scenario there is a steady increase in demand whereas for the 
high growth scenario the growth appears to be exponential. In addition, car/van demand 
was modelled for alternative scenarios of electric vehicle penetration (none, low, high) 
(Figure 67). It can be seen that an increase in the number of electric vehicles is modelled 
to result in an increased demand for car/van travel due to the assumed reduced running 
costs; however, this would not be the case if running costs for electric vehicles were 
broadly similar to those for petrol/diesel vehicles. 
The projected constrained growth (low, medium and high) in vehicle kilometres and 
in vehicle km per lane km, up to 2050, are shown in Figures 68 and 69 (overleaf). These 
display similar curves as for passenger demand. 
Passenger kilometres 
Figure 64: Medium growth, 
passenger demand, reference 
case.
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Road
Rail
Air (UK)
Total
B
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
p
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
r
 
k
m
2010  2020  2030  2040  2050132
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 5
Figure 65: High growth 
passenger demand, reference 
case.
 
Figure 66: Low growth 
passenger demand, reference 
case.
 
 
Figure 67: Impact of future 
technology scenarios. Note: 
ICE = internal combustion 
engine; low and high EV refer 
to penetration rates of electric 
(and hybrid) vehicles. 
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Vehicle kilometres (km); Vehicle km per lane km
Figure 68: Vehicle km per lane 
km. Note: base provision of 
~388 vehicles per lane per hour.
Figure 69: Vehicle km.
 
 
Figure 70: Train km.
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The projected growth (low and high) in train kilometres is shown in Figure 70. The 
projected growth (low, medium and high) of train km per track km is shown in Figure 71 
(overleaf).
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The projected growth (low and high) in freight tonne kilometres, for road, rail, water and 
pipeline, is shown in Figures 72 and 73.
Figure 71: Train km per track 
km. Note: Base year provision is 
around 1.77 trains per hour per 
track km.
 
 
Figure 72: Tonne km, low 
growth.
 
Figure 73: Tonne km, high 
growth.
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5.3.3 DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF TRANSI-
TION STRATEGIES
5.3.3.1 Capacity-Intensive transition strategy
The CI strategy for transport was assumed to result in low demand constraints, high or 
medium uptake of vehicle technology and high or medium capacity growth, depending 
on the demand growth scenario (Table 28, overleaf). The specific meanings of ‘medium 
vehicle technology uptake’, ‘medium demand constraint’ etc., as modelled here, are 
summarised in Tables 29–31 (overleaf). 
Supply options
The CI strategy, combined with either the high growth scenario (1a) or the medium growth 
scenario (2a), was modelled as:
•  23.3% additional capacity provided for the trunk road network by 2050.
•  8.6% growth in the amount of rail track. 
•  High uptake of electric road vehicles: 50% hybrid vehicles and 50% fully electric by 
2050.
•  High uptake of alternative fuel for lorries: 50% use of hydrogenated vegetable oil by 
2050.
•  High rate of rail electrification: 100% electrification for both passenger and freight 
transport by 2050.
•  No introduction of road user charging.
Infrastructure investment costs were estimated to be 1.75% GDP (£26 billion per annum at 
present). 
The CI strategy, combined with the low growth scenario (3a), was modelled as:
•  9.6% additional capacity provided for the trunk road network by 2050.
•  5.4% growth in the amount of rail track. 
•  Medium uptake of electric road vehicles: 30% hybrid vehicles and 20% fully electric 
by 2050.
•  Medium uptake of alternative fuel for lorries: 25% use of hydrogenated vegetable oil 
by 2050.
•  Medium rate of rail electrification: 81% passenger rail electrification and 50% freight 
rail electrification by 2050.
•  No introduction of road user charging.
Infrastructure investment costs were estimated to be 0.88% GDP (£14 billion per annum at 
present).136
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Table 29: Vehicle technology options
Mode Description
Level of uptake by 2050
Low Medium High
Car/van Hybrid
electric
20% 2.5% 30%
20% 50% 50%
Bus/coach Hybrid
electric
40% 0% 50%
25% 50% 50%
Lorry HVO 0% 25% 50%
Passenger rail Electrification  57% 81% 100%
Rail freight Electrification  2% 50% 100%
Notes: (1) HVO = Hydrogenated vegetable oil. (2) The ‘remaining’ unaccounted percentage 
figures are for use of petrol/diesel. 
Table 28: Summary of Capacity-Intensive transition strategy 
Scenario Vehicle 
technology 
Infrastructure 
capacity*
Demand 
constraints 
High growth High uptake High capacity 
growth
Low demand 
constraint
Medium growth High uptake High capacity 
growth
Low demand 
constraint
Low growth Medium uptake Medium capacity 
growth
Low demand 
constraint
* Based on level of investment.
Table 30: Infrastructure investment options
Capacity growth by 2050
Low Medium High
Trunk road network 0% 9.6% 23.3%
Rail network 0.74% 5.4% 8.6%137
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Performance evaluation of the CI strategy
Passenger demand (Figure 74) is almost 20% higher than in the reference case, by 2050. 
The main reason for this is the assumed high uptake of electric vehicles with assumed 
cheaper fuel costs (one tenth of petrol cost). If electric vehicle use was taxed, somehow, 
to bring running costs broadly similar to those for petrol/diesel cars, then demand (Figure 
75) would be similar to the reference case and the results for delays, emissions and fuel use 
would improve upon those shown below. Delays on the 10% slowest routes on the trunk 
road network were modelled (Figure 76). Comparing this with the results for the reference 
case (Figure 60), it can be seen that delays are only slightly greater here, despite the 
increase in demand, due to the additional capacity provided. The introduction of electric 
vehicles reduces CO2 emissions, despite growth in passenger demand (particularly for road 
traffic). This can be seen by comparing the result here (Figure 79) with that obtained for the 
reference case (Figure 61).
Fuel use (billion litres) by road transport on the trunk road network is shown in Figure 77 
(overleaf) for cars/vans and for lorries. It is noted that there are large differences between 
the high and low projections due to the large differences in demand. For the low growth 
scenario there is a fall in fuel use for cars/vans, from around 9.25 billion litres, in the base 
year, to 8.33 billion litres in 2050, with the assumed phasing out of the internal combustion 
engine counteracting the demand growth. Also, fuel use for the CI strategy is lower than in 
the reference case as the numbers of electric vehicles and hybrids are greater. 
Table 31: Demand constraints
Multiplier on fuel price from 2015
Low Medium High
0% 20% 46%
Figure 74: Passenger demand 
growth.
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Figure 75: Passenger demand, 
medium growth assuming tax 
on electric vehicles (introduced 
in stages in 2020 and in 2040). 
 
Figure 76: Delays.
 
Figure 77: Fuel use by road 
transport on the trunk road 
network.   
Figure 78: Energy use by rail 
transport.
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Energy use (mega joules) by rail transport is shown in Figure 78 for both passenger rail 
and freight rail. It can be seen that the passenger sector has the much higher usage, at 
over four times as much (around 31 MJ compared with 7.5 MJ for freight in the base year). 
Energy use is lower here than in the reference case, particularly for rail freight, due to the 
higher assumed take-up of rail electrification. There is not much modelled difference here 
between the low and medium growth scenarios as the greater demand for the medium 
growth scenario is counteracted by the assumed differences between the levels of rail 
electrification between the two scenarios.
5.3.3.2 Decentralisation transition strategy
As transport infrastructure is, by its nature, already decentralised, the ‘DC strategy’ is 
not particularly well-named for analysis of transport; however, it was assumed that this 
transition strategy would result in medium demand constraints, medium or low uptake 
of vehicle technology and medium or low capacity growth, depending on the demand 
growth scenario (Table 32). The specific meanings of ‘high vehicle technology uptake’, ‘low 
demand constraint’ etc., as modelled here, are summarised in Tables 29–31.
Supply options
The DC strategy, combined with either the high growth scenario (1b) or the medium 
growth scenario (2b), was modelled as:
•  Medium uptake of electric road vehicles: 30% hybrid vehicles and 20% fully electric 
by 2050.
•  Medium uptake of alternative fuel for lorries: 25% use of hydrogenated vegetable oil 
by 2050.
•  Medium rate of rail electrification: 81% passenger rail electrification and 50% freight 
rail electrification by 2050.
•  Medium levels of investment resulting in 9.6% additional capacity provided for the 
trunk road network by 2050 and 5.4% growth in the amount of rail track. Medium 
transport investment costs may equate to around 0.88% GDP (=£13.19 billion), 
however, the transport FTA has not specifically considered costs.
•  Medium demand constraint resulting in a 20% added running cost for private road 
vehicles due to the introduction of some form of road user charging scheme by 2015.
Figure 79: CO2 emissions, 
Capacity-Intensive strategy.
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The DC strategy, combined with the low growth scenario (3b), was modelled as:
•  Low uptake of electric road vehicles: 20% hybrid vehicles and 2.5% fully electric by 
2050.
•  Low uptake of alternative fuel for lorries: negligible use of hydrogenated vegetable 
oil by 2050.
•  Low rate of rail electrification: maintained at current planned level of 57% by 2019 for 
passenger rail and negligible use for rail freight.
•  Low levels of investment resulting in no additional capacity provided for the trunk 
road network by 2050 and only 0.74% growth in the amount of rail track. Low 
transport investment costs may equate to around 0.53% GDP (=£7.91 billion), 
however, the transport FTA has not specifically considered costs.
•  Medium demand constraint resulting in a 20% added running cost for private road 
vehicles due to the introduction of some form of road user charging scheme by 2015.
Performance evaluation of the DC transition strategy
The impact of the DC strategy on passenger demand is shown in Figure 80 for the medium 
growth scenario. Modelled demand is higher than in the reference case but lower than for 
the CI strategy. The projected delays on the 10% slowest routes of the trunk road network 
(Figure 81) are similar to those found for the reference case. There is a modelled reduction 
in delays at 2015 due to the introduction of a national congestion charging scheme. CO2 
emissions for the DC strategy (Figure 84, see page 142) lie between those found for the 
reference case (Figure 61) and for the CI strategy (Figure 79).
Fuel use (billion litres) by road transport on the trunk road network is shown in Figure 82 
for cars/vans and for lorries. Fuel use tends to be greater than in the CI strategy, particularly 
for cars/vans, due to the greater reliance on the internal combustion engine. 
Energy use (mega joules) by rail transport is shown in Figure 83 for both passenger rail 
and freight rail. The trends found here are similar to those found for the CI strategy but 
with slightly greater energy use here, particularly in the low growth scenario, due to the 
assumed low take-up of rail electrification. 
Table 32: Summary of the Decentralisation transition strategy 
Scenario Vehicle 
technology 
Infrastructure 
capacity*
Demand 
constraints 
High growth Medium uptake Medium capacity 
growth
Medium demand 
constraint
Medium growth Medium uptake Medium capacity 
growth
Medium demand 
constraint
Low growth Low uptake Low capacity 
growth
Medium demand 
constraint
* Based on level of investment.141
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Figure 80: Passenger 
demand, medium growth, 
Decentralisation.
Figure 81: Delays.
 
Figure 82: Fuel use in road 
transport, Decentralisation.
 
Figure 83: Energy use in rail 
transport, Decentralisation.
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5.3.3.3 Capacity-Constrained transition strategy
The CC strategy for transport was assumed to result in high demand constraints, low 
uptake of vehicle technology and low capacity growth (Table 33). The specific meanings 
of ‘low vehicle technology uptake’, ‘high demand constraint’ etc., as modelled here, are 
summarised in Tables 29–31. 
Supply options
The CC strategy, for all growth scenarios, was modelled as:
•  Low uptake of electric road vehicles: 20% hybrid vehicles and 2.5% fully electric by 
2050.
•  Low uptake of alternative fuel for lorries: negligible use of hydrogenated vegetable 
oil by 2050.
•  Low rate of rail electrification: maintained at current planned level of 57% by 2019 for 
passenger rail and negligible use for rail freight.
•  Low levels of investment resulting in no additional capacity provided for the trunk 
road network by 2050 and only 0.74% growth in the amount of rail track. Low 
transport investment costs may equate to around 0.53% GDP (=£7.91 billion), 
however, the transport FTA has not specifically considered costs.
•  High demand constraint resulting in a 46% added running cost for private road 
vehicles due to the introduction of a national road user charging scheme by 2015.
Figure 84: CO2 emissions, 
Decentralisation. 
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Table 33: Summary of the Capacity-Constrained transition strategy 
Scenario Vehicle technology  Infrastructure capacity* Demand constraints 
High growth Low uptake Low capacity growth High demand constraint
Medium growth Low uptake Low capacity growth High demand constraint
Low growth Low uptake Low capacity growth High demand constraint
* Based on level of investment.143
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Performance evaluation of the CC transition strategy
Projected passenger demand for the CC strategy is shown in Figure 85. There is a 
slight reduction in demand compared with the reference case, due to the introduction 
of assumed additional motoring costs associated with the introduction of a national 
congestion charge (in 2015). The projected delays on the 10% slowest routes of the trunk 
road network (Figure 86) are slightly lower, but similar to, those found for the reference 
case. There is a modelled reduction in delays at 2015 due to the introduction of a national 
congestion charging scheme. The CO2 emissions for the CC strategy (Figure 89) are slightly 
lower than those found for the reference case (Figure 61). Fuel use (billion litres) by road 
transport on the trunk road network is shown in (Figure 87, overleaf) for cars/vans and for 
lorries. Fuel use tends to be slightly greater than for the CI and DC strategies, except for in 
the low growth scenario, due to the greater reliance on the internal combustion engine. 
Energy use (mega joules) by rail transport is shown in Figure 88 (overleaf) for both 
passenger rail and freight rail. The trends found here are similar to those found for the CI 
and DC strategies but with greater energy use here due to the assumed low take-up of rail 
electrification. 
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Figure 85: Passenger 
demand, medium growth, 
Capacity-Constrained.
 
Figure 86: Delays, 
Capacity-Constrained.144
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5.3.3.4 Summary performance 
Figure 90 presents a summary visualisation of the performance of the transition strategies 
across two time periods: 2010–2030 and 2030–2050. As the CI strategy results in higher 
growth in demand, it results in greater congestion, and an increase in delays. However, this 
growth in demand is compensated by improved fuel efficiency, resulting in the greatest 
reduction in CO2 emissions compared with the other strategies. The CC strategy would 
result in the lowest growth of demand, with reductions in car and van km and reduced  
CO2 emissions for cars and vans and for HGVs in 2050 compared with the reference case. 
The CC strategy results in the best aggregate performance across the entire time period. 
Notably, there was little change in performance over the two time periods, and emissions 
were most problematic in the high growth scenarios.
Figure 87: Fuel use in road 
transport, Capacity-Constrained.
 
 
Figure 88: Energy use in rail 
transport, Capacity-Constrained.
 
 
Figure 89: CO2 emissions, 
Capacity-Constrained.
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5.3.4 DISCUSSION
The transport sector has seen a long run increase in demand, although there is some 
indication that this has slowed down recently. However, it is not clear whether this is due 
to the recent economic downturn or is a more permanent phenomenon. Past trends seem 
consistent with the low growth scenarios but this may reflect supply side constraints 
(Figure 91). The FTA results demonstrate that capacity constraints are likely to be important 
for both road and, particularly rail, in the future. This is also expected to be true of airports 
and seaports, at least in respect of container traffic. The results indicate that infrastructure 
would be particularly stressed under high growth rates. At existing electricity prices and 
taxation, electrification of the road transport sector would reduce transport prices and 
lead to additional stress on road infrastructure. Although it would reduce environmental 
impacts, at least at the point of use, it would lead to increased congestion. This suggests 
policies need to be investigated that either reduce congestion (such as congestion pricing) 
or increase capacity (such as advanced traffic control). Alternatively, there is a need to 
examine behavioural changes policies that induce modal switch and reduce the demand 
for travel.
Figure 90: Summary 
visualisation of performance  
for the three transition 
strategies across the three 
scenarios for the time-periods 
of interest to 2050.
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There is some evidence that the UK’s economic competitiveness is hampered by the 
transport system (Eddington, 2006) and transport a poor performer environmentally (Stern 
(2007), Royal Commission on Environment Pollution, Commission for Integrated Transport 
etc.). Large co-dependencies with other economic sectors exist. Although spatiality has 
not yet been introduced into the analysis, there is a high level of dependence on some key 
transport links and nodes, in particular the main radial routes into London, the main orbital 
roads around London and some other major cities (Birmingham, Manchester) and some 
key international gateways (Heathrow, the Haven Ports). Infrastructure policy has shifted 
from ‘predict and provide’ to something more akin to ‘predict and prevent’ but with little 
palpable effect on key trends, to date.
Transport infrastructure has relatively high stress levels, in terms of congestion and poor 
environmental performance, and these are likely to increase substantially for air, road 
and rail. Supply-side constraints would mean a high level of unmet demand, particularly 
in high growth scenarios. Low growth scenarios are considered more likely as they are 
more consistent with past trends and the recent forecasts of others. Technological change, 
where it reduces transport costs, could exacerbate the mismatch between latent demand 
and capacity.
Surplus capacity is not really an issue for national transport infrastructure, as any such 
additional capacity provided rapidly fills up, at least for road and rail. Nor is decentralisation 
a particular issue. The key coupling is with the energy sector where substantial investment 
will be required to permit the electrification of the road transport fleet. Lack of this 
investment is likely to be a major constraint. Subsequent analyses will need to consider 
the impact of excess demand on the price of electricity. Also, changing compositions of 
the energy and waste sectors are likely to have an influence on freight demand and, in 
particular, the capacity requirements for ports.
5.3.4.1 Key uncertainties
A large area of uncertainty is associated with the uptake of electric vehicles which in turn 
relates to their future performance, in terms of speed and acceleration characteristics, 
range (distance travelled before recharging), recharging requirements (e.g. where this can 
be done and time required) and costs (purchase, running, maintenance etc.), particularly in 
comparison to ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) vehicles. 
Another area of uncertainty is the extent to which the ‘Smarter Choices’ agenda (DfT, 
2010b) could stimulate behavioural change in terms of reducing travel (including 
substitution by information technology and communications) and modal switching 
(including ‘Active Travel’).
Making long run forecasts is, in itself, inherently risky. For rail we note that under high 
demand growth, the mismatch between demand and supply becomes so acute, that 
beyond 2050 sensible predictions become difficult.147
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5.4 WATER
The FTA focuses on public water supply, balancing the average daily rates of water 
available for use and consumers’ demand for water with the ITRC population 
projections. 
The Capacity-Intensive transition strategy implies high investment in supply 
infrastructure (including reservoirs, transfers and desalination) as well as 
in capital programmes of leakage reduction. These measures contribute to 
security of supply in terms of both capacity and flexibility of use of resources. 
The strategy is threatened by the possibility of climate change reducing water 
availability, the requirements for restoring aquatic environments and the energy 
implications of desalination and inter-basin transfers. The Decentralised strategy 
implies more local self-sufficiency, which is vulnerable to supply and demand 
side uncertainties. Economies of scale indicate that this approach is only cost-
effective in low population density localities. The Capacity Constrained strategy 
emphasises vigorous price and regulatory measures to reduce demand to an 
average of 110 litres per person per day by 2050, which have the added benefit 
of reducing energy use, in the water sector and by water consumers. At the same 
time, margins between supply and demand are eroded, with implications for 
security of supply.
5.4.1 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
The FTA considers public water supply in isolation, focusing on the balance between the 
average daily rates of water available for use and consumers’ demand for water. The sole 
consideration of public water supply is due to the lack of detailed data concerning existing 
water supply infrastructure across all sectors. The FTA considers each water supplier of 
England, Wales and Scotland independently, aggregating available water supply capacity 
and demand across all company resource management zones, with results presented at a 
national level.
Focusing again on the public water supply, this study assumes that population is a 
principal driver of consumers’ demands for water from the public water supply. It estimates 
a mean daily expectation of household demand from the per-capita daily demand of 
household consumers, and that both non-domestic water consumption and leakage are 
assumed a constant proportion of total demand, based on 2008 measurements (Ofwat, 
2011b) (data in Annex G). The ITRC population projections are divided between each water 
company in England and Wales according to the proportion of those countries served 
by each company in 2008, assuming that 100% of the population is served by the public 
water supply. Scottish Water is assumed to serve 100% of the population of Scotland. These 
proportions are assumed constant for the duration of the study. These values are in  
Annex G.
The focus upon domestic demand limits analysis of the interaction between non-domestic 
water use and economic growth. Most projections of non-domestic and/or industrial water 
consumption disaggregate the quantity by industrial sector, and exploit the relatively 
strong regression relationship between Gross Value Added and water consumption. By 
way of contrast, the link with GDP is weak at best; hence, this analysis adopts a simple 
proportional relationship between non-domestic water demand and domestic water 
demand based on an estimate of the former and the relationship between the two valid in 
2008.148
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Estimation of the capacity of the public water supply is complex. It exhibits large variation 
across water suppliers and is dependent on a number of factors, including climate, 
land-use and management practices. The amount of water available to meet demand in 
England and Wales was 17,016 Ml/d in 2010–2011 (Ofwat, 2011b); the combined yield of 
all sources in Scotland was 3564 Ml/d in 2001 (Scottish Executive, 2003). These quantities 
may have slightly differing definitions; however, the FTA assumes no discernible difference 
between deployable output and the water available to meet demand. Thus, the combined 
water resource of Great Britain is 20,580 Ml/d, which is adequate for an aggregate 2008 
baseline value. Values for each company were compiled from the available data, and 
adjusted for existing imports and exports (see Annex G). Assuming constant per capita 
demand, the effects of the FTA population scenarios on demand can be compared in 
Figure 90.
The effects of climate change on water resource yield are projected to vary strongly across 
GB and whilst some impacts may be severe there is substantial uncertainty, as they are 
a combined result of a number of possible changes. These include changes in seasonal 
mean precipitation and evapotranspiration (driven by several meteorological variables 
such as temperature and solar radiation) affecting long term average availability as 
well as more critical multi-seasonal variability causing droughts. Droughts are not well 
reproduced by climate models and in the absence of a definitive study incorporating the 
full UKCP09 uncertainty range a simplified approach has been followed here. The FTA 
applies three scenarios of the impact of climate change on water resource yield (Table 34). 
They derive from analysis of the relationship between company deployable outputs and 
simple metrics combining precipitation and evapotranspiration estimates using UKCP09 
outputs. The spatial pattern across GB is broadly similar to that found by Blenkinsop and 
Fowler (2007) for drought frequency using the Hadley Centre Regional Climate Model with 
the most severe impacts in SE England. The central estimate of impact in 2020 is similar 
to the decrease in deployable output anticipated by the water suppliers of England and 
Wales (Charlton and Arnell, 2011). Analysis proceeds under the assumption of a smooth 
interpolation of values between 2008 and 2050 using a natural spline.
In the absence of active intervention, the combined effects of population increase and 
climate change represent a strategic challenge for the UK water industry (Figure 92), 
representing a progressive erosion of security of supply. Figure 92 masks considerable 
regional variation. Table 35 summarises the decade in which demand may exceed capacity 
when accounting for the impact of climate change. It underlines that the high demand 
scenario places significant strain on the water resource infrastructure, and also suggests 
that the medium and even low growth scenarios may overwhelm national capacity.
Table 34: The impact of climate change on water resource yield, as a percentage of 
the baseline resource yield
Year Lower estimate Central estimate Upper estimate
2020 +5.6% -3.8% -14.9%
2050 -1.4% -18.5% -33.8%149
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5.4.2 DESCRIPTION OF TRANSITION STRATEGIES
There are two commonly cited adaptation measures: (i) constrain consumers’ demand 
for water, thereby prolonging the useful life of existing infrastructure assets, and (ii) 
improve the capacity of infrastructure in order to meet demand. The infrastructure options 
considered in the FTA are reductions in per capita demand, leakage reduction and the 
development of new resources to augment the yield of the water supply network.
5.4.2.1 Per capita demand
The per capita demand of household customers has remained fairly constant between 
2005 and 2010, at between 145 and 155 l/p/d (EA, 2009b; Water UK, 2010). Between 2010 
and 2011, it ranged from less than 120 l/p/d to over 160 l/p/d, with customers in the 
southeast of England consuming more than customers elsewhere in England and Wales 
(Defra, 2011d).
It is widely accepted that customers whose consumption is measured using water meters 
consume less than those whose consumption is unmeasured. In 2008, the mean per 
capita demand of metered and unmetered customers in England and Wales was around 
125 l/p/d and 150 l/p/d, respectively (Ofwat, 2011b). The former may represent the lowest 
feasible limit of the impact of behavioural change on household demand (Walker, 2009). 
Around 30% of household customers in England and Wales were metered in 2008, with the 
penetration of individual companies ranging from 10% to 60% (Ofwat, 2011b). 
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Figure 92: The relationship 
between demand and capacity 
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Water companies anticipate meter penetration to increase to around 50% by 2014, 
with an upper limit of 90% feasible in the future (Walker, 2009). Although the costs and 
benefits of metering are not yet well-known, studies suggest that an investment of £2000 
in behavioural change and retrofit in existing homes can yield savings of around 1 Ml/d 
(Walker, 2009).
In accordance with established projections (EA, 2009b), the FTA established three scenarios 
of per capita demand:
1.  Major efforts to reduce per capita water consumption, including metering and 
uptake of water-efficient devices, leading to an average household consumption of 
110 l/p/d in 2050;
2.  No active measures to reduce per capita consumption allows consumption to drift 
upwards towards the highest rates currently observed in the UK (170 l/p/d);
3.  An intermediate case which sees gradual reduction in per capita demand.
These three demand scenarios will be associated with the CC, CI and DC strategies 
respectively. They are a summarised in Figure 93.
5.4.2.2 Leakage
More than 4000 Ml of water are lost each day from the water supply infrastructure of GB, 
constituting 20%–25% of the total demand for water (Water UK, 2010; Ofwat, 2011b). 
Individual companies’ estimates of leakage having a range of over 850 Ml/d, and are 
differentiated by network characteristics, asset condition and consumer behaviour (Ofwat, 
2011b). The majority of leakage emanates from the failure of underground assets, such as 
distribution and supply pipe infrastructure, which deteriorate over time. To manage the 
risk of failure, assets are replaced or rehabilitated systematically before they fail as they age 
or their performance becomes unacceptable. Assets that fail unexpectedly are replaced 
immediately.
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Although it is currently prohibitively expensive to eliminate leakage, the economic 
regulator provides incentives to achieve and maintain an affordable rate of investment 
in asset management via the definition of an ‘economic’ rate of leakage, below which 
the costs of leakage reduction exceed the benefits. Most water companies in England 
and Wales already maintain their infrastructure at this level, about 20% of the total 
water input to supply; however, the regulator anticipates a further 2% reduction in the 
national aggregate level of leakage between 2010 and 2015, with some companies 
expected to reduce leakage by as much as 7% over this period (EA, 2009b; Ofwat, 2009). 
In Scotland, where the current rate of leakage greatly exceeds that of England and Wales, 
Scottish Water anticipates a reduction of 50% for the same period (Scottish Water, 2011). 
Between 2002 and 2010, the water industry invested around £2 billion annually in asset 
replacement, corresponding to an annual reduction in leakage of just over 105 Ml/d, or an 
annual decrease of around 2% (Water UK, 2010). Projections of leakage rates for England 
and Wales (EA, 2009b) suggest:
•  Under a Capacity-Constrained transition, representing ‘business as usual’, leakage 
might tend towards 3000 Ml/d in 2050: a reduction of nearly 10%;
•  A decentralised transition, utilising existing management practices in combinations 
with the best available technology, could reduce leakage by as much as 40% by 2050, 
to around 2000 Ml/d.
•  A Capacity-Intensive transition might involve the implementation of the best 
available technology coupled with a significantly more capital-intensive programme 
of asset maintenance, raising their average condition. A suitably ambitious target for 
leakage across England and Wales under a Capacity-Intensive transition might be as 
little as 1000 Ml/d, or around 30% of the current level of leakage.
Figure 94 summarises the extension of these assumptions to GB.
Figure 94: Annual rates of 
leakage by transition.
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5.4.2.3 Supply infrastructure
The FTA considers three mechanisms for the provision of additional capacity:
•  Reservoirs;
•  Inter-basin transfer;
•  Desalination.
It is considered unlikely that additional abstraction from rivers and groundwater sources 
will provide strategic resource without major reservoir or transfer investments. Reservoirs 
are a traditional means of enhancing water supply, involving the repurposing of naturally 
occurring surface water bodies and/or the impoundment of watercourses to create an 
artificial lake. Smaller bodies can be created by pumping water from rivers into natural 
or artificial depressions. They can be used to provide water via direct abstraction from 
the reservoir itself, or as a means to regulate downstream watercourses and support 
abstraction elsewhere. The use of reservoirs as strategic assets is limited by upstream 
and downstream hydrological conditions, as well as the performance and extent of the 
infrastructure networks they support.
The typical cost of developing a reservoir is considerable, extending beyond the 
construction of a dam and supporting infrastructure, to the environmental and social 
costs of repurposing massive swathes of land: current estimates place the cost of a new 
reservoir providing 200 Ml/d to the southeast of England at around £2 billion. Over time, 
however, reservoirs can become important environmental and social assets in their own 
right. In addition, once established, reservoirs without pumped storage entail relatively low 
operating costs, although periodic de-silting is often necessary to maintain capacity.
Inter-basin transfer (IBT) involves the abstraction of water from a donor region with excess 
resource, and its movement via pumped and gravity-driven transfer in pipelines to one or 
more receptor regions. That receptor regions can be hydrologically distinct from the donor 
region makes IBT a powerful and flexible tool for deploying water resource, and as such, it 
forms an important component of the water resource infrastructure of GB, with numerous 
schemes of strategic significance in operation across the country.
IBT is expensive to construct and operate: pipelines are often built underground, pumped 
transfer entails significant energy consumption and the environmental and social costs 
of IBT are thought to be high. Thus, IBT is mostly used intermittently where alternative 
technologies, such as reservoirs, are not viable. In addition, major IBT schemes are often 
coupled with a major strategic reservoir, the storage of which can be redeployed using the 
transfer infrastructure.
In their revised draft Water Resource Management Plan, Thames Water identified a number 
of feasible inter-basin transfers of varying length, transfer capacity and environmental and 
social impact (Thames Water Utilities Ltd, 2009). On average, their costs are as follows:
•  £5 million per Ml/d capital cost;
•  £1 million per Ml/d operating cost;
•  484 MWh/Ml/d electricity consumption;
•  845 tonnes of CO2 per Ml/d during construction;
•  260 tonnes of CO2 per yr/Ml/d during operation.153
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Formerly considered esoteric, desalination now plays a role in water resource provision in 
the UK. The only desalination plant on the mainland of the UK, Beckton water treatment 
works produces some 150 Ml/d at a capital cost of £250 million (water-technology.net, 
2011). Costs for seawater reverse-osmosis desalination have fallen substantially in recent 
years and are currently around $0.50 m3 (Sauvet-Goichon, 2007), equivalent to around 
£320 Ml. Beckton is estimated to consume 2 kWh m3 of electricity and emit 2 kg CO2 m3 
(Way et al., 2010). Comparison may be made with the Ashkelon plant in Israel operating 
with higher salinity feed water (41,000 ppm salt compared with average 35,000) and 
requiring around 4 kWh m3. Note that the thermodynamic limit for desalination is around 
0.9 kWh m-3. Values of 3 kWh/m3 and £320 Ml have therefore been assumed for future 
desalination operations in the UK.
5.4.2.4 Summary of transition strategies
The CI strategy meets demand for water through the development of new sources of 
water. This is achievable through the construction of new abstraction points to exploit 
existing rivers, lakes and groundwater sources, the impoundment of rivers to form 
artificial reservoirs, and the implementation of technologies such as desalination, IBT and 
effluent re-use. A strategy of high investment, it assumes that there is always sufficient 
water availability in the environment, or else deployed inefficiently in the infrastructure 
system, such that there is no limit to the augmentation of capacity. As such, consumers are 
under no pressure to change their behaviour, and per capita demand increases without 
constraint, but leakage is reduced at a high rate. The driving principle of the strategy 
derives from the assumption that the margin between capacity and demand observed in 
2008 provides satisfactory security of supply, and that the capacity of the infrastructure 
system should be continually expanded to maintain that margin at all times. The CI 
strategy considers the following interventions:
•  Increase in per capita demand to approximately 170 l/p/d by 2050 (Figure 93);
•  Decrease in leakage rate to approximately 1000 Ml/d by 2050 (Figure 94);
•  One-third of additional capacity provisioned through any amount of IBT at a cost of 
£1 million per Ml/d, and an incremental cost of £5 million per Ml/d;
•  One-third of additional capacity provisioned through any amount of reservoir 
support at an incremental cost of £5 million per Ml/d;
•  One-third of additional capacity provisioned through any amount of desalination at a 
cost of £320 per Ml/d and an incremental cost of £1.7 million per Ml/d.
By way of contrast, the CC strategy is a low-investment strategy. It does not provide 
additional capacity through the construction or augmentation of sources of water, 
focusing instead on the use of demand-reduction measures, such as retrofitting of existing 
properties. Consumers react to increasing scarcity of resource by reducing their per capita 
demand, but leakage is reduced at a low rate. This strategy allows reduction in the margin 
between capacity and demand observed in 2008 by 50% by 2050. This is interpretable as 
a decrease in the security of supply of the infrastructure system. The CC strategy considers 
the following interventions:
•  Decrease in per capita demand to approximately 110 l/p/d by 2050 (Figure 93);
•  Decrease in leakage to approximately 3000 Ml/d by 2050 (Figure 94);
•  Demand reductions at an incremental cost of £2000 per Ml/d of water saved.
The existing water resource is already decentralised to a large extent, with few strategic 154
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interconnections between discrete regional infrastructure networks. In effect, a DC 
strategy would operate much like a CI strategy: the balance of capacity and demand would 
remain constant, with capacity augmented by all available technologies, excluding IBT. 
An important distinction is the local implementation of the best available technologies, 
retrofit and increased rates of asset maintenance, which would yield decreases in per 
capita consumption consistent with the observed trend, or better.
5.4.3 EVALUATION OF THE TRANSITION STRATEGIES
5.4.3.1 Capacity-Intensive transition strategy
The CI strategy preserves the capacity-demand balance throughout the study period, 
regardless of the impact of climate change and increasing per capita demand (Figure 93). 
In a low growth and in the absence of high climate change, this can be achieved largely by 
leakage reduction (which according to convention in Figure 95 is included as part of the 
demand calculation). In the case of high growth, considerable additional investments in 
water supply are required.
Table 36: Summary of transition strategies
Capacity-Intensive Capacity-Constrained Decentralisation
• No effort to reduce per 
capita demand
• High rate of leakage 
reduction
• No loss of 
infrastructure 
performance
• No restriction on the 
range or scope capacity 
enhancements
• Radical decrease in per 
capita demand
• Low rate of leakage 
reduction
• Decrease in 
infrastructure 
performance
• No new capacity 
provisioned
• Moderate decrease in 
per capita demand
• Moderate rate of 
leakage reduction
• No loss of 
infrastructure 
performance
• Only local capacity 
enhancements 
provisioned
*    This results in an increase in per capita demand.
Figure 95: The relationship 
between capacity and demand 
under a Capacity-Intensive 
transition strategy.
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Figure 96 shows the costs of a Capacity-Intensive transition for each demand and climate-
change impact scenario. Leakage reduction costs are approximately £1.3 billion per year 
under this strategy, with remaining costs tracking the additional capacity required to 
maintain network performance.
5.4.3.2 Capacity-Constrained transition strategy
The CC strategy involves reducing demand and modest leakage reduction, which means 
that in low climate change scenarios the margin between capacity and demand can be 
preserved. In central and high climate change scenarios, the margin between supply and 
demand is allowed to erode, but even so additional capacity is still required (Figure 97).
Figure 98 (overleaf) shows the costs of a Capacity-Intensive transition for each demand 
and climate-change impact scenario. Leakage costs are approximately £160 million per 
year under this transition, with remaining costs strongly influenced by the climate change 
impact scenario. In any case, total costs are much less than in the CI strategy.
Figure 96: The cost of a 
Capacity-Intensive transition 
strategy.
 
Figure 97: The relationship 
between capacity and demand 
under a Capacity-Constrained 
transition strategy.
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5.4.3.3 Decentralisation transition strategy
The relationship between capacity and demand under the DC strategy would be very 
similar to Figure 95, as the DC and CI strategies both ensure adequate provision of water 
resources to maintain current network performance.
Differences may occur on a regional level, where, in the absence of inter-basin transfers, 
a different blend of technologies is necessary to maintain performance. This would 
be reflected in the cost of the transition, as well as the robustness of interventions 
implemented on a local scale to climate change.
5.4.3.4 Summary performance evaluation of transition strategies
Three metrics are used to compare the transition strategies, security of supply, energy use 
and cost. 
Security of supply: The CI strategy will always provide adequate security of supply. The CC 
strategy allows erosion in security of supply, though the rate at which this takes place is 
dependent on the climate change scenario. The DC strategy may be less robust than CI, as 
opportunities for new capacity are more scarce at the local scale, and could become more 
so under future climates. 
Energy: The CI strategy maximises leakage reduction, which in low growth and low climate 
change scenarios is sufficient to keep up with demand and so is a low energy solution. 
Where additional capacity is required, high energy solutions such as desalination and IBT 
are adopted. By relying upon demand reduction, the CC strategy is a low energy strategy. 
The DC strategy achieves some energy saving relative to CI, by not employing IBT and 
making more progress with demand reduction. 
Figure 98: The cost of a 
Capacity-Constrained transition 
strategy.
Figure 99: Summary 
visualisation of performance for 
the three transition strategies 
across the three scenarios for 
the time-periods of interest to 
2050.
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Cost: The CI strategy is the most costly, involving ambitious leakage reduction and costly 
supply-side measures to preserve security of supply. The CC strategy, by contrast, relies 
on less costly demand reduction and less leakage reduction, though additional supply 
side measures will be required towards the end of the assessment period in high growth 
and high climate change scenarios. The DC strategy lies between the two, though without 
costly investment in IBT. 
The performance of this analysis at a national scale, projection of the impacts of 
climate change at a similar level, and the assumption of adequate scope for resource 
augmentation mask local variation in the capacity-demand balance of water. In 
aggregating the amount of water available to meet demand across all water suppliers in 
GB, this analysis substantially overestimates the capacity of the infrastructure network 
to meet demand, and its resilience to climate change. The national water supply 
infrastructure consists of numerous regional and local networks that are (currently) 
relatively unconnected. Some networks are already close to capacity, while others are 
massively over-supplied, and there are few means to relieve those at risk of failure to meet 
standards of service with excess water resources from other regions. The spatially variable 
impacts of climate change may exaggerate these regional variations in the balance of 
water supply and demand in a non-linear and more severe way than presented here, 
pushing networks beyond their capacity to adapt in isolation.
The analysis is also limited in its treatment of the competition between sectors for the 
limited quantity of water in the environment. The Government White Paper ‘Water for 
Life’ is introducing reform of the abstraction licencing regime in order to deal with the 
legacy of over-abstraction from rivers (Defra, 2011d). The quantification of more complex 
interactions, such as abstraction licence trading and the impact of projected climate 
change, requires a more comprehensive, consistent and detailed approach. Changes 
in water use across the electricity generation and hydroelectricity generation sectors 
may be particularly influential as the nation’s energy infrastructure portfolio and energy 
consumption profile evolves.
5.5 WASTEWATER
The main demand driver for wastewater is population. However, population 
density and the treatment technologies implemented determine the unit cost of 
treatment.
As with water supply, economies of scale favour centralised strategies and 
increasing population density reduces costs low-energy treatment technologies 
exist but have not been deployed extensively to date. In the CC strategy, for which 
we assume incremental changes to current sewage treatment infrastructure, 
energy costs increase steadily. The performance of the CI transition strategy is 
characterised by replacement of existing energy-intensive treatment capacity to 
new energy recovery technologies. These technologies could allow wastewater 
treatment to become an energy-neutral or energy-generating process. 
However, these new treatment technologies still require extensive research 
and development. The high cost and long design lives of the existing sewerage 
technologies means that we cannot easily transition away from ‘business as 
usual’ with this technology in the period to 2050. This will mean managing the 
existing assets actively and intelligently, perhaps accelerating the adoption of the 
active monitoring and control of sewerage systems, and developing strategies to 
incrementally replace or renew the network.158
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5.5.1 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
The costs of treatment and sewerage are largely driven by the number of people and 
scale (see Annex H). The scaling of the costs is important to consider. For sewerage, the 
per capita costs depend on the nature of the development. Typically, density increases 
with population size in which case sewerage capital costs/capita scale with population 
approximately to the power of -0.8. If density is constant with population (i.e. sprawl), 
then per capita costs increase with density, reaching an asymptote. The key elements 
in the costs are pipe diameter, depth of excavation and location (urban or green field). 
The running costs of sewers are a function of the natural log of the density of the sewer 
network and the number of connections per kilometre, which are themselves functions of 
the population density.
For sewage treatment plants, running costs and capital costs decrease with size, and are 
dictated by the number of people (not the volume of waste, but its physical and chemical 
composition). Running costs are probably more important and scale (to the power of -0.2) 
with the amount of waste treated, which is in turn a direct function of the population. 
About half these running costs is electricity. 
5.5.1.1 Demographics
The cost of wastewater treatment is a function of the number of people being served not 
the volume of wastewater consequently 6500 people produce 1 Ml of wastewater per day, 
and each person produces about 50 g of BOD per day that must be treated. An increase in 
population will mean a modest increase in treatment capacity. However, it will also mean 
an increase in the number of customers, so if the treatment is affordable and feasible this 
will not be a serious problem.
The number of households is not a problem per se. However, if those households are in 
low-density settlements with small-scale treatment then the per capita running and capital 
costs will be higher than if they are in high-density urban areas.
5.5.1.2 Economics
The load, and thus the cost of sewage treatment, is probably relatively insensitive to rises in 
GDP. However, rises in GDP may be necessary to ensure that sewerage remains affordable. 
The cost of treatment is strongly linked to the cost of electricity, which is used for pumping 
and especially aeration. The demand for electricity is likely to increase as higher effluent 
standards are promulgated and where there is increased demand for reuse. This will be 
further exacerbated by the need to purchase carbon credits in order to obtain electricity.
5.5.2 Analysis of future demand in the FTA scenarios
Applying the drivers of change, the demand and under the three FTA demand scenarios 
can be seen in Figure 100. The treatment capacity, shown in Figure 100 at its value in 2008, 
must always exceed demand.159
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5.5.3 Description of transition strategies 
5.5.3.1 Capacity-Intensive transition strategy
For the CI strategy, low energy strategies are invented and deployed for treating 
wastewaters that at worst use no energy and may at best generate energy and increasingly 
valuable nutrients. It assumes the implementation of technologies not yet invented.
Increased scope for investment under a CI strategy also facilitates the replacement 
and rehabilitation of infrastructure at rates exceeding contemporary levels of asset 
management. Eliminating those infrastructure components that are most expensive to run 
(Figure 102, overleaf) would diminish the operating cost of the network.
Figure 100: The demand for 
wastewater treatment under 
the FTA population growth 
scenarios at a production rate 
of 50 g BOD per person per day. 
The treatment capacity (shown 
here for 2008) must always 
exceed demand.
Figure 101: The current (2010) 
value of the nutrients and 
energy in a mega-litre of 
wastewater and the energy 
costs of treatment.
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The improvement of assets, and the construction of new assets using new technology, 
would result in a rapid increase in capacity at the beginning of the programme of 
improvements. Eventually, such over-provision would become unnecessary, and capacity 
would follow the trend in demand. A slight decrease in capacity may occur as obsolete 
assets are decommissioned.
Sewage treatment
A business-as-usual scenario will see a steady increase in costs year-on-year, as the price of 
electricity rises inexorably. The electricity demand is dictated by the available technology 
and there is only very limited scope for energy saving (good housekeeping and the 
anaerobic digestion of sludge) at present and these initiatives are being actively sought by 
water undertakings. Furthermore, as there is no alternative technology available at each 
time a new plant is built, we are locking ourselves into these costs for at least 25 years. 
However, our energy scenarios suggest that electricity costs will at least double during the 
lifetime of these plants. Using a simple econometric model and assuming that power is 
about half of the running costs of a large plant, we can see the effects on per capita costs 
under the high and low price assumptions (Figures 103 and 107). Most people’s waste is 
treated in such plants; the costs for smaller plants are typically higher. Thus, significant price 
rises are inevitable unless we can transition to low energy technologies relatively quickly.
Such technologies do not yet exist in temperate climates, though very large plants  
(> 1 million PE) are operated in the tropics. In principle, anaerobic treatment systems and 
microbial fuel cells could, provide low energy treatment systems and might even produce 
energy. The amount of energy in waste exceeds that required for its treatment. The 
introduction of this mode of treatment would be part of a valorisation strategy in which 
energy and nutrients were recovered. The value of energy and nutrients in wastewater 
already exceeds the treatment costs (Figure 98). The value of N and P is expected to rise in 
the future. The cost of ammonia is related to the price of energy, typically natural gas, and 
the value of phosphorus is expected to increase as geological resources are exhausted.
It may already be too late to develop the technologies to avoid the costs in the next  
20 years; however, it seems very likely that these costs will make the transition to 
low-energy wastewater treatment systems inevitable. Thus, we can expect costs to rise 
in the short term and then decline as energy neutral treatment plants replace existing 
technologies. These technologies will be at existing treatment plants initially. They may 
be decentralised in the next generation (after 2050) depending on how the costs of the 
technologies scale.
Figure 102: Skew of wastewater 
capacity towards assets of 
superior condition, and lower 
operating cost, following a 
surge in asset maintenance 
under a Capacity-Intensive 
strategy.
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Sewerage costs
The very long life of the assets we have implied that we will, in the short term at least, have 
to intelligently manage the assets we have rather than to undergo wholesale replacement. 
This is in principle possible but may require an as-yet unrealised synthesis of measurement, 
modelling, control and physical intervention. This may require very little new technology; 
however, it will require extensive investments in human and physical resources. This will 
increase the cost of managing the sewage network. However, this will also allow us to 
gather the expertise required to make logical and cost effective choices about the long 
term replacement of the existing sewerage network in the light of both the changes in the 
climate and improved treatment technology.
A CI strategy may focus on the refurbishment of existing works and the augmentation of 
existing capacity with new technology. The benefits of this may include reduced per capita 
cost of treatment in terms of energy consumption, GHG emissions and other long term 
operating costs, as well as increased capacity in terms of chemical composition, hydraulic 
capacity or population equivalents. They depend strongly on the technology implemented 
and the constraints placed on the quality of processed water discharged (Foley et al., 2010).
The lowest value of energy consumption and GHG emissions per unit wastewater reported 
for the UK wastewater industry are around 630 kWh/Ml and 0.4 t BOD Ml, respectively.
Figure 103 illustrates the impact of a CI strategy on the demand-capacity relationship for 
wastewater treatment.
Energy consumption (Figure 104, overleaf) would again grow rapidly until new assets 
using more efficient technologies come on-line, at which point, energy use will decrease 
rapidly. If all energy-consuming assets are replaced with energy-neutral technologies, 
the overall consumption of the system could fall to zero. There is also scope for energy 
generation at wastewater treatment plants.
Figure 103: Demand-capacity 
relationships for wastewater 
treatment under a Capacity-
Intensive transition for: a) low 
growth; b) medium growth, and; 
c) high growth scenarios.
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5.5.3.2 Decentralisation transition strategy
In the DC strategy, there is a gradual abandonment of current combined (centralised) 
treatment processing in favour of smaller decentralised foul systems with many small 
treatment plants in lieu of trunk sewers, and increased use of grey water recycling. 
However, the benefits of such an approach will depend on how costs scale in treatment 
plants and networks. Much of the enthusiasm for decentralised treatment has overlooked 
the manner in which treatment and sewerage costs scale.
Small treatment plants are very expensive to run (on a per capita basis) and large sewerage 
networks are very efficient at high population densities. A recent Swiss study (Maurer et al., 
2010) has demonstrated this convincingly (Figure 105), and should be repeated in the UK.
In this context, grey water recycling may be something of a ‘red herring’. The benefits 
accrue to the water supply problem, not the wastewater problem, and the issue of scaling 
of treatment costs must be confronted.
Figure 104: The energy cost of 
wastewater treatment under a 
Capacity-Intensive transition.
 
Figure 105: Sewerage 
construction costs under 
differing population density 
assumptions. In cases 3, 5 
and 2, density increases with 
destination, and centralised 
networks are preferred. In cases 
1 and 4, density is constant 
with population (sprawl) and 
decentralised systems are 
cheaper (Maurer et al., 2010).
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5.5.3.3 Capacity-Constrained transition strategy
The FTA considers the CC strategy as a ‘Business as usual’ strategy. It is the most likely 
strategy, as there is a lack of workable alternative technologies at present. However, 
contrasting with the general transition strategy approach in the FTA, it is not necessarily a 
low-investment strategy.
As stated in Section 5.3.3.1, a business-as-usual scenario will see a steady increase in costs 
year-on-year as the price of electricity rises, and that newly built plants will inevitably incur 
increasing per capita costs. Most waste is treated in such plants; the costs for smaller plants 
are typically higher. Thus, significant price rises are inevitable under this scenario, though 
the costs would be ameliorated by using larger treatment plants. 
 
It is unacceptable for the wastewater infrastructure to fail through insufficient provision of 
treatment capacity.
In a risk-based framework, the capacity of the wastewater network is managed not in 
terms of total capacity for conveyance and treatment versus total demand, but in terms 
of the distribution of capacities across infrastructure elements in the network, where the 
probability of failure often relates to depreciation in the condition of the infrastructure, 
rather than its age alone. If demand exceeds capacity in any one element of the network, 
this effectively constitutes unsatisfactory performance across the entire system. Figure 107 
(overleaf) illustrates this concept.
 Cyclical programmes of risk identification and asset management result in a constant 
turnover, where capacity from old infrastructure is seamlessly supplanted by capacity from 
new. Combined with regional buffers against failure, this yields an apparent over-provision 
of wastewater treatment capacity at the national scale; however, this effectively ‘tracks’ 
demand for wastewater services as capacity is constantly renewed (Figure 108, overleaf).
Energy consumption and cost would escalate rapidly (Figure 109, overleaf).
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Figure 107: Wastewater 
infrastructure capacity in a risk-
based framework.
 
Figure 108: Demand-capacity 
relationships for wastewater 
treatment under a business-
as-usual transition for: a) low 
growth; b) medium growth, and; 
c) high growth scenarios.
 
Figure 109: Energy cost under a 
Capacity-Constrained strategy.
C
a
p
a
c
i
t
y
Good condition 
e.g. low age
Poor condition 
e.g. high age
Failure
Capacity  Demand
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2
0
1
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
3
0
2
0
4
0
2
0
5
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
3
0
2
0
4
0
2
0
5
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
3
0
2
0
4
0
2
0
5
0
t
B
O
D
/
d
a) Low growth b) Medium growth c) High growth
Future energy cost
Current energy cost
Time
E
n
e
r
g
y
 
c
o
s
t165
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 5
Sewage treatment
A modest warming in the climate will have relatively little effect on wastewater treatment 
per se. However, it may exacerbate issues of cost as lower flows in the receiving waters and 
reuse in agriculture will lead to higher effluent standards.
Sewerage
The number of households served, and the number of people served, is expected to 
increase. The increased hydraulic load on the systems will be offset in part or in whole 
by reduced water use. However, the number of people and households per se may be 
less important than their density. Increasing the number of connections in an area will 
bring down both the running costs and increases the efficiency of use of existing assets 
in established networks and the per capita capital expenditure for new builds. The 
envisaged growth in GDP will help ensure the affordability of sewerage. The per capita 
costs of running the network are of a similar order to those for wastewater treatment 
and the impact of rising electricity prices will depend on the amount of pumping which 
is highly variable. There are data for terminal pumping costs and these at present are 9% 
of the costs of running a network. This element will double or quadruple in the life of the 
network. The only alternative to pumping would be the development of small footprint 
treatment plants. However, the designs we have at present are some of the most energy 
intensive forms of wastewater treatment plants and may in many circumstances use more 
electricity than a pumping station.
Increases in rainfall and, to some extent temperature, have important implications for 
the sewerage. These implications were the subject of a relatively recent study (Ashley et 
al., 2007), and include sewer flooding and the excessive discharge of combined sewer 
overflows under a business-as-usual strategy. This will plainly be unacceptable and lead to 
change.
Figure 110: Cost of wastewater 
treatment in a median (60,000 
people) sized wastewater 
treatment plant under differing 
energy cost regimes.
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5.5.3.4 Summary performance evaluation of transition strategies
Figure 111 presents a summary visualisation of the performance of the three transition 
strategies across the three growth scenarios for key performance metrics. In the CC 
strategy, energy demand increases rapidly over the time periods. In the CI transition 
strategy, treatment capacity is increased using new energy recovery technologies, 
which may also result in wastewater treatment to become an energy-neutral or energy-
generating process towards the end of the century. For the aggregate performance across 
the three growth scenarios and the two time periods, the DC strategy had the lowest 
overall performance, mostly due to the associated cost of the strategy.
5.5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Population determines the volume of wastewater requiring treatment; however, it is the 
population density, the physical and chemical composition of sewage, and the treatment 
technologies implemented that determine the cost of treatment.
The most important interdependency is electricity. Low-energy treatment technologies 
are plausible but do not exist yet. We could transition to such technologies in the current 
network in 10 years’ time, at a rate dependent on the relative merits of alternative 
technologies.
The other key dependency is population density, which appears to affect strongly the 
scaling of the cost of sewerage. This in turn affects options for treatment.
Other potentially important interdependencies include agriculture, the value of nutrients, 
the role of the drainage network in collecting and conveying run-off, and the relationship 
between effluent quality and receiving waters’ capacity for dilution.
Although adaptation options include the promotion of high-density settlements and the 
charging for water and sewerage services by density rather than rateable value, future 
policies for wastewater infrastructure provision must necessarily prepare for higher 
charges for water and sewerage services.
In particular, the cost and very long design-lives of the existing sewerage technologies 
means that we cannot easily transition with this technology in the period to 2050. This will 
mean managing the existing assets actively and intelligently, perhaps accelerating the 
adoption of the monitoring and control of sewerage systems (to 2050) and developing 
strategies to either abandon or renew the network (beyond 2050).
Figure 111: Summary 
visualisation of performance for 
the three transition strategies 
across the three scenarios for 
the time-periods of interest to 
2050.
Cost
Electricity
Capacity margin
Low growth scenario
Principal growth scenario
High growth scenario
High performance
(e.g. low cost, low CO2, 
high supply security)
Medium performance
Low performance
(e.g. high cost, high CO2,
low supply security)
L
P
H
L
L
L
L
L
L
M
M
M
M
M
M
H
H
H
H
H
H
L
L
L
L
L
L
M
M
M
M
M
M
H
H
H
H
H
H
L
L
L
L
L
L
M
M
M
M
M
M
H
H
H
H
H
H
Wastewater
2010–2030
2030–2050
Capacity-Intensive (CI) Capacity-Constrained (CC) Decentralisation (DC)167
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 5
5.6 SOLID WASTE
Demand scenarios are constructed for municipal solid waste (MSW), commercial 
and industrial (C&I), and construction and demolition (C&D). Each of these sources 
of waste interact differently with the drivers of change. 
EU and local government imposed targets will require new capacity for some 
treatments (e.g. composting and recycling), but capacity may be sufficient in 
landfill. Even under the highest growth scenario (a tenfold increase in waste 
arisings), and lowest investment option, the investment levels are sufficient 
to build the infrastructure required to process waste arisings throughout the 
century. For this reason, the analysis of transition strategies in the FTA is limited 
to this ‘worst case’ combination, with an assumption that other combinations of 
growth scenarios and transition strategies will result in fewer waste arisings and 
higher levels of available investment. 
There are implications for higher recycling targets to be met for this to be 
achieved, and issues related to provision of sufficient treatment sites. The 
investment levels across the transition strategies were sufficient (i.e. did not 
impose restrictions) across all the FTA scenarios to meet demand.
5.6.1 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
The assessment will concentrate on MSW, C&I and C&D wastes; mining and quarry wastes 
and agricultural wastes will not be considered. Waste arisings for MSW, C&I waste and 
C&D waste together constitute the greatest mass of waste recovered or disposed of in the 
UK to waste management facilities. Mining and quarry wastes tend to be reused for site 
restoration. Agricultural manures are reused on farmland and are therefore not deemed 
to be wastes. Other wastes generated on farms, such as plastic wrapping, containers, etc. 
constitute only a small fraction of total waste arisings. Hazardous waste treatment will 
not be considered in the FTA, but given its importance it should be considered in the next 
phase of the research.
For the FTA modelling exercise, existing demographic projections combined with per 
capita waste generation are used to predict waste demand. The economy is strongly linked 
to waste generation despite efforts to decouple. The relationship of waste generation with 
economic change is assumed to continue; projections for economic growth or decline in 
the UK will be used to estimate future trends in waste generation. 
It has also been assumed that there will be no further changes in government policy up to 
2020. This is likely to encourage further waste reduction and increased recovery of wastes. 
The impact of meeting targets for recycling and reduction of disposal to landfill on waste 
infrastructure and failure to meet these targets will be modelled. The impact of social 
factors (human behaviour, age, social class, etc.) on waste demand will not be included in 
the FTA since the results are often variable and based on small scale studies. 
5.6.1.1 Demand drivers
It is clear that MSW arisings are likely to be driven by population (a greater number of 
people implies more waste is produced) and GDP (wealthier people consume more) and 
this proves to be the case, at least over part of MSW datasets. 168
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For C&I the drivers are less clear. It seems likely that population and GDP are linked to the 
waste arisings from the commercial and industrial sectors but there is no strong correlation 
between either population or GDP and the waste arisings in this sector. There is, however, 
a good correlation between waste generation and the index of production (IoP). For the 
purpose of the FTA, a static per capita lower limit has been assumed, and that the per 
capita upper limit will follow IoP (which increases linearly with time). This has been carried 
out for Scotland and England but there is only a single year of Welsh C&I data; this has not 
been considered, although this will only have a relatively small impact on the total figures. 
For C&D waste, again there is no strong correlation with either population or GDP. There 
has been a correlation between the volume of new construction orders and waste arisings 
in the sector, however this link has only been strong since the start of the economic 
downturn and it is not known how new construction orders will continue into the future. 
The FTA assumption is for static per capita upper and lower limits to waste generation for 
each country, although the validity of this assumption is questionable. 
The majority of future projections in the FTA suggest increases in the amount of waste 
being generated, despite some of the data showing falls in recent years. The decline in 
waste production may simply be a product of the recession but may also be due to greater 
awareness in the public of the need to reduce their waste generation, although it is difficult 
to see what would cause this, given the lack of transparency of waste disposal costs to 
the taxpayer. It is not easy to see how the public can reduce their waste arisings without 
reducing their consumption. Figures from WRAP (2009) suggest that some of the decrease 
in waste arisings could be due to diversion of biodegradable waste to home composting.
Resource costs might have an impact on solid waste management, but discussions with 
operators suggest that the impact is likely to be fairly small. When the value of recyclables 
increases above a certain threshold, the extra profits will be shared between the local 
authority and the waste management company. This is only likely to inform the waste 
management decisions at the planning stage rather than during the 25 year life of waste 
management plant/contract. At least one waste management company has carried out 
detailed cost benefit analyses for the excavation of an existing landfill to recover resource 
and consider that resource costs would not have to rise very significantly before it would 
be cost effective. Further investigation of the drivers will be needed for the next phase.
5.6.2 ANALYSIS OF FUTURE DEMAND IN THE FTA SCENARIOS
5.6.2.1 MSW generation scenarios
In England, MSW generation may have become decoupled from economic growth in 
2002/03. In the worst case (i.e. maximum waste generation), per capita waste generation 
continues to follow economic growth (starting from 2009/10 levels). In the best case (i.e. 
minimum waste generation), per capita waste generation remains static at approximately 
500 kg/person/yr.
In Scotland, MSW generation may have decoupled from economic growth after 2005/06. In 
the worst case (i.e. maximum waste generation), the per capita waste generation continues 
to follow economic growth (starting from 2009/10 levels). In the best case (i.e. minimum 
waste generation), per capita waste generation remains static at approximately  
600 kg/person/yr.169
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For Wales, there is no correlation between GDP and waste arisings. Since 2004/05, waste 
arisings have been falling and there is a very strong inverse correlation (R2 =0.97) with 
landfill tax. Since Wales has failed to meet some of its BMW diversion targets, this is not 
surprising and suggests that the level will continue to fall in the short term as landfill 
tax continues to rise, although it is not clear how landfill tax could have an effect on the 
population who generate MSW due to the social decoupling of MSW generation from 
the costs of dealing with it. In the worst case (i.e. maximum waste generation), per capita 
waste generation remains static at approximately 600 kg/person/yr. In the best case (i.e. 
minimum waste generation), per capita waste generation continues to fall following the 
landfill tax rises and then remains static at 2014 levels. It is known that landfill tax will be at 
least £80/tonne from 2014 to 2020 but beyond this has yet to be decided.
The FTA focuses on English MSW as:
1.  MSW is the only waste type which has high quality current and historical data. 
2.  England has by far the largest population in Britain and hence the largest waste 
arisings. 
3.  According to senior industry figures, the vast majority of UK waste infrastructure 
has been built for MSW with C&I being dealt with in the same facilities on an ad-hoc 
basis. This may be changing with investment into C&I waste infrastructure likely to 
be significantly more attractive in the short term and changes in the national waste 
targets made in 2010 (ICE, 2010b) in which BMW was redefined to included C&I 
waste. 
5.6.2.2 C&I and C&D generation scenarios
In comparison with MSW, there is a relative paucity of data and most of the data is based 
on extrapolations from a limited set of survey data (e.g. NW region of England survey 
2006/7 which provided the basis for 2009 England data). There is only a single year of data 
for Welsh C&I data and so this has not been included here as it is impossible to judge future 
trends on this basis.
Figure 112: Projections of British 
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Figure 113: Projections of 
English C&I generation.
 
Figure 114: Projections of 
Scottish C&I generation.
 
Figure 115: Projections of British 
C&D generation.
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The following are the assumed static upper and lower per capita arisings for each region 
for C&D:
•  England  (1.4 t/capita lower and 1.8 t/capita upper)
•  Scotland (1.5 t/capita lower and 2.2 t/capita upper)
•  Wales (1.1 t/capita lower and 4.0 t/capita upper) 
5.6.3 DESCRIPTION OF TRANSITION STRATEGIES 
The waste management industry is already decentralised with policy and guidance being 
issued centrally (and shaped by European directives) and waste management decisions 
made at the local authority level. Waste management has been handled at the town/
borough level since the first waste decrees appeared in the Middle Ages and this seems 
likely to continue. Government may wish to encourage/discourage different types of 
decision making, e.g. encouragement for AD through Defra’s Waste Strategy for England 
2007; changes to planning regulations to make it easier or harder to build certain types 
of facility etc., but it seems unlikely that it would ever be managed centrally nor that 
responsibility could be decentralised further. 
5.6.3.1 Capacity-Intensive transition strategy
The CI strategy has a high investment in the sector (0.2% GDP). Thus, it is possible to 
invest in new technologies including advanced thermal treatments (ATT) including EfW, 
gasification, plasma arc gasification and pyrolysis as well as AD. Gasification and pyrolysis 
both produce syngas which, after cleaning, can be used as a primary fuel, although there 
may be significant technical difficulties with this and it is not clear it this has been achieved 
anywhere with MSW; it may also be that this is less efficient than immediate combustion 
for the generation of electricity. AD and landfill produce biogas, which in some instances 
might be better used as a primary fuel, rather than for energy generation. To be used in 
this way they need to be cleaned. The technology for this is available but might benefit 
from government funded demonstrator projects.
The output from MBT and MHT plants as well as the residue from MRFs can be used as a 
fuel SRF or RDF which can be used in any of the above ATTs or co-combusted with coal or 
biomass, although these latter two are likely to be problematic due to Waste Incineration 
Directive (WID) regulations, which impose much tighter emissions regulations on waste 
combustion than combustion of other materials (IMechE, 2010). Thermal treatment should 
ideally be combined heat and power (CHP) schemes and may need to be coupled with 
significant investment in district heating (DH) infrastructure or preferentially co-located 
where there are requirements for heat.
Planning should be carried out on a regional level (CIWM, 2005) with treatment plant being 
optimally sized and co-located with potential customers for waste heat. As can be seen in 
the gate fees, the landfill tax has an important influence on waste management practices 
and this should continue.
5.6.3.2 Decentralisation transition strategy
The DC strategy focuses on investments that favour local treatment/disposal (proximity 
principle), with local plants that are smaller and sub-optimal in size. These may include 
modular facilities, e.g. AD, gasification, that are more efficient at small scales than 
incineration. Thermal processes are used to maximise energy recovery by utilising CHP. 
Localised treatment would include MBT for the purposes of producing SRF which could be 
either used locally or transported.172
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Table 37: Waste arisings by sector for each growth scenario. Colour indicates 
scale of challenge: green – limited problems; orange – possible problems (annual 
capacity increase of 400–1200 Kt); red – likely problems (annual capacity increase 
>2 Mt).
Annual waste 
production (Mt)
2020 2050
Low growth MSW 
2009: 30.3 Mt 
2006: 33.5Mt
Lo (static)
Hi (GDP)
32.2 33.2
32.8 46.4
C&D 
2005/6: 112.4 Mt
Lo 87.4 90.3
Hi 121.7 125.0
C&I 
2009: 54.6 Mt
Following IoP 67.2 86.3
Static 83.5 86.6
Medium 
growth
MSW – 
2009: 30.3 Mt
2006: 33.5 Mt
Lo (static) 33.2 38.3
Hi (GDP) 36.2 67.9
C&D 
2005/6: 112.4 Mt
Lo 90.0 104.1
Hi 125.4 144.4
C&I 
2009: 54.6 Mt
Following IoP 69.2 99.4
Static 86.0 99.7
High growth MSW 
2009: 30.3 Mt 
2006: 33.5Mt
Lo (static) 34.2 43.6
Hi (GDP) 38.8 88.9
C&D 
2005/6: 112.4 Mt
Lo 92.7 118.6
Hi 129.2 164.8
C&I 
2009: 54.6 Mt
Following IoP 71.3 113.2
Static 88.6 113.5173
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5.6.3.3 Capacity-Constrained transition strategy
The CC strategy is the lowest sectoral investment strategy (0.06% GDP). The policy focus 
is on demand reduction measures, with an increased effort from WRAP and other entities 
to reduce waste at source. Policies would include continued increases in landfill tax. 
SQWenergy (2010) found that the most cost effective way of meeting Scotland’s zero waste 
MSW targets was to maximise source segregation of the waste (maximisation of recycling; 
recyclables less contaminated, hence have greater value; reduced MRF requirement). 
However, WYG (2011) and WRAP (WRAP, 2011) found that recycling rates were significantly 
higher when recyclables were co-mingled (wheelie bins have much larger capacity than 
the green boxes required for kerbside sort schemes) and collection was fortnightly rather 
than weekly.
5.6.3.4 Performance evaluation
Table 37 summarises the waste arisings by sector for each growth scenario. All data is 
GB except for C&I data which is England & Scotland only as previously discussed. A more 
detailed version is shown in Annex I. 
5.6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
There is a gap between English MSW treatment facilities and generation, assuming that 
the mass of MSW to landfill remains at 2020 level (i.e. in compliance with Landfill Directive), 
and the 2020 requirement that at least 50% of MSW must be recycled/composted is 
retained. The worst case scenario for England in 2050 is that 38.5 Mt recycled/composted 
(~10 Mt in 2009), 12.2 Mt landfilled, and 26.3 Mt other (3.6 Mt incinerated in 2009). If the 
shortfall is to be met by thermal treatment, this would imply a need for 67  
(400,000 tpa) incinerators in England alone by 2050 in this scenario, although clearly more 
waste could be composted or recycled which would reduce this requirement. Whilst it is 
hard to imagine a UK market for nearly 40 Mt of recyclables and compost, the increased 
population and economic growth required to reach this level of waste generation imply 
significantly increased markets for recyclables. It is not clear if the same would be true for 
residual wastes from AD and aerobic treatment. The increase of population may lead to a 
loss in the availability of land on which these soil improvers can be spread.
In some of the waste generation (demand) scenarios, there is a clear need for greater 
treatment capacity. In the majority (or possibly all) of the scenarios, the EU and local 
government imposed targets will require new capacity for some treatments (e.g. 
composting/recycling) but there may be sufficient capacity or even over-capacity in 
landfill, although in the longer-term lack of landfill capacity may become problematic.
Figures 116 and 117 (overleaf) show two approaches to predicting the changes in 
treatment growth trajectory which is required in order to judge the timing and nature 
of required infrastructure investment in each of the transition strategies. As can be seen, 
if the entire period shown in Figure 116 is considered, the annual growth by mass can 
vary significantly when compared to the growth between 2007/8 and 2009/10. It seems 
sensible to use growth by mass rather than by proportion as it is independent of future 
growth and so will perhaps better show the requirement for extra capacity.174
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 5
EfW by mass
Dry recycling by mass
Green recycling 
by mass
Land￿ll as % of arisings
EFW as % of arisings
Dry recycling as 
% of arisings
Green recycling as 
% of arisings
Linear (land￿ll as 
% of arisings)
Linear (EFW as % 
of arisings)
Linear (dry recycling as 
% of arisings)
Linear (green recycling 
as % of arisings)
Linear (EfW by mass)
Linear (Dry recycling 
by mass)
Linear (Green recycling 
by mass)
10,000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1
9
9
7
/
8
8
1
9
9
8
/
9
9
1
9
9
9
/
0
0
2
0
0
0
/
0
1
2
0
0
1
/
0
2
2
0
0
2
/
0
3
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
2
0
0
4
/
0
5
2
0
0
5
/
0
6
2
0
0
6
/
0
7
2
0
0
7
/
0
8
2
0
0
8
/
0
9
2
0
0
9
/
1
0
M
a
s
s
 
o
f
 
w
a
s
t
e
 
(
0
0
0
s
 
t
o
n
n
e
s
)
W
a
s
t
e
 
r
e
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
a
s
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
c
o
v
e
r
y
 
(
%
)
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
w
a
s
t
e
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
(
%
)
M
a
s
s
 
o
f
 
w
a
s
t
e
 
(
0
0
0
s
 
t
o
n
n
e
s
)
EfW by mass
Dry recycling by mass
Green recycling 
by mass
Land•ll as % of arisings
EFW as % of arisings
Dry recycling as 
% of arisings
Green recycling as 
% of arisings
Linear (EFW as % 
of arisings)
Linear (dry recycling as 
% of arisings)
Linear (green recycling 
as % of arisings)
Linear (EfW by mass)
Linear (dry recycling 
by mass)
Linear (green recycling 
by mass)
y=69.803 + 5993.9
R2=0.92947
y=1.1967x + 20.415
R2=0.9996
y=215.75x + 3455
R2=0.89755
y=223.4x + 2919.5
R2=0.97531
y=1.3875x + 11.695
R2=0.9589
y=1.2526x + 9.7834
R2=0.99283
Figure 116 (top): Treatment routes by mass and 
proportion of arisings for English MSW between 
1997–1998 and 2009–2010.
Figure 117 (bottom): Treatment routes by mass 
and proportion of arisings for English MSW 
between 2007–2008 and 2009–2010.175
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The existence of over-capacity in MRFs suggests that the low annual increase in recycling 
between 2007–2008 and 2009–2010 was due more to the reduction in overall waste or 
to changing habits, rather than anything more significant. However, for household waste 
in England, the only recycling target successfully met is the 2015 recycling target and 
only in the low growth scenario. It may be that the growth trajectories slowed during the 
recession leading to lower growth in green and dry recycling from 2007 to 2008 onwards 
than in the previous decade. The accompanying reduction in waste arisings would mean 
that recycling rates continued to rise. 
The approach of using different processing trajectories for the different waste materials 
needs to be compared to the production of waste suitable for each treatment. The most 
comprehensive review of the material make up of MSW was carried out for Defra (2009b).
Table 38 has been used to determine the amount of different type of wastes materials in 
MSW. This is required in order to estimate the requirement for new infrastructure. It has 
been assumed that:
•  These arisings include the material which is source separated for recycling. The total 
amount of waste strongly supports this assumption.
•  Some wastes can be processed in multiple ways (e.g. paper & card can be recycled, 
biologically degraded or used as a combustible; plastic could be recycled or burnt). 
•  All the materials which do not clearly fit into a single processing group will be 
landfilled. This includes the following groups – textiles, hazardous, sanitary, furniture, 
mattresses, miscellaneous non-combustible, soil, other wastes and fines. It is 
recognised that some of this material can be recycled and also that textiles could be 
banned from landfill in the near future.
•  The proportion of each type of waste remains the same. This is unlikely to be true 
given the effort by expended by government on reducing certain waste streams 
(e.g. WRAP’s ‘Love Food, Hate Waste’ campaign), but would represent too much 
complexity for the FTA.
In Table 38, paper & card and plastic have been separated as both can appear in more 
than one category and this may impact on the different transition strategies. Paper & card 
can be biodegraded, recycled or burnt as a fuel. The modified waste hierarchy in the 2011 
Government Waste Policy Review (Defra, 2011b) would suggest that biodegradation and 
recycling would be equally acceptable, provided that the output from the degradation 
meets quality protocols and so could be used as soil improver. Energy use for the paper & 
card component through EfW would also be acceptable and have the same place in the 
waste hierarchy provided certain efficiency criteria are met and it can be shown that there 
is a better environmental outcome than the alternatives. Similarly plastic can be recycled 
or used as a highly calorific fuel. The minimum value for landfill is higher than necessary 
as it contains material which could clearly be recycled (e.g. textiles) but is not currently 
collected for recycling by most local authorities, despite the high commodity value  
(£300-£350 for clothing bank textiles in Sept 2011 according to Letsrecycle.com (2011)). 
The actual values in the table show that:
•  Substantially less waste is being biologically treated than could be. Even the latest 
figures show that less than half of the lower limit of biodegradable wastes are 
being treated biologically. This may in part be due to the lack of markets for the end 
product, without which, landfill is likely to be required for disposal.176
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Table 38: Composition of English MSW from 2006/7 (Defra, 2009b). Preferred treatment methods for each 
component of the waste stream are indicated with **; possible treatment is indicated by * and blanks indicate the 
treatment is not suitable
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3 Other organic 490,352 1.73 ** * *
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8 Plastics 2,831,585 9.99 ** ** *
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•  In 2009/10, whilst dry recycling and EfW both used more than twice the lower limits 
for their respective waste streams, both have the potential for further development.
It is difficult to accurately state the current capacity for waste treatment. This creates 
difficulties when deciding how much capacity needs to be added and on what timescale.
Increasing capacity
Figure 118 shows capacity and arisings for English MSW projected out to 2050, showing 
the lowest investment strategy and the highest waste growth scenario (high growth and 
waste arisings following GDP). Capacity increase was calculated conservatively assuming:
•  Each tonne of additional annual processing capacity costs £500. This is at the top end 
of infrastructure (i.e. maximum costs for gasification and incineration plant) and most 
infrastructure can be built more cheaply than this.
•  Ten per cent of the infrastructure is assumed to be lost each year (operational life is 
expected to be 25 years for much infrastructure, especially if PFI funded).
•  This write-down was also included in the start year which would imply insufficient 
capacity now which is not the case.
•  All the investment is aimed at MSW with other waste streams utilising any over-
capacity. This is essentially how the market has operated up until now but needs to 
be approached in a more sophisticated way in the next stage of the project. A second 
line is shown in which 60% of the investment is used for MSW.
Figure 118: Projected capacity 
and arisings for English MSW in 
the high growth with arisings 
following GDP and with low 
investment (0.06% GDP). See 
text for details of assumptions 
made.
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In the first few years, there is insufficient capacity but this is due to taking a simplistic 
approach in which the current capacity is assumed to be the current arisings but this is 
then written down by 10%. In both investment strategies, shown in Figure 115, not only is 
capacity greater than demand, the capacity added is of the most expensive kind. If cheaper 
treatment options were chosen, even lower investment rates could lead to an excess of 
capacity. It should be noted that these results show an investment of £8.5 billion to 2020 
for MSW, which is broadly in line with other sources.36 In this analysis it was assumed that 
other waste streams would use excess capacity in MSW plant and this is likely to be an 
oversimplification. More sophisticated analyses will be carried out in the next phase of 
the project, and will include infrastructure built for C&I and C&D wastes. In lower growth 
scenarios, capacity will be even easier to achieve. 
Modelling capacity increase
Given the uncertainties of current capacity, a simplistic modelling approach has been 
used: a base case of capacity is assumed for each growth scenario, with further capacity 
added incrementally. This approach results in increasing capacity for ‘recycling/preparing 
for reuse’ by about 325 ktpa and total recovery (including ‘recycling/preparing for reuse’) 
by about 650 ktpa. It should be noted that ‘recycling/preparing for reuse’ can make up a 
bigger proportion of total recovery than this and in some transition strategies it probably 
will.
As was shown earlier it would be financially possible, even in a low investment strategy, to 
meet the costs of new infrastructure even in the worst case scenario of high growth and 
waste arisings following GDP. 
Market factors potentially affecting arisings
Relative poverty reduces UK consumption and/or encourages recovery and re-use, and 
resource scarcity drives an increase in recovery of recyclables. Waste companies become 
resource recovery companies (for C&I wastes, major producers may take steps to recover 
value themselves, e.g. Tesco no longer sends any of the 500,000 tonnes of waste it 
generates annually to landfill (Davey, 2009)).
Policy/societal factors potentially affecting fate of wastes
A possible EU ban on biodegradable waste to landfill by 2020/25. After 2020, it is likely 
that there will be further reductions in permitted quantities of BMW going to landfill 
(i.e. going beyond the Landfill Directive 2020 targets) , until some nominal zero point. 
According to operators, about 10% of the input into clean MRFs has to be landfilled (due 
to presence of non-recyclables or contamination) and this is also occurs in MHT and MBT 
plant.
A complete EU ban on landfill. Whilst there would be much sympathy elsewhere in Europe 
for this policy, it seems unlikely that in the foreseeable future we will have no residual 
wastes which require landfilling (e.g. Scotland’s ‘zero waste’ policy allows for 5% of MSW 
to be landfilled). This will cause similar problems to those outlined above but to a greater 
extent.
36 For example, ICE (2010b) and letsrecycle.com. (2009b, 04/12/09). “When is waste infrastructure 
strategic?”   Retrieved 07/12/11, from http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/opinions/when-is-waste-
infrastructure-strategic which suggests £10–20 billion (with £10 billion required for MSW alone) 
and ESA (2011) suggesting £7.5–£20 billion of waste infrastructure investment is required by 2020.179
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Table 39: Capex costs and options under different transition strategies
Strategy Recycling Capex costs Recovery Capex costs
Capacity-
Intensive
MRFs; large MBT 
plant to feed EfW or 
supply SRF to kilns or 
co-located industry.
Waste as Resource 
plant (WaR) with up to 
1 Mt throughput
MRF ~£40–175/tpa
MBT/MHT 
~£85–150/tpa
WaR ~?
Large scale EfW or 
ATT possibly funded 
by multiple local 
authorities
WaR
£190–500/tpa
£160–833/tpa
?
Decentralisation Mix of small local 
AD & IVC for green 
waste and MRF for dry 
recyclables, probably 
25–50 ktpa capacity. 
Maybe able to utilize 
larger plant and 
combine with local 
farm slurries (Defra, 
2011b)
AD ~£150–300/tpa
IVC ~£150–200/tpa 
(NB costs from IVC 
from Viridor)
MRF ~£40–175/tpa
Gasification ~50 ktpa
Pyrolysis ~50 ktpa
CHP – in new 
developments it 
could supply the 
waste generators 
with district heating 
but probably easier 
to collocate with 
industrial heat users
£160–500/tpa
£160–850/tpa
Capacity-
Constrained
Change to collection 
– wheelie bin for 
co-mingled dry 
recyclables; fortnightly 
collection, separate 
food waste.
AD?
Associated 
costs (e.g. for 
separate food 
waste containers 
and collection) 
likely to be met 
by reduction in 
landfilling costs 
of due to increase 
in recycling rates 
(WYG, 2011) 
Windrow 
composting?
But probably attempt 
to reach targets 
by forcing more 
recycling
£35/tpa
Modification of waste incineration directive (WID). At present any plant burning wastes 
including SRF & RDF must comply with the WID emissions regulations. Emissions from 
other combustion processes (e.g. coal-fired power station) are permitted to be 10 times 
higher than those from WID compliant plant (IMechE, 2010). This is both irrational and 
reduces the potential markets for SRF. At the moment cement kilns are partially exempt 
from WID compliance but there is a limit (due to the exemption terms and the number of 
cement kilns) to how much waste can be utilised in this way.
CHP directive requires member states to promote CHP. Electricity generated from waste 
combustion processes (gasification, pyrolysis and incineration) are typically 20–30% 
efficient (Castillo-Castillo et al., 2009). CHP systems are often stated to be up to 80% 
efficient, although Castillo-Castillo et al. (2009) found lower efficiencies.180
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Renewable obligation certificates (ROCs), feed-in-tariffs, renewable heat incentive 
(RHI) and other renewable energy incentives may well change the waste management 
landscape. The Waste Framework Directive (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2008) has changed the regulations on EfW such that energy efficient 
plant will be classed as recovery, rather than disposal thus moving up the waste hierarchy, 
provided certain efficiency criteria are met.
Planning process may become increasingly difficult for many waste facilities. This is 
particularly true for ALL forms of thermal treatment. Difficulty in obtaining financing (e.g. 
banks already reluctant to fund unproven waste management technologies). 
The size of the land bank able to take the output from aerobic and anaerobic processes. 
Without land upon which these outputs can be spread, there will be little choice but to 
landfill them.
CIWM (2005) drawing on European experience recommended that there should be 
strategic regional planning authorities for waste infrastructure which would be intended 
multiple waste streams (i.e. not just MSW as is currently the case) and funded by alternative 
systems of financing.
Technical factors potentially affecting fate of wastes
Incineration still produces waste (gaseous wastes, bottom & fly ash and residues from air 
pollution control (APC) systems, although the ashes are recycled and there are markets 
developing for APC residues). Various processes could be improved or optimised, including 
anaerobic digestion, MBT, MHT, composting and incineration. Final storage quality of 
landfills (i.e. when they no longer require active management) is important. Landfill 
mining, materials recovery and reuse of void space may also become important in the near 
future either due to increases in raw material prices, concerns about methane emissions 
from closed landfills or a combination of the two. 
Possible causes of step changes
Creation of targets (coupled with the threat of significant financial penalties) has had a 
significant effect on both MSW treatment and its final disposal route and it is likely that this 
could be effectively replicated across the other waste sectors with the right drivers.
If it was shown that processed wastes currently not landfilled posed a hazard (e.g. presence 
of heavy metals in incinerator bottom ash; compost-like output (CLO) from aerobic 
degradation of MSW is used for landscaping but may also produce leachates and emit 
methane), alternative disposal routes may need to be found, e.g. controlled landfill.
If government policy was directed to extracting maximum benefit from all waste streams, 
this could potentially change the infrastructure requirement, e.g. decommissioning of 
aerobic composting plants and replacing with anaerobic digesters (AD). Alternatively it has 
been suggested that biodegradable municipal waste (the source of landfill gas) could be 
diverted to sewage AD plants and this would impact on the wastewater sector. 
A move to strategic regional planning authorities; integration of planning across waste 
types; with compensation for communities hosting waste facilities (and other strategic 
infrastructure) (CIWM, 2005) could significantly improve planning, remove the potential 
biases of some local authorities and ensure efficiencies of scale are accessed. 181
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An ad-hoc version of this has already happened in e.g. the South East 7 – a group of 
five County Councils and two unitary authorities working in partnership (Defra, 2011b). 
Changing waste governance via moving to a single government department responsible 
for solid waste rather than the current split of departmental ownership between planning 
(DCLG) and policy (Defra) might facilitate strategic planning.
The desire to move to a ‘zero waste’ economy requires extensive recycling and reuse. The 
inclusion of infrastructure for reuse or which can use recyclates, within the planning of 
waste infrastructure might significantly improve closed loop recycling and reduce the 
necessity for shipping recyclates across the world.
5.6.4.1 Summary performance evaluation of transition strategies
Figure 119 presents the visualisation of the evaluation of the performance of the 
three transition strategies over the three growth scenarios. Analysis indicated that the 
performance of the transition strategies would not change over the two time periods. Due 
to the available investment levels, the CI strategy results in the greatest capacity margin. 
Both CI and DC implement energy recovery technologies, thus perform better than the CC 
strategy with respect to energy recovery. The aggregate performance over the two time 
periods and three growth scenarios resulted in CI having the best overall performance. 
Figure 119: Summary 
visualisation of performance for 
the three transition strategies 
across the three scenarios for 
the time-periods of interest to 
2050.
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5.7  ICT
ICT capacity has continued to rapidly expand keeping well ahead of demand 
thanks to on-going innovation in a competitive market. It is anticipated that 
this arrangement will continue, so the sector has not been subject to the same 
quantified analysis as other sectors. In 2010, ICT consumed an estimated 13–16% 
of the total electricity in the UK. Projections indicate that global electricity usage 
in ICT will grow by approximately 9% per year, a trend that may continue up 
to 2020. However, since 2000 there has been a continuing decrease in growth 
for home computing and other electronic consumer goods in the UK, and new 
products have greater energy efficiencies, which may serve to depress future 
growth of energy use in ICT. Beyond 2020, technological changes make electricity 
demand from ICT very difficult to project.
The exponential growth in ICT capacity means that analysis of future capacity under the 
transition strategies is inappropriate. Thus, although the carefully chosen growth scenarios 
below will certainly lead to varying degrees of demand for everything from home PCs 
to high-speed networking, the question that is to be addressed is the possibility that ICT 
provision could constrain the main infrastructures under the three scenarios.182
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A more subtle question is whether the continued exponential growth in ICT availability 
could open up new possibilities to optimise use of the physical infrastructures. An example 
would be that the sort of traffic information that is currently only available by SatNav and 
mobile phone links (or very coarsely on overhead gantries) might be made available over 
motorway-side wireless that could be picked up on extremely inexpensive receivers in cars. 
5.7.1 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
In the future development of ICT sector, we do not consider end-user devices and 
applications due to their short lifespan, low cost, high turnover, etc. Furthermore, it was 
mentioned that we do not expect any capacity constraints from computing power of 
end-user devices. Finally, even the current computation capacity would enable us to 
perform the necessary tasks of all future scenarios.
Instead we aim to consider the development of the following parts of ICT infrastructure: 
communication networks, data centres, IT systems, people (specialists). Historical accounts 
shows that breakthroughs in ICT solutions completely change the situation, therefore, the 
following scenarios would hold only in absence of such breakthroughs. 
“640 kb ought to be enough for everybody” – attributed to Bill Gates, 1981;
“I think there is a world market for maybe five computers.” – Thomas Watson, 
 chairman of IBM, 1943.37 
Due to the commercial dimension of ICT infrastructure, we evaluate the transition 
strategies as being a decision by both government and commercial entities. For example, 
in the Capacity-Constrained strategy we envisage capacity constraints from both 
government and companies combined (e.g. lack of investment). 
5.7.2 DEMAND FUTURES UNDER SCENARIOS
Demand futures for ICT sector should be considered under different facets: computation, 
communication (fixed, wireless, spectrum), IT services, etc. It would be difficult to construct 
a unified model, and separate demand futures should be modelled.
Furthermore, historically, ICT sector has witnessed exponential growth in capacity for 
most of its components, in contrast to linear growth in physical infrastructure sectors. 
The growth can usually be related to new technologies, new generation components, or 
breakthrough changes in the sector, rather than economic or population drivers. Still, these 
drivers could influence overall demand futures in the long run. Furthermore, technological 
breakthroughs and demand trends have high a level of unpredictability in the sector, 
which results in difficulties of forecasting (or modelling) demand in the future. Most 
reports avoid forecasting ICT trends and demand more than 5–10 years in the future.
ITRC analysis focuses on the ICT sector in its interdependence with physical infrastructures. 
For this reason, we are more interested in demand futures by other infrastructure sectors, 
rather than end-user ICT demands. For the latter, we may witness capacity constraints 
for radio spectrum, broadband speed, etc. (Table 40). However, for the needs of physical 
infrastructure, we do not believe in any capacity constraints forming in ICT sector.
37 http://www.rinkworks.com/said/predictions.shtml183
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One area where ICT demand for physical infrastructure sectors may play an important role 
is availability of people. An AEA study records the ICT professional workforce doubling in 
the last 12 years, and forecasts requirement of 140,000 new ICT specialists annually over 
the next 5 years (AEA Technology, 2010).
ICT electricity usage
The rapid changes in the ICT sector make it hard to project ICT needs for electricity. On 
the one hand, exponential ICT growth increases the electricity usage, however the greater 
efficiency of new technologies counters the increase significantly. Different estimations 
of ICT electricity usage have been suggested. Reports put the worldwide ICT electricity 
consumption at around 8% (UK at 10%) in 2007/2008 (Global Action Plan, 2007; Pickavet 
et al., 2008; Akoush et al., 2011). Alternative figures suggest ICT had consumed around 
13–16% of the total electricity in the UK in 2010, depending on assumptions about 
industrial ICT usage (data centres, etc.) (DECC, 2011c).
If we assume worldwide projections for UK’s ICT electricity usage, they give around 20% 
ICT share of total electricity consumption in 2020. The figure is based on projected annual 
growth of about 9% for the whole of ICT (Pickavet et al., 2008), starting from 10% share in 
2008, assuming 3% annual growth in total electricity consumption.
However, trends from the last 10 years (2000–2010) show slowing down of ICT electricity 
usage growth. Data centre electricity usage worldwide showed 16.7% annual growth 
in 2000–2005 (Koomey, 2008), but 9.3% annual growth in 2005–2010 (Koomey, 2011). 
Furthermore, in the UK, home computing growth slowed down from 13% to 1.5% per 
annum in the period 2000–2010, consumer electronics from 3.75% to ~1% growth per 
annum (DECC, 2011c). This hints towards new efficient units replacing older ICT devices.
Table 40: ICT sector possible end-user capacity constraints
ICT component End-user capacity constraint examples
Radio spectrum See examples in Section 4.6.2.7.
Fixed broadband Internet Service Providers applying Traffic Management 
policies to limit demand for bandwidth during peak 
hours.
Mobile broadband 3G not available universally; shaky connections and 
weak signals; still very slow.
IT services IT systems, which lack investment to stay up-to-date, 
age very quickly (e.g. recently upgraded banking 
system is quick and useful, but one that lacked 
upgrades is frustrating to use).
Computation Very large scale computations still exceed current 
capacity, e.g. super computers to calculate weather 
forecast models, or distributed computing for Folding@
home, SETI@home, etc.184
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 5
5.7.3 DESCRIPTION OF TRANSITION STRATEGIES FOR ICT 
Although there are no expected limitations to meeting demand for ICT in the future, the 
focus of each transition strategy could affect the nature of ICT usage and data provision. 
Some of these differences are shown in Table 41. 
Table 41: Description of the transition strategies for ICT
Capacity-Intensive Decentralisation Capacity-Constrained
• Comprehensive national 
provision
• High growth in digital demand
• IT projects: risk of failures 
increases with project size. 
Vulnerabilities in deploying 
nationwide IT systems – do we 
have experience?
• Comprehensive investment into 
training/academia/colleges to 
provide with academics and IT 
specialists in the area
• Investment and uptake of new 
technologies. Development of 
custom-made solutions
• Promoting resilience of networks: 
multiple networks from different 
providers. Availability of different 
of kinds of networks.
• Technological diversification
• Localised systems. IT systems: 
e.g. instead of building a 
comprehensive centralised 
NHS database, invest into 
interoperability and standards, 
while allowing single hospitals 
to choose their own providers (or 
use existing systems)
• Increasing home working. Need 
additional investment to achieve 
good connectivity to remote 
areas. Direct these investments 
from city centres
• Peer-to-peer networks
• Investment into off-the-shelf IT 
solutions
• Broadband capacity still exceeds 
demand
• Remaining gaps in geographical 
coverage of broadband and 
mobile
• Limit to existing technology. 
Investment for maintenance only. 
Providing services within current 
capacities and conditions
• Enforce sharing of ICT assets 
• Provide at least one connection 
type for users, but do not aim for 
comprehensive provision.
Summary performance evaluation of the transition strategies
Figure 120 presents the qualitative evaluation of the three transition strategies over the 
two time periods. As previously discussed, in the time-horizon of interest the assumption 
is that there are no foreseeable limits to meeting demand for ICT (with respect to supply). 
Thus, the three strategies perform equally well with respect to the capacity margin 
metric. Since the CI strategy results in greater investment, the resultant network and 
data provision coupled with new technologies results in greater costs and energy usage, 
particularly in a high growth scenario. Costs are reduced in both DC and CC strategies by 
adopting less sophisticated solutions to future demand growth. 
 
Figure 120: Summary 
visualisation of performance for 
the three transition strategies 
across the three scenarios for 
the time-periods of interest to 
2050.
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5.8 GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRANSITION 
STRATEGIES
This section considers what the three transition strategies might mean for the 
governance of UK infrastructures.
5.8.1 CAPACITY-INTENSIVE TRANSITION STRATEGY
The CI strategy is more focused on centralised options across sectors, both in terms of 
governance and technology. The aim is to minimise the capacity constraints on demand 
thus creating surplus capacity across the sectors and potential for unconstrained growth 
in supply of infrastructure services. The nature of the CI strategy also makes it capital 
intensive, with requirements for large-scale, ‘lumpy’ investments in new infrastructure.
Within the energy sector, the CI strategy would include the decarbonisation of the sector 
thus requiring large scale infrastructure investment in offshore wind, fossil fuel plants 
with carbon capture and storage, nuclear plants, etc. This suggests a governance strategy 
which reduces risk for such capital intensive investments, and focuses most on established 
utilities and other large investors that would make such investments. The current 
proposals for Electricity Market Reform are designed to do this, although questions remain 
about whether the chosen approach will reduce risks sufficiently for investors. Under 
this strategy, there may be a need to go further, for example, to a ‘single buyer’ model 
for electricity capacity investment. This would involve either government or an agency 
specifying what should be built and offering contracts to firms to deliver this capacity. 
The risks of this strategy are significant, for example, the predictions by the government 
or the agency of how much capacity is needed might be wrong. It may also mean much 
less (or no) emphasis on competition and a risk that assets would be ‘gold plated’ and 
more expensive than they need to be. It is less clear what this strategy means for gas 
infrastructure. It may mean a more permissive planning regime so that more gas import 
facilities, pipelines and storage facilities can be built (to the extent that they are needed). 
In the case of the water sector, water security is provided through capital intensive options 
such as leakage reduction, by asset management and renewal, or large scale inter basin 
transfers, intensified main replacement, and water treatment options such as desalination. 
These strategies may prove to be very instrumental in demand management particularly in 
areas with a high rainfall deficit such as the South East. However, the government’s ability 
to implement these centralised options in the current governance system is significantly 
determined by two main concerns: (a) the cost/ investments required for implementing 
these options; (b) the environmental impacts of the suggested options which may give 
rise to public opposition. These concerns suggest a governance strategy that will use an 
amalgamation of regulatory change and incentives. To assure continued investment in 
modern and updated water and sewerage assets, the government would require a steady 
regulatory regime that continues to attract private investment and finance. Furthermore, 
investment in leakage reduction practises particularly in densely populated areas such 
as London, would require more government support for R&D and innovation to explore 
innovative ways to manage and renew pipes for leakage reduction in dense areas (in a cost 
effective manner). This suggests a governance intervention in amending the regulatory 
approach of Ofwat where regulators limit the scale of R&D investments in the water sector 
(by considering R&D expenditure as a part of the operating expenses) (Defra, 2011c). 186
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Furthermore, the adoption of capital intensive water treatment technologies such as 
desalination, UV disinfection, etc., may raise arguments around their high energy usage, 
and resulting greenhouse emissions that can have implications for the future adoption 
of these options. This suggests government strategies that incentivise the uptake of 
energy efficient and low carbon technologies in water infrastructure. This may require 
further reconsideration of the current regulatory approach. Ofwat performs the role of 
consumer champions and often accepts the water company plans or proposals if they 
seek full approval by customers. Ofwat expects the water companies to undertake a 
cost benefit analysis of each project that they propose and also consult these proposals 
and the respective costs and benefits with the customers. Whilst investment in water 
treatment, pumping mains, etc. directly impacts the users and they see value in such 
projects, investment in low carbon and energy efficient water infrastructure is not directly 
close to the needs of the users, as they are unaware of the indirect benefits of investing in 
low carbon infrastructure. This suggests a governance strategy that encourages the water 
companies to remove such information asymmetries by making the customers aware of 
the cost and benefits of investing in low carbon water infrastructure. Furthermore, Ofwat 
indirectly happens to encourage technologies that are more in line with core business of 
the water sector such as CHP, thus companies see no incentives to harness more renewable 
sources in the water sector. This suggests policy attention towards enhancing Ofwat’s 
cross-sectoral perspective so as to ensure the uptake of sustainable capital intensive 
transition strategies. 
Within the waste sector a CI strategy would include investment in low carbon technologies 
and infrastructure for waste treatment as well as energy recovery. The current system 
fairly achieves the waste reduction and recycling targets through significant investment 
in processing and treatment facilities over the last 10 years. This includes use of various 
pre- treatment and treatment technologies such as MBT, MHT, AD and composting. 
However, in terms of resource/energy recovery from waste, the UK lags behind many other 
EU countries. One of the barriers to the development of waste to energy infrastructure is 
its susceptibility to planning barriers such as opposition from local populations (Tunesi, 
2010). A governance strategy that overcomes limitations such as local opposition, would 
require efforts towards removing information asymmetries between local communities 
and government agencies. Additionally, another option would be to further strengthen 
the authority of the central planning structure to discourage local objections. A stronger 
planning guidance to local authorities so that they have a presumption in favour of 
facilities such as EfW and AD plants can also be implemented. Large scale uptake of newer 
technologies for energy recovery such as Advanced Thermal Treatment (ATT) plants with 
Combined Heat and Power including gasification, pyrolysis, etc., also require governance 
intervention to attract Private Finance Initiative (PFI) funding. Demonstration projects are 
needed to prove the commercial viability of new technologies to investors. Alternatively, 
long term contracts with Waste Disposal and Waste Collection Authorities for specific 
volumes of waste may provide some long term certainty to commercial firms to invest 
in such facilities (Kern, 2011). In addition to removing financing and planning barriers, 
government intervention to enhance energy recovery would require more synergies 
between recycling, which is overseen by local authorities, and the residual treatment by 
the private sector. Currently there appears to be a missing link between these two waste 
streams and the public and private actors engaged in these waste streams (Tunesi, 2010).
Within transportation the capital-intensive strategies would likely include investment 
in capacity enhancement of transport infrastructure in rail, road, airports, ports, etc. 
Specific attention would be placed on the decarbonisation of surface transport through 
the improved efficiency of conventional vehicles, and increasing the spread of electrical 
vehicle infrastructure. 187
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The governance strategy would also need to go ahead with the implementation of 
proposed schemes such as the construction of Crossrail and successor urban rail projects, 
and investment in a more extensive interurban High Speed Rail Network.
However, decarbonising transport infrastructure would require specific government 
intervention in order to remove barriers to investment in green infrastructure (such as rail 
and vehicular electrification). Governance intervention designed to enhance investment 
in rail electrification would require the removal of policy uncertainties and procurement 
barriers for the investors and the other actors within the supply chain. A recent BIS report 
highlights that policy uncertainty around the electrification programme, which was ruled 
out in 2007 and regained importance later, discouraged investors, due to lack of direction 
and the associated risks, and acted as a barrier to future growth of electrified transport 
(BIS, 2011a). The High Speed Rail Network on the other hand has received committed 
policy direction reflected in proposals for HSR-2. However, government intervention is 
required to do away with weaknesses within the procurement processes to enhance the 
uptake of High Speed Rail and rail electrification. Also, the procurement process should 
be able to engage more innovative small companies working in the area of low carbon 
infrastructure, whose engagement and visibility seems to be lacking under the current 
system (BIS, 2011a). A recent joint study funded by DfT and ORR also recommends that 
the government may impose less prescriptive franchises procurement so that the Train 
Operating Companies (TOCs) have more flexibility to react to market conditions (DfT and 
ORR, 2010). 
The uptake of Electric Vehicles (EV) will also require governance intervention, particularly 
to help establish new charging infrastructure where this is required. Though increasingly 
there is a view that home charging for people with parking at their home would be a good 
way to get round the need for a national charging infrastructure. However, this would only 
work for people who do limited mileage between charges, and not necessarily for long 
distance journeys by EV. Having said this, it is a capital intensive transition strategy and it 
is therefore the one most likely to involve investment in a national network of charging 
and/or battery swap stations on motorways. In the absence of complete investment in 
EV infrastructure, it is feared that behavioural change amongst the users to switch to 
EV will be very difficult. For example, currently there is still a lack of clarity about who is 
best placed to provide and maintain public and outdoor recharging posts (POST, 2010) 
Governance changes are needed to provide market signals and further the development 
of prototype arrangements which encourage growth in the supply chain and investments 
for the EV industry. The high initial investment required by the users has also been a major 
deterrent for the uptake of the technology. To address these costs, further Government 
intervention can be used to provide incentives and subsidies for using EVs (for example, 
tax credits for buying EVs, etc.). 
Further government attention may be needed to remove uncertainties associated with 
the unintended consequences of the uptake of EVs. The increased uptake of the EV in the 
future may result in a reduction of emissions at the start, but may have rebound effects if 
consumers start overusing these vehicles due to a total reduction in their fuel cost (Sorrell, 
2010). This may cause stress on both electricity and road infrastructure. Government 
intervention may be introduced to balance technological advances with mechanisms such 
as road user charges, High Occupancy Vehicle fast lane programme, etc. Furthermore, the 
increased use of EVs may induce high scale use and demand for energy. Thus government 
intervention may require a balanced approach synergising Electric Vehicular use with use 
of other alternative fuels such as biofuels and encouraging the use of mass transit.188
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: CHAPTER 5
In the case of Road Infrastructure, supply side measures alone seem to be unrealistic. 
Governance suggestions would thus include efficient operation, maintenance, and better 
use of existing assets. 
Capital Intensive strategies for ICT and digital technologies include comprehensive 
national coverage with high investment in digital technology infrastructure such as high 
speed broadband. This will also include promoting the resilience of networks by involving 
multiple networks from different providers. This would require increasing the coverage, 
speed and reliability of data networks in all forms of digital communication. For superfast 
broadband network, the private sector has been very instrumental in making ample 
investment in the past and has allocated investments for the future as well (HM Treasury 
and Infrastructure UK, 2010a). However, policy and regulatory attention may be required 
to provide support and spread coverage in areas which are difficult to serve (for e.g. 
rural regions where it is uneconomical for the private sector to invest). This may require 
Ofcom’s regulatory intervention in allowing the private companies to get access to the 
existing networks and infrastructure. Furthermore, the scale and fast rollout of fixed line 
network infrastructure is largely limited by availability of skilled human resource (such as 
IT specialists and engineers) (BIS, 2011a). Government support may be secured to enable 
comprehensive investment in professional training schools to provide with IT specialists 
and engineers. 
The increased demand for mobile and broadband networks require installation of new 
infrastructure such as base stations, networks, and up gradation of existing networks. 
Planning permissions required to acquire right of way access to install or upgrade 
infrastructure for broadband and mobile networks, hinder the rollout of technology 
required to meet the market demand causing impediments for the network operators (BIS, 
2011a). Governance intervention to make the planning process less cumbersome may 
suggest network companies to use the same network as used by the water and sewerage 
companies. The use of already laid network may help the network operators get access 
to the existing ‘right of way’ instead of entering into a new process for acquiring planning 
permissions.
5.8.2 DECENTRALISATION TRANSITION STRATEGY 
The DC strategy emphasises utilisation of decentralised technological options and exploits 
beneficial local interdependencies between electricity and heat, energy and solid waste as 
well as wastewater and water. 
In the case of energy these decentralised technologies will include micro-generation, 
onshore wind, anaerobic digesters (biogas), and solar (both PV and thermal) technology. 
A key question in this strategy is whether infrastructure can be significantly decentralised 
without governance also being decentralised. If governance also needs to be decentralised 
– which is likely, at least to some extent – this implies radical change as local actors would 
not only invest in infrastructure, but also finance and regulate it. Local Authorities would 
be granted more power and influence over energy system development and regulation. 
Local utilities might start to proliferate, perhaps in some cases part owned by Local 
Authorities. This may also imply greater variation across the UK in governance – with some 
areas pursuing the decentralisation of governance whilst others being less enthusiastic. 
Another potentially important implication is a breakdown in traditional divides from a 
governance perspective – between generation, networks and supply to consumers. More 
integration of generation and network operation might be expected, building on the 
Low Carbon Networks Fund experience. This would mean changes for Ofgem such as a 
relaxation of rules that discourage network companies from investing in generation. The 
strengthened role for local government within this strategy might mean limits to Ofgem’s 
jurisdiction – or perhaps even its abolition. 189
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Similar trends may be seen in the water sector too where localisation of water measures 
(such as local level domestic water storage, grey water use, sustainable urban drainage 
strategies) may direct towards localised decision-making, regulation, financing and 
investment. For example, development of rainwater harvesting systems in new 
developments has sprung up with initiatives by local developers, local authorities and 
regional water companies. Kingspan Water is one of the water companies which have 
supported the installation of an integrated rainwater harvesting system in the new 
housing development called Severnside Housing in Ford, Shropshire. Although various 
such strategies have sprung up at the local level so as to increase local water resilience, 
the sustainability or the large scale uptake of these options is under question. A larger 
uptake of such decentralised options in newer developments would require government 
action towards building synergy between local water infrastructure planning and regional 
spatial planning (which requires policy intervention as Regional Spatial Strategies have 
most recently been revoked). Barriers such as high individual costs, maintenance burdens, 
and lack of reliability of supply may manifest in sustainability of decentralisation options. 
This may suggest governance strategies that provide household level incentives such 
as subsidies or allowing payment of RWH installation costs in instalments. For example, 
Infrastructure UKs suggestion on water savings through household efficiency can be 
encouraged under a joint energy and water programme within the Green Deal (HM 
Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010a). Furthermore local support agencies may be 
established that provide free maintenance services for such options. These local level 
strategies are expected to be very instrumental in ensuring local supply management; 
nevertheless, in order to ensure reliability and security of supply, it is essential that the 
centralised infrastructure is maintained in synergy with the decentralised system. 
For waste, governance intervention may include measures that enable greater investment 
in local treatment/disposal systems, and encourage localised treatment (i.e. thermal 
processes utilising CHP and MBT for the purpose of producing SRF). Local councils are 
responsible for contracting new waste infrastructure, providing planning permissions, 
etc. Therefore, the achievement of local infrastructure objectives largely depends 
on governance strategies that support local authorities. This would imply genuine 
decentralisation of decision-making under this strategy such that local authorities are 
free to decide what they would like to do with their waste, without interference from 
the central government. Strategies could include government measures to ensure the 
adequate availability of finance for local authorities. The Waste Infrastructure Development 
Programme (WIDP) established by Defra in 2006 has been instrumental in encouraging 
local authorities to develop the large scale infrastructure required to treat waste, by 
helping them access Private Finance Initiative (PFI) credits and promote a supply chain 
for building treatment and disposal facility such as SRF (Tunesi, 2010). However, in 
the 2010 Spending Review, the government has cut the PFI credits for waste disposal 
investments for new incinerators and MBT plants from seven councils. The 2011 waste 
policy review recommends governance strategy to promote more collaboration between 
local authorities and private companies in times of funding cuts in order to ensure better 
economies of scale through combined efforts, increasing cost effectiveness, and increasing 
efficiency through combined procurement partnerships (Defra, 2011b). Incentives are 
likely to be used in this strategy to encourage the local adoption of technologies such as 
AD and which may increase the investment in AD and other similar technologies.
A decentralised governance strategy could also include reducing the institutional gap 
between local waste authorities that develop waste management strategies and spatial 
planning authorities. When waste strategies are disjointed from spatial planning of waste 
management facilities this fragmentation acts as a barrier to acquiring planning permits 
for plant sites (Tunesi, 2010). Furthermore, governance intervention is required to develop 
common visions between local authorities and private actors. 190
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The government in its recent initiative has attempted to reduce procedural burdens on 
local authorities which allows them to develop partnerships between local authorities 
and private actors and ensures cost effective waste management. These burdens include 
reducing the data requirement from local authorities and ending the Landfill Allowance 
Trading Scheme by 2012–2013 which had been useful in the past but was acting as a 
barrier for local authorities (Defra, 2011b). Additionally, the Treasury might also allow local 
authorities keep some of the income from the landfill tax that is collected within their area 
and this income could then be used to invest in alternatives to landfills. 
Within transportation, the DC strategy include measures that promote a modal shift 
towards the local energy efficient options such as short range Electric Vehicles for urban 
use light rail and tram systems, and walking and cycling. The government strategy 
suggests soliciting the support of local authorities towards planning infrastructure for 
Electrified Vehicles and cycling. The implementation of the DC strategy will also require 
refined cooperation and facilitation by local authorities to large-scale modal shift from 
cars to public transportation through incentivised car sharing and bus usage. The recent 
Transport White Paper clearly recognises the crucial role of local governance to achieve 
the UK’s overall transportation goals (DfT, 2011a). The recent schemes introduced by the 
government, such as financial support for local authority transport schemes and the local 
sustainable transport fund, may be effectively used to support local transport priorities. 
Within this transition strategy, it is likely that the scope of local government involvement 
would be extended further, for example, to include the ability of Local Authorities to raise 
their own finance for public transport schemes through borrowing or specific local taxes 
(as London does now through the Congestion Charge).
ICT/ digital technology within a DC strategy may require technological diversification to 
meet specific needs at the local level (instead of requiring a standardised level of coverage 
across the UK). In order to encourage private investment in diversified technological 
ventures, governance intervention may be required to encourage the local authorities and 
the local society to identify specific needs and projects before beginning the procurement 
process. This shall reduce the unnecessary preliminary scoping hurdles for private actors 
that often act as a barrier for investments. Within this transition strategy, it is likely 
that local diversification may induce disparities between different regions in terms of 
infrastructure provision and access. 
5.8.3 CAPACITY-CONSTRAINED TRANSITION STRATEGY 
A CC strategy emphasises the reduced demand to the current level of capacity. There 
is no new capacity added in this strategy, though existing capacity is replaced when it 
reaches the end of the life, with low carbon technologies. Demand is reduced from both 
technology and policy options. The aim is to maintain security of supply through demand 
management. 
For energy this includes intensive demand management, and the replacement of nuclear 
and coal electricity capacity with gas-fired capacity which is less capital intensive. This 
strategy implies radical regulatory changes which would be likely to go well beyond 
current proposals such as the Green Deal (which will allow consumers will be able to pay 
back the costs of energy efficiency investments through their bills). For example, the UK 
could unilaterally tighten up appliance standards so that only the most efficient appliances 
can be sold. Building regulations would be more strictly enforced – with more stringent 
requirements for existing buildings enforced, for example, though a new home ‘MOT’ 
(Foresight, 2008). 191
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Governance changes might also include a shift to an integrated resource planning 
approach – with energy companies having a greater incentive to consider demand and 
supply side investments at the same time, and to favour energy saving more than they 
do now. Another possible governance change would be a greater commitment to green 
tax reform to increase prices to align them better with external environmental costs – and 
therefore to encourage efficiency. This would also be likely to require more emphasis on 
the fuel poor, and investing in poor housing stock so that high energy prices do not mean 
large bills. 
For water, governance changes may include measures that incentivise water savings or 
a shift towards regulations that compulsorily induce water saving. Metering is one such 
demand side option. Currently meters are installed by the companies on the voluntary 
demands of users. Compulsory metering is currently expected in those areas which have 
been legislatively declared as ‘water scarce’. Dover and Folkestone are the areas with 
such a designation so far. This strategy is likely to include universal compulsory metering, 
especially if voluntary uptake continues to be slow. However, the imposition of compulsory 
metering option may also face severe political criticism which may have implications 
on fully fledged implementation of metering. For example, it is argued that the 
implementation of compulsory metering system, may compromise the health standards 
of poorer families who shall restrict their usage of water. The roll out of smart meter and 
variable tariff rates have also been suggested as possible options to deal with such risks. 
Besides metering incentivising installation of water efficient fittings and appliances can 
be an effective demand management strategy. However, it is often refrained due to 
expensive costs of retrofitting in replacing old fittings. Innovative financing incentives can 
also be offered to the households in order to reduce the burden of costs. For example, two 
Australian companies, Yarra Valley Water and Sydney Water have developed new schemes 
such as the Ecosaver retrofit programme. This programme offers discounted loans to users 
on the condition that the savings are used for water efficient devices (House of Lords 
Science and Technology Committee, 2006). Similar incentives can be offered to enable 
water efficiency amongst households. Furthermore, the capital expenditure bias of some 
companies may discourage or dis-incentivise the implementation of voluntary demand 
measures. Radical regulatory changes may also be required to incentivise the water 
companies to implement the demand and supply measures in parallel to each other. 
For waste, the CC strategy will require government interventions that reduce the demand 
for waste services by promoting waste prevention, reduction, reuse, segregation, 
recycling, and resource efficiency. The Landfill Directive, which is intended to divert 
biodegradable waste from landfills by 2020, and the Waste Framework Directive that 
aims to ensure that by 2020, 50% of household waste is recycled and 70% of commercial 
waste is recovered, have been major drivers towards demand management strategies. 
The associated governance interventions require tackling waste management higher up 
in the waste stream both at the household and at the businesses level. Waste prevention, 
reduction, and recycling can be encouraged by carrot and stick measures and by removing 
information barriers amongst the users. Under the current system the public sees no 
incentive to prevent waste as they lack clarity about the cost of waste management. 192
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The governance changes might include using a ‘polluters pay’ principle or the introduction 
of a ‘unit based’ pricing system. For example, in the Netherlands pricing of rubbish 
generation is based on per unit (bags specially earmarked for rubbish) and has been an 
ongoing practise for decades. Based on a study of 428 Dutch municipalities, it has been 
shown that per unit pricing (in combination with the availability of alternatives such 
as kerbside recycling collection and home composting) has significant implications on 
changing user attitudes and reduces the amount of unsorted and biodegradables in 
general waste (Allers and Hoeben, 2010); however, it should be noted that Dutch per capita 
MSW arisings are almost 20% higher than in the UK (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 
2011), so their measures have had little or no effect on reducing MSW arisings. Unit based 
pricing is also considered equitable as households that produce less rubbish pay less. 
In addition to proposed waste reduction measures, there is also a need for regulatory 
support to avoid offences such as illegal dumping of waste. Fearing the problem of 
non-compliance, the recent waste review has abolished proposals to introduce new bin 
taxes for householders. Instead of charging, the UK waste policy places more emphasis 
on incentive schemes that reward or recognise good habits amongst waste generators. 
The recent waste review also aims to decriminalise household bin offences and reduce 
the burden of regulation on legitimate businesses whilst targeting those who are serious 
offenders (Defra, 2011b). The policy also suggests voluntary responsibility as a means to 
encourage recycling, waste reduction and resource efficiency within the business sectors 
such as hospitality, retail, construction, waste, direct mail, etc. Despite the known benefits 
of incentive based measures, their success largely depends on the behavioural and 
voluntary response of the users and they may or may not achieve the waste management 
targets in the most effective manner. Thus a governance strategy that uses a combination 
of incentives and pricing mechanisms alongside the continued imposition of landfill 
tax may be more effective at ensuring a reduction in waste and increase in recycling. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the comprehensive waste prevention programme (to 
be developed in 2013) alongside the use of the waste prevention fund proposed by the 
recent waste review may also encourage waste reduction amongst small businesses, social 
enterprises, and local authorities (Defra, 2011b). 
Within transportation, the CC strategy will include measures that reduce the demand for 
new transport infrastructure in the UK. Such measures will be needed to alter user choices 
to reduce demand and to encourage modal switching to public transportation and other 
sustainable modes of commuting. It is estimated that nearly two thirds of the journeys 
undertaken in the UK are under 5 miles and these can easily be done by walking, biking, or 
using public transport (DfT, 2011a). Behavioural change towards ‘smarter choices’, such as 
public transportation, sustainable workplace travelling, telecommuting and working from 
home, using car clubs, cycling, etc., require governance strategies that are more fine-tuned 
than simple information and awareness dissemination. Various systems (i.e. Sustainable 
Transport Systems) have been put in place by the government to promote these ‘softer’ 
measures. However, increased government support is required to enhance their uptake 
and address challenges such as growing population and emissions from transportation. 
Some government strategies suggest encouraging commuter behaviour towards 
enhanced bus usage. Past initiatives enhanced partnerships between local authorities and 
bus operators to improve the quality of bus travelling for users, which resulted in increased 
bus use (Sloman, 2003). Nonetheless, there is still a lot of potential for increasing bus usage 
by making buses more convenient and cost effective. One of the main deterrents of bus 
usage is the cost and inflexibility of fares. Reduced fares, discounts for multiple uses, and 
combined (single) tickets can be promoted for all modes of transportation (train, bus, etc.). 
However, the existing deregulation rules make it difficult to reduce prices in GB.193
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Government attention has also gone into the promotion of car sharing in UK. Decline in 
car ownership and car usage are the direct outcomes of car sharing. Significant impacts 
can be seen in countries like Switzerland and Germany where direct correlation exists 
between increase in car sharing (particularly among new car drivers) and reduced car 
mileage (Sloman, 2003). Government changes to promote car clubs/car sharing can 
include engaging local authorities to plan and encourage local car sharing, particularly in 
newer residential areas and amongst new car drivers. Learning from the Swiss example, 
partnerships can also be established between car club companies and railways to ensure 
smooth onward travel by users (Sloman, 2003). 
The shift to other transportation modes such as bicycling has been promoted by various 
local authorities but has only seen an increase in uptake in cities like Cambridge, Oxford, 
etc. The lack of designated biking paths and piecemeal biking infrastructure is often 
perceived as a safety concern by potential biker commuters. Government changes to 
enhance the uptake of biking culture require assigning more independence to local 
authorities in designing innovative bike plans, which are currently often hindered by the 
Highway Agency’s design standards for public spaces (Sloman, 2003). 
Employers can also play a very critical role in changing the behaviour of the employees 
towards car usage for work related travel. Governance initiatives to encourage employers 
include increasing the role of local authorities in facilitating companies to get bulk 
discount deals from public transport operators within their region. Employers can also 
encourage a ‘work from home policy’ on certain days or whenever possible. 
Finally, the continuation of toll charges and road pricing schemes could also lead to 
reduced demand for road infrastructure in some areas – even if there is a switch to 
technologies such as electric vehicles that have the potential to lower emissions.
The CC strategy for ICT/digital technology includes investment in maintenance of 
existing infrastructure and sharing of assets and networks between companies in the ICT 
sector and amongst ICT companies and utility providers. This would imply governance 
intervention to encourage solutions that promote sharing of infrastructure and ICT assets. 
As with demand management measures in other sectors such as water, it is likely that any 
restrictions imposed by government or by infrastructure providers would lead to political 
controversy. Governance mechanisms would be needed to negotiate which services and 
groups of users might be affected.
5.8.4 COMPATIBILITY OF CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS 
Having set out some of the potential governance implications of the three transition 
strategies, it is then important to analyse how compatible they are with the current 
governance system. One important general consideration is the phenomenon of lock-in 
that was mentioned earlier in this report (Unruh, 2000). For some UK infrastructures, 
lock-in to particular forms of provision and technologies – whether they are centralised or 
decentralised for example – might make some transitions more difficult to implement than 
others. 
With respect to the energy sector, there are a range of policy changes being implemented 
including Electricity Market Reform (DECC, 2011e) and the Green Deal for energy 
consumers. Looking at the package of current and announced policies as a whole, a 
number of observations can be made about the transition strategies: 194
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•  The CI strategy most closely matches the direction of current policy. The Electricity 
Market Reform proposals in the White Paper ‘Planning our electric future’ (DECC, 
2011e) are designed to foster new investment in large scale low carbon electricity 
supply technologies such as offshore wind, nuclear power and carbon capture and 
storage. 
•  The White Paper also discusses the potential for demand side flexibility, which could 
be said to be more in line with the DC or CC strategies. However, there is a lack of 
detailed policy proposals in the White Paper that might unlock this potential. Other 
policies such as Feed in Tariffs for micro-generated electricity and the Green Deal are 
more in line with the DC and CC strategies. 
•  The CC strategy is reflected to some extent in current changes to policies and 
governance arrangements. But it would require much more emphasis on policies to 
promote energy efficiency, and perhaps to reduce energy demand. In the Electricity 
Market Reform White Paper, the government acknowledges that more action is likely 
to be needed to support energy efficiency in households for example. 
•  Lock-in in the energy sector is a particularly important consideration. The 
historical momentum of the UK energy system – particularly the electricity sector 
– has meant increasing centralisation (Foresight, 2008). This applies both to the 
technical architecture of the system (with, for example, large scale power plants 
and centralised networks) and the governance of it (largely through national and 
international policy frameworks, actors and institutions). Despite recent moves 
by government to recognise the potential of smaller scale energy generation and 
other local actions, this lock-in means that the DC strategy is likely to require more 
extensive governance changes than those currently envisaged. 
With respect to the water sector this should analyse the extent to which the three 
strategies represent continuity or change with respect to the current proposals for water 
sector reform.
•  The current policy direction has significantly promoted a twin track approach 
where capital intensive strategy can go hand in hand with demand management 
(as reflected in Defra’s Future Water Strategy) (Defra, 2008). However, in practise the 
twin track approach is not being used in parallel. The CI strategy closely matches 
the strategies adopted by the water supply companies to date, where water 
policies and strategies are closely geared towards supply fix and capital intensive 
solutions. For example, the construction of water resource infrastructure during the 
pre-privatisation era and the construction of treatment plants under the influence 
of EU obligations. Leakage reduction through asset management and infrastructure 
renewal has also been a priority for Ofwat’s regulation. Various fines have been 
imposed on utilities like Thames Water, United Utilities, etc., for failure to meet leak 
reduction targets.
•  The growing scarcity of water in summer months, particularly in some regions, is now 
directing water authorities towards water efficiency solutions (Capacity-Constrained 
solutions). This is evident within the Water Resource Management Plans developed 
by various Utility companies, particularly in the South East region. Despite the 
growing attention towards demand management strategies, it appears from the 
recent views of Waterwise (in the Ofwat review), that Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 
bias is one of the main disincentives for some companies to engage in demand side 
efficiency measures (Defra, 2011c).195
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•  Presently, most of UK’s water systems use fairly centralised technologies that 
have proven to ensure economies of scale. However, recent initiatives in local 
decentralised level water and wastewater management have emerged where the 
local water authorities are encouraged to coordinate with water companies, local 
developers, the Environment Agency, and the users to bring forward proposals 
in promoting more sustainable surface water drainage systems. In contrast to the 
conventional method which allows the surface water to run through drains causing 
pollution, drain flooding, and wastage of water, the Sustainable Urban Drainage 
Strategy (SUDS) aims to promote new options such as permeable paved roads, 
rainwater harvesting, ponds and wetlands, etc. which reduce or prevent run off. This 
is one of the local strategies if implemented effectively may help (in reducing the 
central burden) in reducing water treatment costs, flood management costs, and 
reusing harvested water at the household level (CIRIA, 2007). 
•  Thus a policy shift towards more decentralised technologies and the CC strategy is 
becoming evident. 
With respect to the waste sector, we intend to analyse the extent to which the three 
strategies represent compatibility with current waste management system and current 
proposals for the waste sector reform.
•  The past and the existing system significantly match with the goals of a DC strategy 
with an element of capital intensive investments. The recent government waste 
policy review by Defra (2011b) stresses continued support for local authorities in the 
provision of waste infrastructure and meeting the obligations required under the EC 
Landfill Directive (Defra, 2011b). The Waste Infrastructure Development programme 
(WIDP) established by Defra in 2006, has also been very instrumental in encouraging 
local authorities to develop the large scale infrastructure required to treat waste 
through helping them access the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) credits and promote 
a supply chain for building treatment and disposal facility such as SRF (Tunesi, 
2010). However most recently the level of financial support has gone down and 
more emphasis is being given to targeting waste at the highest level of the waste 
hierarchy (Defra, 2011b). Another barrier to development of waste infrastructure is 
its susceptibility to the planning barriers due to opposition from local population. 
The planning act that was introduced in 2008 was one such initiative that 
provisioned a more transparent, faster, and efficient planning system for Nationally 
Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs), such as energy, transport, water, waste, 
and ICT. The act also reformed the public consultation process whereby it laid 
greater onus of public consultation on the promoter of the infrastructure projects 
(CLG, 2011). However, in reality it has been unable to achieve swifter planning for 
infrastructure projects (Moor, 2011). Further changes were introduced in 2010 with 
the new localism bill which abolished the Infrastructure Planning Commission 
(IPC) and appointed responsibility for decision making in infrastructure projects 
to government ministries. It is believed that the 3 month time limit for ministerial 
signoff for infrastructure projects may ensure timely decision-making (CLG, 2011). 
However, it is feared that increased community powers through referendums and 
neighbourhood planning under the localism bill may constrain the development 
of infrastructure projects and thus a dual approach that incentivises community 
acceptance of infrastructure projects and timely decision-making is essential. For 
example, the use of incentives (as suggested by the APSRG) such as offering discount 
on household utility bills to areas that allow establishment of new infrastructure or 
local shareholding schemes such as the community ownership of wind turbines in 
Cumbria (APSRG, 2010).196
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•  Recent attention is being given to tackling waste at the topmost level of the 
hierarchy. Thus, the CC strategy closely matches the proposed future policy 
direction reflected in the Government Waste Policy Review by Defra (2011b). 
The review particularly prioritises the prevention of waste followed by other 
subsequent activities as reuse, recycling, waste recovery, and lastly waste disposal. 
The government has also introduced reward and recognition based incentives 
for businesses and households that may induce demand management and more 
responsible behaviour towards waste management. Voluntary Responsibility 
agreements are expected to be signed with businesses in the sectors such as: 
hospitality, construction, direct mail, etc. Government has also proposed to introduce 
the comprehensive waste prevention programme (to be developed in 2013) 
alongside the availability of waste prevention fund in order to encourage waste 
prevention amongst small businesses, social enterprises, and local authorities (Defra, 
2011b).
•  In transportation, the CI strategy closely matches the past governance direction. 
Publicly funded road building and widening measures has significantly dominated 
the past supply side measures. However, these supply solutions and their inability to 
deal with congestion issues clearly reflect the lack of realistic strategies to deal with 
transportation issues. Gradually investment in capital intensive rail infrastructure 
received significant attention. Proposals for Crossrail and High Speed Rail network 
in the High Speed Rail white paper 2010 are the recent initiatives that will induce 
investment in capital intensive infrastructure. The DfT White Paper on Transportation 
‘Creating Growth Cutting Carbon’, 2011 further makes suggestions for decarbonising 
transportation by public transport investment, electrification of key rail routes, and 
High Speed rail for long distance travel (DfT, 2011a). 
•  The DC strategy is now being reflected to a large extent in the recent transport White 
Paper (2011) that clearly recognises the crucial role of local governance to achieve 
the UK’s overall transportation goals (DfT, 2011a). The schemes introduced by the 
government, such as financial support for local authority transport schemes and 
the local sustainable transport fund, give clear indication of the important role local 
governance can play to support local transport priorities.
•  The CC strategies such as shift to use of public transportation are largely discussed 
in the transport White Paper and local policy decisions; however, the current 
pricing of public transportation often discourages users to use buses and trains. 
This is particularly due to the existing deregulation rules that make it difficult to 
reduce prices in GB. Biking is also used in a limited scale due to inadequate biking 
infrastructure. The limited infrastructure such as biking paths are often hindered by 
the Highway Agency’s design standards for public spaces.
With respect to the ICT/digital technology sector, the CI strategy closely matches the 
direction of current policy in digital technology. Government is investing around  
530 million pounds to ensure comprehensive coverage of broadband service along with 
superfast broadband (BIS, 2011a). The government also published a National Broadband 
Strategy in 2010 which provides a detailed account of the support available for broadband 
vision (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010a). However, large scale spread of mobile 
and broadband networks require installation of new infrastructure such as base stations, 
networks, and up gradation of existing networks. The existing planning permissions to 
install or upgrade infrastructure requires various ‘right of way’ clearances that may hinder 
the comprehensive coverage programme (BIS, 2011a).197
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5.9 CROSS-SECTORAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES
As previously mentioned, the transition strategies focus on exploring the dimensions of 
investment level and decentralisation by design. Key questions of interest to stakeholders 
and decision makers can be analysed by choosing strategy options from aims that aligns 
near the boundaries of the continuum of these dimensions.
 
What are the implications of growing demand for infrastructure services? 
High growth in demand for infrastructure services is associated with increasing costly 
needs for infrastructure provision, in particular given the CI and DC transition strategies, 
but high growth in demand is associated with scenarios in which more resources would 
be available for infrastructure investment. High growth in demand is also associated 
with higher GHG emissions, unless the CI transition strategy is adopted, in which case 
innovation and investment enables a successful transition to infrastructure systems that 
are all effectively decarbonised. Higher transport demand is associated with increased 
transport congestion even given a CI approach to transport infrastructure provision, as, 
without demand management measures, demand continues to expand to fill the available 
capacity. 
What are the implications of constrained investment in UK infrastructure capacity?
Evaluating the performance of the CC strategy provides insight into the implications of 
constraints on investment levels for NI. For example, in the water sector the CC strategy 
requires vigorous price and regulatory measures, over many years, in order to achieve 
the per capita water demand target of 110 l/d. Security of supply is eroded, especially in 
high growth scenarios. The CC strategy is the least cost approach, as costly supply-side 
measures are avoided through demand management. However, whilst demand reduction 
can under some circumstances result in efficiency improvements without deterioration 
in the quality of the infrastructure service (for example, by building insulation reducing 
requirements for space heating), in other sectors, notably transport, stringent demand 
reduction will have implications for the economy and society. 
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What are the implications of a carbon-constrained future? 
As a consequence of the Climate Change Act (2008) the UK is committed to a reduction 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of at least 80% (relative to of 1990 levels) by 2050. 
Increasing global demand for fossil fuels at a time of reducing global oil reserves 
reinforces the case for reducing dependence upon fossil carbon. The UK’s GHG mitigation 
commitments imply a major restructuring of the UK’s energy supply infrastructure and 
ripple through other NI sectors, which are all dependent upon energy. Changes within 
these sectors in turn influence the energy sector, in particular in the case of a transition to 
electric vehicles. For both wastewater and solid waste, there is the potential for the energy 
demand from these sectors to be met through conversion of the waste streams to energy. 
What are the implications of a decentralised National Infrastructure system? 
The FTA revealed that reorientation towards a decentralised arrangement of infrastructure 
(both in terms of technology and governance) could result in NI performance increases. 
The energy sector analysis, for example, revealed that the DC strategy resulted in the 
greatest diversification of energy supply options. Decentralisation also has the potential to 
capitalise upon interdependencies (e.g. via local waste to energy conversion or combined 
heat and power plants) and provide new supply options (e.g. rainwater harvesting in the 
build environment). However, the evaluation of the cross-sectoral performance of the DC 
strategy indicated that there are significant front-loaded capital investment requirements 
to transition towards a decentralised arrangement, particularly in the high and medium 
growth scenarios.
What are the implications of interdependence between infrastructure sectors? 
Demand for different infrastructure sectors is highly correlated, both due to the final 
demand associated with population and economic growth and because of intermediated 
demands between infrastructure sectors. The FTA has revealed the importance of cross-
sectoral interdependence, in particular via energy demand from all sectors. Potential 
changes in demand (e.g. from electric vehicles and as a consequence of ICT) need to be 
accommodated in the energy sector. Changes in other sectors, for example in transport 
congestion or water availability will also have cross-sectoral impacts. The FTA has not 
revealed new opportunities that could be accessed by taking interdependence into 
account, though these may exist at the scale of individual facilities or infrastructure 
corridors. However, understanding interdependence is essential to avoid cross-sectoral 
demands that cannot be accommodated and to minimise the risks of infrastructure failure.199
The FTA has made important methodological first steps for the ITRC by: 
•  Establishing key definitions;
•  Establishing a framework for analysis of future drivers of change and 
their associated uncertainties;
•  Setting out common understanding of each infrastructure sector 
according to a consistent format;
•  Establishing understanding of interdependencies in demand between 
infrastructure sectors;
•  Analysing past and current governance arrangements;
•  Developing and analysing three integrated transition strategies;
•  Working collaboratively with ITRC stakeholder network to agree key 
principles, assemble knowledge and validate the analysis.
This initial analysis has helped to prioritise issues for further analysis in the next 4 years 
of the ITRC. Future research will develop advanced methodologies for analysing capacity 
and demand over the long term, building upon the FTA. In parallel the ITRC will develop 
methods for national strategic assessment of vulnerability and risk due to interdependence 
between networks and will pioneer work on understanding the co-evolution of 
interdependent infrastructure with the economy and society. The work will be brought 
together in two further cycles of national assessment, which will supersede the FTA by 
using more advanced models, datasets and infrastructure transition options. The next cycle 
of analysis will be delivered at the end of 2013. 
6.1 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE FTA
The FTA has accelerated the delivery of preliminary messages from the ITRC research 
programme to partners in industry and government. These messages are the results of 
the cross-sectoral review of the current status and governance of NI, and the exploration 
of future uncertainties in the demand and capacity of NI services. Backed by significant 
quantitative analysis, the messages serve to corroborate, or question the key assumptions 
and findings of earlier studies and reports on NI in GB. 
6  Taking forward the ITRC’s research  
  programme200
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It was critical that the ITRC fast-tracked these results, as the challenges facing NI are 
pressing and decisions about significant investments are presently being made. For 
example, an extra £5 billion of capital investment was announced in the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer’s autumn statement (2011), with a view to stimulating economic growth. 
The National Infrastructure Plan (2011) has stressed the urgency of measures to improve 
understanding of infrastructure provision and to mobilise investment. 
The FTA also facilitated early and intense collaboration amongst the members of the 
ITRC consortium, who are distributed across the UK, as are their partners in industry 
and government. As NI sector planning and design often occur in sectoral silos, this 
was particularly important to enable the cross-sectoral integration and analysis that 
the research programme aimed to achieve. The FTA ensured early and active guidance 
and input from partners in industry and government. This was critical to ensure that the 
models developed address the current and emerging challenges in the analysis, planning 
and design of national infrastructure. 
From a methodological perspective, the FTA was an essential first step of the ITRC research 
programme. The completion of the FTA established and illustrated key terms and concepts, 
such as the long term capacity, demand and performance of infrastructure services, and 
cross-sectoral transition strategies. Additionally, inconsistencies identified in the core 
methodology were recognised and addressed prior to large-scale implementation. 
WS1: Balancing infrastructure capacity 
& demand under uncertainty
WS2: Understanding future risks of 
infrastructure failure
WS3: Managing infrastructure as a 
complex adaptive system
WS4: 
Enabling 
tools
WS5: Developing integrated strategies for transitions in national 
infrastructure systems
Cycle 1 – Year 1
Fast track 
assessment of 
infrastructure 
futures
Cycle 2 – Year 3
Quantiƒed 
assessment 
using WS1 & WS4
outputs
Cycle 3 – Year 5
Quantiƒed 
assessment 
using outputs from 
WS1 to WS4
Figure 122: Overview of the ITRC 
Work Stream (WS) structure201
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6.2 DIRECTION OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
By design, the scope of the FTA was limited in order to complete the analysis on a short 
timescale. These limitations of the FTA will be addressed in the future work of the ITRC 
research programme focusing on balancing capacity and demand over the long term, 
planning for resiliency against risk, understanding the evolution of interdependent 
infrastructure with the economy and society, including feedbacks and constraints, and 
developing integrated strategies for NI provision.
Going forward, the ITRC is adopting three methodological perspectives in its development 
of tools for analysis of NI provision. The development of models and tools is taking place in 
the first three ITRC Work Streams (Figure 122).
6.2.1 CAPACITY AND DEMAND FOR INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES IN 
THE LONG TERM
For expediency, the FTA adapted pre-existing models for the evaluation of the capacity 
and demand for infrastructure services. However, most of these models were originally 
designed for use over short time horizons. Models that use elasticities for future demand 
estimation are often challenged for failing to account for step changes in behaviour or 
technology. Additionally, as the FTA was constrained to three demand scenarios, the 
exploration of uncertainties associated with future capacity and demand was illustrative 
rather than comprehensive. 
The next phase of the ITRC research will develop new models for the long term change in 
capacity and demand (under uncertainty) of NI as interdependent systems. In that sense 
it will resemble the FTA but will be based upon more quantified and more fully integrated 
models. 
Work Stream 1 (WS1) is developing a system of quantified capacity/demand assessment 
modules (CDAM ) for analysis of long term strategies for infrastructure provision. In that 
sense it will resemble the FTA but will be based upon more quantified and more fully 
integrated models including:
•  A micro-simulation model for generation of high resolution demographic and 
demand scenarios.
•  A regional economic model that will generate regional multi-sectoral projections of 
industrial demand for infrastructure services.
•  A model of the UK electricity and gas networks and a new disaggregated energy 
demand module.
•  A national strategic model of trunk road, rail, port and airport infrastructure.
•  A national water resources system model, coupled with a model of wastewater 
treatment systems.
•  A national solid waste assessment model.202
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Models will be geographically explicit at the national-scale. The identification of key 
interdependencies between sectors enable the models to be integrated as far as is 
necessary to capture salient behaviours and test integrated transition strategies. odels will 
be geographically explicit at the national-scale for energy, transport, water, wastewater 
and solid waste systems. The identification of key interdependencies between sectors 
enable the models to be integrated as far as is necessary to capture salient behaviours and 
test integrated transition strategies. 
In the following paragraphs, the limitations of the FTA modelling for energy, transport and 
water sectors is contrasted with the approach to be used in the next phase of the ITRC for 
illustrative purposes. 
6.2.1.1 Further development of drivers and scenarios
The FTA dealt with only three high level drivers of change, namely population, economic 
growth and global energy prices, along with the sector specific driver of climate change in 
the water sector. Work Stream 2 is extending this analysis to the secondary drivers listed 
in Table 4. These will be quantified and will provide the dimensions of a high-dimensional 
uncertainty sampling methodology. 
6.2.1.2 Regional multi-sectoral economic scenarios
The FTA has made use of the MDM regional multi-sectoral model of the UK economy. 
Three scenarios have been analysed, which are reported in detail in Annex D. These 
results provide the basis for the regional spatial disaggregated analysis that is now under 
way in Work Stream 1. The scenario space will be more extensively sampled and issues 
of consistency between the assumptions in the economic model and the infrastructure 
sectors (in particular the energy sector) will be addressed. 
Figure 123: The Generic ITRC 
Model Framework.
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6.2.1.3 Geographical patterns of urbanisation and demand
The FTA has made use of ONS population projections, with additional regional 
disaggregation. In Work Stream 1 this approach will be supplemented with a household 
level micro-simulation model. The model is expected to present similar aggregate results 
as ONS but much greater spatial disaggregation, allowing for detailed spatial analysis of 
demand for infrastructure services.
6.2.1.4 Energy 
Modelling the energy sector in the FTA adopted engineering-economy models (e.g. 
MARKAL) together with elasticity-based demand estimation. The econometric model has 
difficulty in incorporating step changes in drivers over the long term. Further, engineering-
economy models are not designed for disaggregated modelling. They assume a perfect 
market with no asymmetry of information, where technologies are chosen mainly on cost 
considerations. However, non-cost considerations such as economic, policy, or security 
factors (e.g. carbon targets) may take precedence over costs. Further, rather than using 
sector model output, the sector demand for energy was projected independently using 
the energy model. 
In the next phase of ITRC research, the energy sector will be modelled through the 
development of a demand and capacity model. The demand model will evaluate demand 
for a number of different energy services within each of seven sectors of the economy: 
residential, transport, industry and commercial services, agriculture, water, wastewater, 
solid waste, and ICT. As it will include cross-sector energy demand, the results of the 
other sectors will be used as input. These projections will be spatially explicit for the nine 
different energy carriers throughout GB. 
To evaluate the capacity for energy service, the next phase of research will use an extended 
version of the combined gas and electricity network (CGEN) model. This model provides 
a cost-minimal configuration and operation of the combined gas and electricity networks 
while meeting demand. The model consists of a load flow analysis of the electricity 
network and detailed modelling of the gas network including facilities such as gas storage 
and compressor stations. The interaction between the two networks is through gas turbine 
generators connected to both networks.
6.2.1.5 Transport
There are a number of limitations to the transport modelling in the FTA (e.g. using a 
constant elasticity model designed for marginal changes). As the model is being used 
to examine non-marginal changes, it is likely that elasticities would vary with price and 
income levels. For road and rail, the FTA attempts to incorporate the impact of supply-
side constraints on demand and have shown these constraints to be significant even with 
low demand growth, indicating that infrastructure is already stressed. However, the FTA 
does not introduce supply-side constraints for airports and seaports, but rather suggests 
capacity caps. The treatment of the FTA in road and rail does not consider intermodal 
cross-effects (e.g. suppressed road demand, switching to rail, and suppressed rail demand 
switching to road). Finally, the FTA does not introduce spatiality into the model. 
Many of the limitations mentioned will be addressed in Work Stream 1 through the 
development of a strategic model based upon the principles of DfT’s Long Distance 
Model and Network Modelling Framework, plus specific demand forecasts for airports and 
seaports. The model will be spatially disaggregated, enabling analysis of bottlenecks in the 
network and the benefits of targeted provision of new infrastructure.204
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6.2.1.6 Water and wastewater
A national strategic model of water supply infrastructure will be employed which expands 
considerably on the notion of water supply infrastructure as expressed in the FTA. It uses a 
schematic spatial representation of the water supply infrastructure network, including:
•  Reservoirs;
•  Surface water abstractions;
•  Groundwater storage and abstractions;
•  Water treatment works;
•  Wastewater treatment works;
•  Demands representing a wide range of consumers from multiple sectors.
It is coupled to the UKCP09 probabilistic climate projections via a Weather Generator and 
a hydrological model to model explicitly the dependence of water resource on climate 
change at spatial and temporal scales relevant to long term planning scenarios (Figure 
124).
The demands for water and wastewater are closely related, as are the infrastructure 
networks providing the capacity to service those demands. At the level of abstraction 
programmed, future research models will incorporate the wastewater network as an 
additional layer of vertices and edges. These would represent wastewater treatment works 
and the collection network, respectively.
Hydrological model
Reservoir resource
River resource
Groundwater resource
Water treatment works/
desalination plant
Distribution network/
demand centre
UKCP09 probabilistic climate projections
Weather Generator
Figure 124: Water model for 
use in the future ITRC research 
programme.205
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6.2.1.7 Implementation of the integrated assessment
 These models will be coupled in an overall simulation framework in which the main 
scenario uncertainties are extensively sampled, expanding upon the small number of 
scenarios analysed in the FTA. A set of infrastructure investment options will be developed 
for each sector and assembled flexibly into cross-sectoral packages, representing a 
major extension of the three transition strategies analysed in the FTA. New tools will be 
developed to explore and visualise the results of the analysis.
The interaction between this overall modelling system and the NI database being 
developed in Work Stream 4 (WS4) is illustrated in Figure 125. The WS4 database, which is 
built using an open source spatial database architecture, already contains more than 300 
different layers of infrastructure and demand data and is rapidly expanding. 
6.2.2 RESILIENCY AND RISK EVALUATION
The FTA has not examined in any depth the risks of infrastructure failure and the ways in 
which interdependence between infrastructures may exacerbate those risks. This topic 
is the focus of ITRC Work Stream 2 (WS2). Given the severe long term threats posed by 
climate change, WS2 has begun by focussing upon climate-related hazards, though 
opportunities to extend to other natural hazards and man-made hazards will be explored 
later in the research programme. Spatially coherent probabilistic scenarios of extreme 
climate related hazards and their associated uncertainties are being developed. Working 
with our industrial partners and building upon previous studies, WS2 will characterise the 
vulnerability and interdependence of energy, transport, water, waste and ICT systems. 
High resolution  
demographic projections
Regional multi-sectoral 
economic model
National 
infrastructure
database and
analysis 
archive
Module for:
1  Sampling scenarios &
  uncertainties 
2  Specifying options & strategies 
  for infrastructure provisions
3  Specifying CDAM model runs
4  Post-processing & visualising 
  results
Capacity/Demand Assessment 
Module (CDAM) for each NI sector
Energy
Transport
Water & wastewater
Solid waste
Figure 125: Structure of the 
system of assessment models 
and databases now under 
development in Work Streams 
1 and 4 of ITRC  ICT is excluded 
from the capacity/demand 
model development as the FTA 
has illustrated that new capacity 
is being provided for the 
foreseeable future and demand 
is very sensitive to unforeseen 
technological developments.206
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Central to WS2 will be the development and testing of network models for analysis 
of interdependent NI failure and risk. Quantification of the direct consequences of 
infrastructure failure will use the economic and demographic scenarios developed in WS1. 
The indirect economic consequences of failure and recovery will be analysed at regional 
and national scales using an input-output modelling approach. Results will be presented 
as a range of metrics of vulnerability and risk. 
ICT
Whilst ICT capacity will not limit the growth of the physical infrastructures, there are risks 
of cascading failure that will be explored in future research. The danger of malicious attack 
on infrastructures (e.g. energy) via ICT presents a serious threat (cf. Iranian story (Nicol, 
2011)). The risks associated with ICT arise from the interdependencies between ICT and 
the physical NI systems. ITRC will study chains of failures and make proposals as to how the 
risks can be reduced. While the progress of ICT opens up new possibilities (e.g. air traffic 
control systems make it possible to fly more aircraft safely through the same airspace), the 
dependability of such systems and strategies for addressing failures must be analysed, 
which will be undertaken by the ITRC in future research.
6.2.3 INFRASTRUCTURE AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM
Scoping of Work Stream 3 (WS3) is now under way, exploring a variety of complex 
systems approaches to simulate and interpret the long term interactions between 
infrastructure, society and the economy. The research in WS3 will start with exploratory 
simulations of synthetic examples and work up to more realistic models. Complex systems 
methodologies under examination include land use and transport spatial interaction 
models, dynamic network models and a variety of methods in evolutional economics. The 
most promising approaches will be tested in order to identify patterns of emergence and 
to understand how in the real world these new insights may be used to steer NI systems 
towards sustainable outcomes..
6.2.4 DEVELOPING ENABLING TOOLS
Work Stream 4 of the ITRC research programme is developing tools to support the model 
development activities elsewhere in the consortium. One such tool is the implementation 
of national scale spatial database to map the location and represent the properties 
of infrastructure assets and networks within the UK. This database will also explicitly 
represent the interdependencies that exist between infrastructure assets and networks to 
facilitate analysis by the simulation models developed in ITRC.
Future planned phases of development of the spatial database include: (i) full integration 
of project partner data on NI resources into the database (where feasible); (ii) development 
of interdependent NI network models in the database for simulation modelling; (iii) 
integration of spatial fields of current day and future predicted hazards including flooding, 
wind and heat; (iv) development of a suite of user interface tools for analysis, simulation 
and visualisation of the database contents.207
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6.3 TIMESCALE FOR DELIVERY
At the same time as the FTA, work has begun in 2011 in all of the other Work Streams: 
Work Stream 1:
•  The methodological framework for WS1 has been established and the modelling 
components that will fit within this framework have been specified.
•  A working simulation architecture for interaction between distributes assessment 
modules and the WS4 spatial database has been established.
•  A PhD project on long term appraisal of the benefits of interdependence is under 
way. 
Work Stream 2:
•  Methodological development in WS2 has begun, building upon several recent 
projects on infrastructure resilience.
•  PhD projects on reliability of ICT systems and resilience of interdependent networks 
are under way. 
Work Stream 3:
•  A scoping study of complex systems issues and methodologies to address in WS3 is 
under way. 
•  A PhD project on evolutionary economics is under way. 
Analysis of governance arrangements for infrastructure provision is also under way, 
building upon the governance analysis presented in the FTA. 
Figure 126: An illustration of the 
central role data plays in ITRC. 
Data is pivotal to providing any 
of the suite of tools required to 
assess the current and future 
state of national infrastructure.
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The first phase of development of the Work Stream 1 models is due to be completed in 
March 2013. These models will be used to conduct a much more complete and quantified 
national analysis of infrastructure transition strategies than has been feasible in the FTA. 
Our aim is to build upon the cooperation with partners in government and industry that 
was established in the FTA so that the second cycle of NI assessment further deepens our 
processes of co-producing knowledge. This co-production process will help to ensure that 
our research is directly addressing the UK’s infrastructure challenges, whilst also being 
recognised internationally for research excellence and impact. This second cycle of national 
infrastructure assessment is due to be delivered at the end of 2013. 209
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ABP  Associated British Ports
AD  Anaerobic digestion
APC  Air pollution control
ATT  Advanced thermal treatments (including eFw, gasification, plasma arc 
gasification, pyrolysis
BAA  British Airports Authority
BIS  Department for Business Innovation & Skills
BMW  Biodegradable municipal waste
BOD  Biochemical oxygen demand
C&D  Construction & demolition waste
C&I  Commercial and industrial waste
CAPEX  Capital expenditure
CAR  Compound annual growth rate
CCC  Committee for Climate Change
CCGT  Combined cycle gas turbine
CCS  Carbon Capture and Storage
CERT  Carbon Emissions Reduction Targets
CESP  Community Energy Saving Programme
CGEN model  Combined gas and electricity network model
CHP  Combined heat and power
CO2  Carbon dioxide
COD  Chemical oxygen demand
CPF  Carbon Price Floor
CST  Council for Science and Technology
DECC  Department of Energy and Climate Change
Defra  Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs
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DfT  Department for Transport
DNO  Distribution network operators
DSM  Demand Side Management
DUKES  Digest of UK Energy Statistics
DWI  Drinking Water Inspectorate
DWQR  Drinking Water Quality Regulator for Scotland
EA  Environment Agency
EC  European Community
EfW  Energy from Waste
ELV  End of life vehicle
EPBD  Energy Performance of Buildings Directive
EQS  Environmental Quality Standards
ESD  Energy Services Directive
EU  European Union
EU-ETS  EU Emission Trading Scheme
EV  Electric vehicle
FiT  Feed-in-tariff
FPL project  Future Price Limit project
FTA  Fast Track Analysis
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GHG  Greenhouse gas
GIB  Green Investment Bank
GLONASS  Russian owned GPS
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite Systems (US-owned GPS)
GPS  Global Positioning System
HEV  Hybrid electric vehicle
HS2, HS2+  High speed rail projects
HVO  Hydrogenated vegetable oil
ICE  Institution of Civil Engineering
ICE  Internal combustion engine
ICT  Information and Communication Technology
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IT  Information technology
ITRC  Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium
ITS  Intelligent transport systems
IUK  Infrastructure UK, part of HM Treasury224
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GREAT BRITAIN: GLOSSARY
LATS  Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme
LCNF  Low Carbon Network Fund
LCPD  Large Combustion Plant Directive
LDM  DfT Long Distance Model
LFG  Landfill gas
LNG  Liquid natural gas
LOLE  Loss of load expectation
MARKAL model  UKERC energy model
MBT  Mechanical Biological Treatment Facility
MDM-E3  Multisectoral Dynamic Model – Energy-Environment-Economy
MHT  Mechanical Heat Treatment Facility
Ml/d  Mega-litres per day
MRF  Material recovery facility
MSW  Municipal solid waste
Mt  Mega-tonne
MW  Megawatt
NETS  National Electricity Transmission System
NGO  Non-government organisation
NMF  Network Modelling Framework
NOx  Nitrous oxides
NRTS  National Rail Travel Survey
NRW  Non-revenue water
NTM  National Transport Model
O&M  Operation and maintenance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Ofcom  Office of Communications (communications regulator)
Ofgem  Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (energy regulator)
Ofwat  The Water Services Regulation Authority
ONS  Office of National Statistics
OPEX  Operational expenditure
ORR  Office of Rail Regulation
PFI  Private Finance Initiative
PHEV  Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle
PRP  Periodic Review Process
PV  Photovoltaic
R&D  Research and Development225
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RCV  Regulated Capital Value
RCV  Refuse collection vehicle
RO  Renewable Obligation
SEPA  Scottish Environmental Protection Agency
SRF  Solid recovered fuel
TEU  Twenty-foot (container) equivalent unit
UKCS  UK Continental Shelf
UKERC  UK Energy Research Centre
V2G  Vehicle to Grid
VOLL  Value of lost load
WASP model  Wien Autonomous System Planning
WEF  World Economic Forum
WFD  Waste Framework Directive
WID  Waste Incineration Directive
WIDP  Waste Infrastructure Development Programme
WRAP  Waste and Resources Action Programme
Capacity of infrastructure 
services
The extent and amount of activities that may be enabled. 
Demand for infrastructure 
services
The amount and extent of actions enabled by infrastructure services that consumers seek 
to conduct
Infrastructure  The collection of all physical facilities and human systems that are operated in a 
coordinated way to provide infrastructure services
Infrastructure Services The provision of an option for an activity by operating physical facilities and accompanying 
human systems to convert, store and transmit flow entities
National Infrastructure (NI) CST (2009) and Infrastructure UK (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2010b) adopted 
approach based on the five sectors and networks that directly contribute to the economic 
growth by providing infrastructure services. Composed of the five economic infrastructure 
sectors of energy, transport, solid waste, wastewater, water, and information and 
communication technology (ICT)
Scenario [planning] “…a strategic planning process that generates multiple stories about possible future 
conditions, allowing an organization to look at the potential impact on them and different 
ways they could respond.” (Stamatis, 2003)226
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Scenarios “…stories about the future, a way to understand the impact of conditions… [and] focus 
on the external world and the implications of alternative futures for the policies being 
considered.” (Bodde, 2007)
“…stories… of what might be. Decision makers use them to evaluate what to do 
now, based on different possible futures. The options for the future reflect either an 
extrapolation of current trends or introduced changes, such as policies and management 
plans… [and] they are most appropriate under conditions where complexity and 
uncertainty are high.” (Schoemaker, 1993; Wollenberg et al., 2000)
Supply of infrastructure 
services
The amount and extent of actions that are actually enabled
Transition Strategy Cross-sectoral strategic plans composed of sequenced sector-specific governance and 
technology options for national infrastructure oriented towards distinct aimsUK INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSITIONS  
RESEARCH CONSORTIUM 
The UK Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium is informing the analysis, planning 
and design of national infrastructure, through the development and demonstration of new 
decision support tools, and working with partners in government and industry.
The research is taking a national-scale ‘system of systems’ approach which integrates 
energy, transport, water, waste and ICT (Information and Communications Technologies) 
infrastructure.
FAST TRACK ANALYSIS
In its first year, the ITRC has begun the development of a new generation of simulation 
models for national infrastructure assessment that will be ready for piloting in 2013. In 
parallel the ITRC has undertaken a Fast Track Analysis (FTA) in order to: 
1.  Ensure that the ITRC research programme is building upon existing knowledge.
2.  Review and refine the scope of the ITRC research.
3.  Pilot and communicate new analysis concepts. 
4.  Strengthen the relationship between the research team and the consortium’s 
partners in government and industry. 
ITRC
A Fast Track Analysis of strategies for 
infrastructure provision in Great Britain
Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford. January 2012
ISBN 978 1 874370 49 9
www.itrc.org.uk